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Preface 
The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law 
were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution.  
First, it documented the rules of the official family law.  The problem that the 
study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking 
authority".1  Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa 
family law.  The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law 
was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" 
Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights.  Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and 
patriarchal. 
Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and 
enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law.  The study found that the 
Hananwas still observe their system of customary law.  However, there are 
visible changes.  For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity 
requirement for all customary marriages.  A parent or legal guardian must 
consent to a customary marriage of a minor.  The individual spouses, not their 
families, are parties to their own customary marriages.  African women enjoy 
equal status.  This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution 
read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.  
According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 
(CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another 
woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. 
However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights.  For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital 
children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet.  This 
discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the 
provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of 
Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. 
                                            
1 Costa 1998 SAJHR 525, 534. 
 iii 
The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par.  However, the 
courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the 
common law rules.  For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human 
Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of 
customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. 
The legislature could not be outdone.  A meticulous study of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of 
Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their 
provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate 
succession rules respectively.  The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, 
furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979.  Section 28 of the 
Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the 
fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law 
of parent and child.  The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the 
communal form of maintenance under customary law. 
Keywords 
Bill of Rights, capacity to act, capacity to litigate, divorce, emancipation, 
engagement, extramarital children, customary marriage, group rights, 
individualisation, individual rights, intestate succession, legal capacity, lobolo, 
maintenance, marital children, marital guardianship, natal guardianship, 
polygamy, polygyny, polyandry, spousal consent, spousal equality, parental 
consent  
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Glossary 
Hlatswadirope:  Sororate.  According to this custom, if a woman is barren the 
families negotiate an ancillary marriage involving the husband of the barren 
woman and her sister or close female relative for purposes of raising a seed for 
the house of the barren woman.  The ancillary marriage is a subsidiary to the 
primary marriage between the man and the barren woman. 
Go ageletsa motshidi:  Same as go beeletsa. 
Go beeletsa:  An act of betrothal. 
Go e gapa le namane:  When a man marries a woman who has extramarital 
children, the children become his children too. 
Go fiwa dipitsa:  To be released (emancipated) from the guardianship of the 
family head. 
Go kgopela sego sa meetse:  To ask for a hand in marriage. 
Go ntsha ngwana ntlong:  To take a baby out of a quarantined hut after the fall 
of an umblical cord. 
Go nyalwa ke lapa:  To be married to a house without a specific husband.  See 
ngwetsi ya lapa. 
Go thiba sefero:  Same as go beeletsa. 
Go tsena ntlong:  To take the widow of your close relative as a wife. 
Go tshabisa mosadi:  To elope. 
Go tsosa:  To raise the deceased by raising a seed for him or her. 
Lebitla la mosadi ke bogadi:  Customary marriage is a permanent marriage.  
Literally, it means the grave of a woman is at her marital family's. 
 4 
Lobolo:  Cash or kind in consideration of marriage. 
Magadi:  Same as lobolo. 
Ngwetsi ya lapa:  This is a woman who marries into a family without a male heir 
in order to raise a seed for the family.  The family will allocate her a tsena 
husband from among the closest relatives of the house to which she is married.  
The children of the house of the ngwetsi ya lapa belong to her house and not 
her tsena husband or his house. 
Seyantlo:  Levirate.  In the case of levirate, a sister or a close female relative of 
a deceased woman marries her widower in order to raise seed(s) for her sister 
or deceased relative.  The children of seyantlo belong to her deceased sister. 
Traditional leadership:  This is the leadership that governs communities in 
accordance with customary law and custom.  In accordance with the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Act 41 of 2003, the indunas are traditional leaders 
and chiefs are senior traditional leaders.  There are principal leaders to whom 
traditional leaders are subordinate.  There are also kings and queens to whom 
principal leaders report. 
Ukungena:  Same as tsena. 
Ukuvusa:  To raise a deceased person from the dead (to raise a seed for a 
deceased person).  Same as go tsosa. 
Ukuvusa husband:  Same as go tsosa husband. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW 
1.1 Introducing the issues 
In 2005, in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole 
and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another,1 the Constitutional Court had to decide 
whether or not to develop the customary rule of male primogeniture because of 
its apparent inconsistency with the constitutional right to equality.2  Besides the 
fact that the court, in Bhe, eventually found that the rule of male primogeniture 
as it applies in customary law to the inheritance of property is inconsistent with 
the Constitution and thus invalid "to the extent that it excludes or hinders women 
and extra-marital children from inheriting property",3 it also clearly came to the 
fore that the genuine rules of customary law are not always easy to find.4 
1.2 The problem statement 
South Africa is a multi-faith and multi-cultural society that has a multi-layered 
legal system shaped by a Constitution which is the supreme law of the land.5  
One of the layers of this legal system is customary law.  Customary law, in 
particular the living customary law, is community-based, unwritten and generally 
unknown to those who are not members of the community in which it is found.  
                                            
1 Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC).  Hereafter 
Bhe.  See also Bekker and Koyana 2012 De Jure 568, 571. 
2 The equality clause is contained in s 9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
hereafter the Constitution. 
3 For commentary on the customary law of succession, see, among others, Himonga 2005 
Acta Juridica 82; Rautenbach 2008 Electronic J of Comp L 1. 
4 See, among others, Heaton South African Family Law 206 and 210 and the authorities in 
it. 
5 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa; In re: Ex parte Application of 
the President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Hosten et al 
South African Law 1248-1249.  See also s 15(3) of the Constitution, which provides that 
the Constitituon does not prohibit legislation that recognises marriages under a system of 
religious law, customary law, traditional law and personal or family law. 
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The rules of customary law must be predictable and certain. 6   They must 
promote the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom as well 
as the spirit, object and purport of the Bill of Rights. 
Obviously, there are problems that affect the interpretation and application of 
customary law.  The first problem is that the official customary law is "corrupted, 
inauthentic and lacking authority".7  The second problem is that the rules of the 
living customary law are not always readily ascertained and, if they are, are not 
always ascertained with sufficient certainty.8  Just as the system of customary 
law mirrors what goes on in a community in which it is found,9 so the community 
itself is the main source of its own system of customary law.  Elias10 points out 
that the customary law of a given community "is the body of rules which are 
recognised as obligatory by its members".  Although customary law is known to 
recognise a group as a legal subject, the piercing of the corporate veil reveals 
that each individual member of the group "has fairly well-defined rights and 
duties".11  Koyana12 points out that law, in a real sense, "is a reflection of the 
way people live" and law, being a discovery more than an invention, has to be 
expressive of the value system of the society in which it is found.13  All law is 
generated by and develops within society.14  The genuine rules of customary 
law are flexible and adaptive.15 
Matthews16 points out that one of the ways of getting to know something of the 
mind of a people is through the study of their legal system.  The converse is that 
one of the ways of getting to know the genuine legal system of a people is 
through the study of something of their mind: their ways and wants.  A legal 
                                            
6 Grenfell Legal pluralism and the Rule of law 60-70. 
7 Costa 1998 SAJHR 525, 534. 
8 See s 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 55 of 1998. 
9 See among others S v Acheson 1991 2 SA 805 (Nm) 831A-B; Anyebe Customary law 7. 
10 Elias Nature of African Customary Law 55. 
11 Elias Nature of African Customary Law 82-83. 
12 Koyana Customary Law 91. 
13 Koyana Customary Law 156. 
14 Koyana Customary Law 156. 
15 Koyana Customary Law 157. 
16 Matthews Bantu Law 14-15. 
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system contains what a people considers to be worthy of preservation among its 
customs and practices.17  It is said that customary law is "a mirror of accepted 
usage".18  Anyebe19  points out that law "is an expression of the ideals and 
aspirations of [a] given people".  Salmond 20  points out that customary law 
embodies the principles of truth, justice and public utility.  Genuine rules of 
customary law reflect the soul of the society.21  The Constitution22 expressly 
provides that a court must apply customary law when it is applicable subject to 
the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.23  
The court, in S v Acheson,24 described our legal system as: 
[the] mirror reflecting the natural soul, the identification of the ideals and 
aspiration of a nation, the articulation of the values bonding its people 
and disciplining its government. 
The rules of customary law must pass the muster of the Constitution, in 
particular the Bill of Rights.25  The court must actually apply the genuine rules of 
customary law.  If those rules are not consistent with the Constitution,26 they 
must be developed27 or struck down to the extent of the inconsistency.28  The 
Bill of Rights29 provides, among other matters, that everyone is equal before the 
                                            
17 Matthews Bantu Law 14-15. 
18 Omidekun Owonyin v Omtosho (1961) AllNLR 304 309. 
19 Anyebe Customary law 7. 
20 Salmond Jurisprudence 203. 
21 Anyebe Customary law 21. 
22 For detailed discussion on the Constitution and constitutional law, see among others De 
Villiers Birth of a Constitution; Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law; Devenish 
Commentary; Currie and De Waal Constitutional Law; Motala and Ramaphosa 
Constitutional Law; Woolman et al Constitutional Law; Rautenbach and Malherbe 
Constitutional Law. 
23 S 211(3) of the Constitution; Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 
BCLR 243 (CC) (hereafter Gumede); Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African 
Customary Law" 43; Bekker and Van Niekerk 2009 SAPR/PL 206-222.  For further 
reading, see, among others, Kerr 1994 111 SALJ; Kerr 1997 SALJ; Kerr 2001 THRHR; 
Maithufi 1998 THRHR. 
24 S v Acheson 1991 2 SA 805 (Nm) 831A-B. 
25 Ss 2, 39 and 211(3) of the Constitution. 
26 See s 211(3) of the Constitution. 
27 S 8 read together with s 39 of the Constitution. 
28 S 39(2) of the Constitution; Mbatha 2002 SAJHR 260; Mbatha 1999 Bulletin 7; Bekker and 
Koyana 2012 De Jure 568-582; Rautenbach 2008 Electronic J of Comp L 1; Himonga 
2005 Acta Juridica 82. 
29 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
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law and has the right to equal and full protection and benefit of the law.30  
Justice Yacoob31 states that equality is a foundational norm and indispensable 
element of our constitutional order.  Mahomed DP (as he then was), in Fraser v 
Children's Court, Pretoria-North and Others,32 said: 
There can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very 
heart of the Constitution.  It permeates and defines the very ethos upon 
which the Constitution is premised. 
In Hugo33 the court stated that an equal society accords all its members as 
human beings "equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of 
particular groups".34 
The achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply 
inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that that is the goal of the 
Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.
35
 
Moseneke36 puts it thus: 
The Constitution set for itself the object of healing these divisions by 
establishing common citizenship in an undivided country which must 
strive to be united in its diversity.  It reaffirms our common conviction that 
South Africa belongs to all who live in it, that the choice we make is of a 
democratic and open society in which every citizen is equally protected 
by the law.  [My emphasis] 
According to Albertyn and Goldblatt, 37  transformation requires "a complete 
reconstruction of state and society, including redistribution of power and 
resources along egalitarian lines".  All forms of domination and material 
disadvantages based on gender, race, class and other grounds of inequality 
must be eradicated.38  Surprisingly, in Mthembu v Letsela39 the court, per Le 
                                            
30 S 9(1) of the Constitution. 
31 Yacoob "Some Perspectives" 1. 
32 Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria-North 1997 2 SA 261 (CC) para 20, 272A.  Hereafter 
Fraser. 
33 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC).  Hereafter Hugo. 
34 Hugo para 41. 
35 Hugo para 41. 
36 Moseneke 2007 Speculum Juris 4. 
37 Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 248-249. 
38 Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 248-249. 
39 Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 936 (T) 945E-946C. 
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Roux J, concluded that the customary rule of male primogeniture was not 
inconsistent with the Constitution.  In a follow-up case of Mthembu v Letsela,40 
the court again held that the rule was not against the principles of natural justice.  
In Mthembu v Letsela41 the court upheld the two Mthembu v Letsela decisions.42  
However, in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, 43  the court held that the male 
primogeniture rule was unconstitutional and invalid.  The Constitutional Court 
confirmed that the customary rule of male primogeniture is constitutionally 
invalid.44 
However, sight must not be lost of the fact that it is not easy to find and pin down 
the rules of the "living" customary law.  The Constitutional Court, in Bhe,45 
pointed out that the difficulty "lies not so much in the acceptance of the notion of 
'living' customary law … but in determining its content and testing it, as the court 
should, against the provisions of the Bill of Rights".  What complicates the 
difficulty is that, while some of the systems of customary law such as the Zulu 
law,46 Tswana law,47 Tsonga law,48 Ndebele law,49 Swazi law50 and Pedi law51 
are largely documented, others such as the Hananwa law remain 
undocumented and inaccessible to outsiders.  Although the rules of the 
Hananwa family law may be found and ascertained, it is not conclusively clear 
yet as to what would finally become of them when they are judicially subjected to 
the Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights, through whose prism they should 
be construed. 
                                            
40 Mthembu v Letsela 1998 2 SA 675 (T). 
41 Mthembu v Letsela 2000 3 SA 867 (SCA). 
42 See further Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 936 (T) 945E-946C; Mthembu v Letsela 1998 2 
SA 675 (T). 
43 Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2004 2 SA 544 (C). 
44 The Constitutional Court decision in Bhe is discussed in detail in ch 3 of this thesis. 
45 Bhe para 109.  Notes omitted. 
46 See, among others, Dlamini Ilobolo. 
47 See, among others, Schapera Tswana Law. 
48 See, among others, Hartman Tsonga Law. 
49 See, among others, Myburgh and Prinsloo Indigenous Public Law. 
50 See, among others, Nhlapo Swazi Law and Custom. 
51 See, among others, Monnig Pedi. 
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1.3 The aim of the study 
Against this background, this study seeks to determine, first, what the rules of 
the Hananwa family law are and, second, whether those rules are compatible 
with the Constitution. 
1.4 The research objectives 
In order to achieve this modest aim, the following research objectives are 
pursued: 
i. to establish the rules of the official customary family law and the "living" 
Hananwa family law respectively; 
ii. to determine whether the community still observes the rules of the 
Hananwa family law; 
iii. to document the most important rules of the Hananwa family law; and 
iv. to determine whether those rules of the Hananwa family law are 
compatible with the Constitution. 
1.5 The research methodology 
As stated above, Koyana points out that law, as a discovery more than an 
invention, is expressive of the value system of the society in which it is found.52 
Holmes53 argues that: 
The actual life of law has not been logic; it has been experience.  The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, borrowed out of [the] unconscious, even 
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have a great deal 
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which law shall 
be governed. 
The writer did not conduct an empirical enquiry in order to perform this research, 
but engaged in some unstructured face-to-face interviews of community leaders, 
                                            
52 Koyana Customary Law 156. 
53 Holmes The Common Law 1. 
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experts and community members over a long period of time.  The interviews 
were conducted in an informal, flexible and conversational atmosphere. 54  
Where the need arose, the writer solicited the services of assistants who 
enjoyed easier access to some of the community-based experts.  A list of a few 
of the selected informants and their standing in the Hananwa community 
appears at the end of this thesis.  Of course, the following factors limited the 
study, interpretation and application of Hananwa family law to a great extent: 
i. the shortage of literature on Hananwa family law; and 
ii. the generally oral nature of the Hananwa history, culture and religion. 
The writer reviewed a body of literature that comprised, among others, statutes, 
court judgments, commission reports, common law and customary law 
textbooks as well as related scholarly writings such as articles and court cases. 
1.6 The structure of the study 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 introduces customary law.  Chapter 2 sets out the general principles 
of customary law.  Chapter 3 deals with the forms of customary law.  Chapter 4 
deals with the official customary marriage.  Chapter 5 deals with the customary 
law of parent and child.  Chapter 6 deals with the general principles and history 
of Hananwa law.  Chapter 7 deals with the Hananwa customary marriage.  
Chapter 8 deals with the dissolution of a Hananwa customary marriage.  
Chapter 9 deals with the Hananwa law of parent and child.  Chapter 10 sets out 
the research findings. 
1.7 The significance of the study 
The study is significant for a number of reasons, for example: 
                                            
54 Choongh "Doing Ethnographic Research" 76. 
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i. In order to interpret the rules of customary law, and more specifically 
Hananwa family law, one has to know what the rules are.  One cannot 
interpret the unknown.  As far as it could be ascertained, there is a lack of 
documented information regarding the rules of the Hananwa family law. 
ii. Similarly, in order to develop customary law, particularly Hananwa family 
law, one has to know its content.  In acquiring such knowledge it is 
necessary to take into account such positive aspects of customary law as 
its flexibility and its consensus-seeking and group orientation to dispute 
resolution. 
iii. It is important to study the context in which the rules of customary family 
law operate by looking at the kind of community they serve. 
iv. There is a causal link between the changing circumstances of the 
community served by a particular customary law and the customary law 
itself.  In order to understand the living phenomenon of customary law, 
one must therefore study the effect of the changing circumstances of 
society on the rules of customary law. 
v. The rules of the official customary law have not kept pace with the 
changing circumstances of society.  It is important to determine whether 
the rules of Hananwa family law need to be changed or developed as a 
result of constitutional inconsistency.55 
vi. It is important to determine whether the Hananwa community observes 
official and or living customary law.  Generally, official customary law 
becomes ossified and obsolete over time.  It will be significant to 
determine whether this has indeed happened with Hananwa law.  
Communities develop new rules of customary law to regulate their 
changed circumstances.  The communities may make requisite legislative 
                                            
55 Heaton South African Family Law 206 para 17.2.1, in which the author indicates that it is 
difficult to ascertain "what the content of a specific customary law-rule is, for many of the 
official sources on customary law set out a version which is out of touch with current 
customary practices". 
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interventions.  However, the true community law is the living customary 
law because it keeps pace with evolving circumstances.  There is thus a 
need to find out what these changes are and to develop a knowledge 
base which is accessible to others. 
vii. Most notably, all versions of customary law must be compatible with the 
Constitution.  If incompatible, customary law is invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency.  It follows, therefore, that once one knows the rules of 
customary law it will be possible to develop them consistent with the 
Constitution. 
viii. A study of Hananwa family law has the potential to create certainty about 
its rules, which will be conducive to the general growth and development 
of customary law on a par with the common law of South Africa. 
ix. The documentation of the genuine rules of Hananwa family law will make 
it easier for the legislature to develop them consistent with the 
Constitution and/or legislation specifically dealing with customary law. 
x. In addition, the documentation of the rules of the Hananwa family law will 
make them readily accessible to the legal fraternity in general and the 
courts in particular. 
xi. The study might encourage the South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) and others to determine the rules of customary law of various 
other communities in South Africa to create more certainty.  However, 
care must be exercised not to perpetuate the ossification of customary 
law. 
1.8 Terminology 
Some of the terminology used in the study warrants some explanation.  In all 
other cases words and phrases will be defined when used for the first time. 
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1.8.1 Affiliation 
This is a custom in accordance with which an extramarital child is transferred 
from the guardianship of the family head of its mother to the guardianship of the 
family head of its father.  The primary requirement for the custom of affiliation is 
that the family of a biological father must pay special lobola for his extramarital 
child. 
1.8.2 African 
In this study the term "African" refers to Bantu-speaking peoples who generally 
live together according to communally accepted African customs and usages. 
1.8.3 Customary law, African law, African indigenous law, native law and 
Black law 
These terms are used interchangeably.  The definition of customary law in 
chapter 2 applies also to these other terms. 
1.8.4 Extramarital child 
This is a child whose biological parents were not married to each other at the 
time of its conception, birth or subsequently. 
1.8.5 Hananwa law 
This is a system of customary law according to which the Hananwa community 
lives. 
1.8.6 Hlatswadirope 
This is a woman who marries her sister's husband in order to raise a seed for 
her barren sister. 
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1.8.7 Male primogeniture 
This is a customary rule according to which a person succeeds the deceased by 
virtue of being the first-born son or senior male member of the family. 
1.8.8 Patriarchy 
The concept of patriarchy refers to the domination of society by men. 
1.8.9 Polygyny and polyandry 
There are two types of polygamy: polygyny and polyandry.  Polygyny is a 
marriage of one man to more than one woman.  Polyandry is a marriage of one 
woman to more than one man. 
1.8.10 Seyantlo 
This is a woman who marries her brother-in-law after the death of her sister. 
1.9 Concluding remarks 
The Constitution recognises both common law and customary law as equal 
parts of the basic law of the country.56  Customary law is subject to both the 
Constitution and legislation that deals specifically with customary law. 57  
However, the living customary law lacks certainty because it constantly evolves 
commensurate with the conditions of the society and varies from community to 
community.  In order to be able to determine their constitutionality, the rules of 
customary law must be found and ascertained. 58   The definition, sources, 
nature, status and application of customary law are dealt with in the next 
chapter. 
                                            
56 Bekker 2003 Anthropology Southern Africa 124-130. 
57 S 211(3) of the Constitution. 
58 S 1(1) Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 deals with the general principles of the official version of customary 
law.  Hananwa law falls under the broad concept of customary law.  It is thus 
important to know what exactly the meaning and scope of customary law are. 
2.2 Defining customary law 
Bekker and Rautenbach submit that there is a need to address and find a 
workable definition of customary law.59  Although there are many varieties of 
such definitions, there is some consensus on what customary law is.  In the 
following passages, reference is made to a few definitions.  According to 
Bennett,60 "[e]ven within Western jurisprudence, we should not expect to find a 
generally agreed definition of law". 
Matthews61 points out that the expression "customary law" is generally used in 
two senses in South Africa.  In the first sense, "customary law" means the 
indigenous system of customary jurisprudence existing among the various 
African communities of South Africa, while in the second sense "customary law" 
alludes to legislation that applies to Africans as a special grouping.62  Bekker63 
said the following about customary law: 
During the existence of the pre-colonial sovereign Black 'states', 
customary law was an established system of immemorial rules which had 
evolved from the way of life and natural wants of people, the general 
contexts of which was a matter of common knowledge, coupled with 
precedents applying to special cases, which were retained in the 
                                            
59 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" 17-19. 
60 Bennett Customary Law 11. 
61 Matthews Bantu Law 19-20. 
62 Matthews Bantu Law 19-20. 
63 Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 11. 
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memories of the chief and counsellors, their sons and their sons' sons, 
until forgotten, or until they became part of the immemorial rules. 
The living customary law is a non-specialised system of law that governs the 
conduct of and is binding upon members of a traditional community in which it is 
found.  Undoubtedly those rules evolve "from the way of life and natural wants of 
people".64  Save that it shows only implicit apparent regard for the communal 
orientation of customary law, Bekker's is quite comprehensive a definition of 
customary law.  Myburgh65 describes customary law thus: 
Indigenous law, meaning the traditional law of the indigenous peoples as 
adapted to change by themselves may be said to fall within the sphere of 
what is known in Germany as Rechtsethnologie or juristic anthropology. 
Myburgh's approach of sourcing customary law from the confluence of law, 
anthropology, linguistics and government seems to be the right one.  The term 
"traditional law" implies that customary law originates from a binding custom or 
usage which the community has traditionally observed to the extent that the 
custom or usage has become a part of the community's generally acceptable 
modus vivendi.66  According to Hamnett,67 customary law is "a set of norms 
which the actors in a situation abstract from practice and which they invest with 
binding authority".  This definition indicates that the rules of customary law bind 
members of a particular group because they accept them as obligatory. 
Customary law is a form of personal law.68  Mofokeng69 defines personal law as 
a system of law recognised by a traditional community as binding on its 
members "in accordance with the rules of an established and legally recognised 
custom". 70   However, it is submitted that even non-members may subject 
                                            
64 Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 11; Kleyn and Viljoen Beginner's Guide 96. 
65 Myburgh Indigenous Law 1.  Notes omitted. 
66 See Bennett Customary Law 1-5 and 20-23 for a discussion on the role of tradition in the 
making of customary law. 
67 Hamnett Chieftainship and Legitimacy 14. 
68 S 15(3) of the Constitution. 
69 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 1ff. 
70 See also the definition in s 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
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themselves to the customary law of that community.  Mofokeng sourced his 
definition, with express acknowledgement, from Bennett's.71 
In South Africa a number of acts attempt to define customary law as well.  For 
example, section 1(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 72  defines 
customary law as "Black law or customs applied by the Black communities in the 
Republic …".  The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act73 defines customary 
law as "the customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous 
African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the cultures of those 
peoples".  In line with this definition, section 1 of the Reform of Customary Law 
of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act74 defines "customary law" 
as "the customs and practices observed among the indigenous African people of 
South Africa which form part of the culture of those people".  Note, however, 
how the term "peoples" in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has been 
changed to refer only to the term "people" in the Reform of the Customary Law 
of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act.  The significance of this 
change is unclear.  Furthermore, section 1 of the Reform of the Customary Law 
of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act substitutes the word 
"practices" for the word "usages" and excludes the words "traditionally" and 
"and" which are included in the definition of customary law in the Recognition 
Act.  However, save to say that the words "practices" and "usages" are often 
used interchangeably in this thesis, the thrust of the exclusion of the words 
"traditionally" and "and" is equally unclear. 
In 1998 the South African Law Commission (as it then was)75 introduced a 
definition of customary law that discarded any reference to the obligatory nature 
of customary law.76  Some subsequent legislation applicable to customary law 
                                            
71 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 1ff; Bennett Customary Law 1. 
72 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
73 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (hereafter the Recognition Act). 
74 Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 
2009. 
75 Hereafter SALC. 
76 Bekker and Rautenbach Application of African Customary Law 19-20.  Notes omitted. 
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adopted a similar approach.77  However, the observation of a constitutionally 
valid customary law is mandatory.  For instance, the court may enforce the 
nomination of the successor to the position of the head of a household, family or 
community.78  In conclusion, customary law may be defined as a constitutionally 
and statutorily compatible system of personal law 79  of a particular cultural, 
religious or linguistic group whose body of rules the members of the group as 
well as consenting non-members recognise as obligatory.80 
2.3 Sources of customary law 
Olivier et al point out that customary law may be accessed through oral or 
written sources.81  According to Myburgh, "[s]ources may refer to origins or to 
stores of information, and may be termed sources of origin and sources of 
reference respectively". 82   While Myburgh lists custom and legislation as 
sources of origin, he regards the people themselves as the only sources of 
reference yielding data on customary law.83  Obviously, he is alluding to data 
collected by means of field work research methods. 84   On the other hand, 
Hosten et al85 categorise the sources of law into formal and material sources.  
While the formal sources of law are binding, law-generative or law-constitutive 
media,86 the material sources are the sources of law that put emphasis on the 
contents or materials of the rules of law.87   The sources of customary law 
include the Constitution, customs and practices, legislation, case law and 
                                            
77 For example, the Recognition Act; and the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession 
and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. 
78 Masela Mpolo v Cawe Nozihamba 1964 BAC 75 S. 
79 See, among others, s 211(3) of the Constitution. 
80 See ss 15, 30 and 31 of the Constitution. 
81 Olivier et al Indigenous Law 215-216. 
82 Myburgh Indigenous Law 50-51.  Notes omitted. 
83 Myburgh Indigenous Law 51. 
84 For a discussion of current data collection methods see Bennett Customary Law 23-33. 
85 Hosten et al South African Law 379. 
86 Hosten et al South African Law 379. 
87 Hosten et al South African Law 381. 
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commissions' reports 88  and textbooks written by legal and anthropology 
scholars.89 
2.3.1 Constitution 
The Constitution is the primary source of all law.  It empowers parliament and 
provincial legislatures to pass, for instance, legislation that deals specifically with 
customary law.90  It expressly recognises customary law91 and puts it on an 
equal footing with common law.92  It bestows power on a court, forum or tribunal 
to develop customary law in a manner that promotes "the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights" and "[t]he Bill of Rights does not deny the existence 
of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the 
Bill".93  It is thus an imperative source to determine the scope and application of 
customary law rules, and the development of these rules in line with the 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
2.3.2 Legislation 
Legislation derives its authority and validity from the Constitution.94  It overrides 
customary law and customs.95  Bekker and Rautenbach96 put it thus: 
Although the process to codify customary law by means of legislation has 
been criticized as an ossification of customary law, which is in essence a 
flexible, ever-changing legal system, it is still one of the methods to find 
at least the official version of customary law.  It is also a means to 
change or develop customary legal rules which are regarded as 
unconstitutional.  One example is the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act that regulates customary marriages in South Africa. 
                                            
88 See also Bennett Customary Law 23; Olivier et al "Indigenous Law" 6-7. 
89 Bekker and Rautenbach Application of African Customary Law 31. 
90 S 43 read together with s 211 of the Constitution. 
91 S 211 of the Constitution. 
92 Bekker 2003 Anthropology Southern Africa 124. 
93 S 39(3) of the Constitution. 
94 Ss 43, 44 and 104 of the Constitution. 
95 S 211 of the Constitution. 
96 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" 31. 
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Legislation is one of the methods that are used to find at least the official 
customary law.  It may also be used to amend or repeal customary law.  Bekker 
and Rautenbach97 put it thus: 
It is also a means to change or develop customary legal rules which are 
regarded as unconstitutional. 
Classic examples of national legislation that deals specifically with customary 
law are the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 98  the 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 
and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.  Examples of provincial 
legislation include the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law,99 the Natal Code 
of Zulu Law100 and the Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act.101 
2.3.3 Customs and practices 
The living customary law is founded on customs and practices.102  Customs and 
practices are basically binding social practices.  According to Van Breda v 
Jacobs,103 for custom to be recognised as obligatory and enforceable, it must be 
certain, uniformly observed for a long period of time, and reasonable.104  It must 
also be consistent with the Constitution and applicable legislation. 105  
Matthews106 points out that customs have to come to a certain standard of 
general acceptance and usefulness and be obligatory before they can be 
regarded as forming part of the law of the community in which it is found.  
According to Ubink, "custom, in order to be law, must be commonly believed to 
                                            
97 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" 31. 
98 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003. 
99 The KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985.  In terms of Proc 107 in GG 15813 
of 17 June 1994 the Act has been assigned to the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. 
100 The Natal Code of Zulu Law, 1987 (Proc 151 in GG 10966 of 9 October 1987).  In terms 
of Gen N R166 in GG 16049 of 31 October 1994 this Code has been assigned to the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal. 
101 Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act 6 of 2005. 
102 Soga Ama-Xhosa 130. 
103 Van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 330.  Hereafter the Van Breda case. 
104 Van Breda case 330. 
105 S 211(3) of the Constitution. 
106 Matthews Bantu Law 37. 
 18 
be obligatory".107  Nowadays some judges seem to prefer the application of the 
living version over the official version.108   In Mabuza v Mbatha109  the court 
rejected the submission that a cultural practice should be adhered to as a 
validity requirement for a customary marriage. 
Customs vary from community to community.  They are imprecise, 
flexible and liable to constant and subtle change.  Not only is the law 
diverse and volatile but it also exists in at least two versions.  The 
version usually relied upon by the courts and other state organs is a so-
called 'official law'.  This collection of rules [of official law] has been 
called into question by modern scholarship on the grounds that it is 
tainted by apartheid, out of date and a distortion of genuine community 
practice.  In consequence, a distinction is now generally drawn between 
'official' and 'living law', the latter denoting law actually observed by 
African communities.
110
 
According to the Constitutional Court in Shilubana v N'wamitwa,111 customary 
law must be determined by reference to both the history and usage of the 
community concerned.  The evidence of the history and usages of the 
community must be adduced.  Usually, the community would know their history 
and usage and recognise their law as being obligatory.  Juma112 says: 
African customary law is often perceived to be synonymous with culture and 
customs.  Its content is thought to be no more than a repertoire of traditional 
practices and customs that derive from culture and which dictate people's 
modes of behaviour.  That is why Eurocentric ideologues of the past century 
believed it had no role in matters of public law and commerce. 
Mofokeng113 submits that lawyers must always rely on this expert evidence to 
establish the following factors: 
i. whether a particular customs still exists or has fallen into disuse; and 
ii. whether such a custom is binding or merely optional to the community. 
                                            
107 Ubink In the Land of the Chiefs 221. 
108 Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T); Kewena v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 
771 (T); Mthembu v Letsela 1998 2 SA 675 (T); Metiso v Padongeluk Fonds 2001 3 SA 
1142 (T); Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C). 
109 Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C). 
110 SALC Project 90 18-19. 
111 Shilubana 13. 
112 Juma  2007 Speculum Juris 88, 92. 
113 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" 30. 
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Section 1(1) the Law of Evidence Amendment Act empowers a court to take 
judicial notice of customary law under which a particular community lives in so 
far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty.  The Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act further provides that customary law must not be 
considered to be repugnant to the principles of public policy and natural 
justice. 114   A court must, therefore, apply the contemporary version of the 
custom or usage.115  The custom or usage, as does living law, evolves to meet 
the demands of new communities.116  However, as explained in paragraph 2.6 
below, the court has no discretion to apply customary law instead of applicable 
legislation.  However, the legislation itself must be consistent with the 
Constitution. 
2.3.4 Case law 
Another source of law is judicial precedent, particularly the judgments of the 
High Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court.  According to 
Hosten et al,117 the doctrine of stare decisis is the cornerstone of orderly and 
systematic judicial adjudication.  The decisions of courts serve as precedents for 
future court proceedings within the judicial hierarchy.  In other words, the 
precedent system creates an authoritative hierarchy in the court decision-
making processes.  Accordingly, the decision of a higher court binds the lower 
courts.  In other words, the decision of a High Court binds all the courts 
subordinate to it within a particular jurisdictional division.  It is authoritative.  
However, the decisions of horizontal courts, in other divisions, are merely 
persuasive.  A high court may, where appropriate, depart from its previous 
decisions.  In any view, a full bench may overrule the decision of a single judge.  
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal binds all the courts except the 
Constitutional Court.  The decisions of the Constitutional Court bind all the 
courts in the country. 
                                            
114 See s 1(1) Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
115 Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C). 
116 Van Niekerk 2005 Obiter 474-487. 
117 Hosten et al South African Law para 4.3.2.2. 
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The precedent system was introduced into South Africa through the English 
law.118  Roman-Dutch law has no equivalent concept.119  The Roman-Dutch law 
courts merely regarded "a previous judgment as being of persuasive 
authority". 120   The adoption of the precedent system was, therefore, a 
divergence from the Roman-Dutch law practice.121  After the adoption of the 
precedent system, the judicial precedents began to play a decisive role in the 
development of South African jurisprudence. 
Bennett122 points out that the traditional authority courts are not bound by the 
strict rule of stare decisis.  This is aggravated by the general lack of written 
records of the court.  In contrast, the courts of state apply the precedent system.  
This is a common law approach to customary law.  In effect, the court decisions 
which had nothing to do with customary law are generally used to decide 
customary law disputes. 
2.3.5 Commission reports 
Former Commissioners, referred to as Native Commissioners, published various 
reports on aspects of customary law.  These reports still serve as valuable 
sources of customary law.  Sight must, however, not be lost of the fact that only 
constitutionally compliant reports may be accepted as a source of customary 
law.  The following are some of the commission reports:123 
i. Report of the Natal Native Commission, 1881-1882; 
ii. Report and Proceedings, with Appendices, of the Government 
Commission on Native Law and Customs, 1883, (Cape) (G4 OF 1883); 
iii. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission 1903-1905 with 
Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. 
                                            
118 Hosten et al South African Law para 4.3.2.2. 
119 Hosten et al South African Law para 4.3.2.2. 
120 Hosten et al South African Law para 4.3.2.2. 
121 Hosten et al South African Law para 4.3.2.2. 
122 Bennett Customary Law 3.  Notes omitted. 
123 Kerr Customary Family Law para G9. 
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The SALC (as it then was) had, in terms of its Project 90 on the Harmonisation 
of the Common Law and Indigenous Law, published a number of informative 
reports, inter alia:124 
i. Issue Paper 4: Application of Customary Law: Conflicts of Personal Law 
(1996); 
ii. Issue Paper 3: Customary Marriages (1996); 
iii. Discussion Paper 76: Conflicts of Law (1998); 
iv. Discussion Paper 74: Customary Marriages (1998); 
v. Report: Customary Marriages (1998); 
vi. Issue Paper 12: Succession in Customary Law (1998); 
vii. Report: Conflicts of Law (1999); 
viii. Discussion Paper 95: Customary Law: Administration of Estates (2000); 
ix. Discussion Paper 93: Customary Law (2000); 
x. Report: Customary Law (2003); 
xi. Report: Customary Law of Succession (2004). 
2.3.6 Textbooks written by legal and anthropology scholars 
According to Bennett:125 
When the process of colonizing Southern Africa began, all the customary 
laws of the region were unwritten … Hence the business began of 
capturing oral custom in written texts, so that the courts would have a 
single authoritative code of rules. 
Over many years, successive South African governments and legal and 
anthropological scholars documented customary law126 and attempted to ensure 
that "the courts would have a single authoritative code of rules".127  For instance, 
the Natal Administration commissioned a research into Zulu laws resulting in the 
                                            
124 These reports are available on the official website of the South African Law Reform 
Commission at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/index.htm. 
125 Bennett Customary Law 5. 
126 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" 31-32. 
127 Bennett Customary Law 5; Twining Place of Customary Law 32ff. 
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enactment of a code of Zulu laws.128 Presently, there has been a relative paucity 
of Malinowski-style129 field work studies of the living customary law.130 
Reference could be had to statute books and text books to ascertain the 
statutory and customary law taught in the universities.131  Although one can 
study tomes of law text books, case law and legislation dealing with customary 
law, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights may still be found to be out of touch 
with the customary law lived in the sanctuary of the villages.  Bennett states that 
before 1988 the courts treated customary law as if it was the same as common 
law custom,132 which had to be proven in court.133 
2.4 The status of customary law 
Section 11(1) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (BAA) regulated the 
official version of customary law after the former came into operation.  However, 
there was always a system of customary law that continued to exist adventitious 
to the province of state law. 134   Rautenbach points out that the status of 
customary law in South Africa has always been a controversial issue.135  Section 
54A of the Magistrates' Courts Act 136  repealed section 11(1) of the BAA.  
Furthermore, thereafter, section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act137 
repealed section 54A of the Magistrates' Courts Act 138  but retained the 
indomitable repugnancy clause with all its substance, spirit, purport and object. 
                                            
128 Bennett Customary Law 5; Twining Place of Customary Law 32ff. 
129 See Malinowski Crime and Custom. 
130 However, some academics still do.  For example, Whelpton has been doing field work on 
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According to Maithufi,139 customary law is the legal system that is generally 
applicable to the majority of the black population of South Africa.  Van Niekerk140 
puts it modestly as follows: 
Unfortunately, through the years, the existence of the unofficial laws was 
to a large extent ignored.  The perceived superiority of the imposed 
Western law prevailed and a legal order was created which is primarily 
suited to the needs of that section of the community whose traditions and 
way of life may be classified as Western and capitalist. 
At this stage, the authorities practised legal centralism.141  As time went on, the 
authorities accepted that the application of customary law was inevitable.142  
Bennett143 puts it thus: 
Initially at least, nineteenth century colonial policy on customary law was 
no more than a pragmatic response to the fact that governments were 
incapable of forcing a subject population to observe a completely alien 
legal regime.  Indeed, anthropologists could produce abundant evidence 
to show that, for nearly all Africans, customary law remained a primary 
source of regulation. 
However, the courts interpreted customary law consistent with the Roman-Dutch 
law.144  In their interpretation the courts changed customary law.145  According to 
the dictum in the decision of the Privy Council in Oke Lanipekun v Amao 
Ojetunde146 the policy of the British Government was to use native law and 
custom subject to British law.  Unsurprisingly, government recognised 
customary law albeit for selected and limited purposes. 147   The authorities 
                                            
139 Maithufi "Best Interests of the Child" 137. 
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treated customary marriages as mere sexual associations among "primitive" 
African communities.148  Customary marriages were deemed contrary to the 
Western conception of the principles of public policy or natural justice149 and the 
Marriage Act.150  Generally, the courts declared customary marriages invalid on 
the grounds that they were potentially polygynous.151 
2.4.1 The recognition of customary law 1652-1909 
When Jan van Riebeeck and company arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652, the various systems of customary law of the black people in Southern 
Africa were still completely unwritten.152  The law of the conqueror (common 
law) overrode the law of the conquered (customary law).153  The relationship of 
                                                                                                                                
customary unions as valid marriages.  S 56 Maintenance Act 23 of 1963 regarded 
customary marriages as valid for the purposes of maintenance claims against African 
men.  S 1 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 deemed a customary union to be a valid marriage.  
For the purposes of the status of a child as a marital child, s 1(2) Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 51 of 1992 regarded customary unions as valid marriages.  See ch 2 of 
this thesis for a detailed survey of the long distance covered from 1652 to the ultimately 
full and formal recognition of customary law effective from 1994.  However, it will soon be 
shown that the Constitution, legislation and court decisions which purport to equalise all 
legal systems such as common law, traditional law (customary law) and religious laws 
only scratch the surface of the inequalities of the erstwhile plural but unequal legal 
systems.  There is no responsible effort to achieve substantive equality within the 
conspicuous South African legal pluralism (i.e. equality of the contents and results of the 
comparative legal rules, norms, concepts and principles).  The Recognition Act and the 
Reform of Customary law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 
2009 equalise the rules of common law and the rules of customary law by transposing the 
rules of common law into the sphere of customary law.  Where there is a lacuna the rules 
of common law fill it and where the rules of customary law are incompatible with the 
Constitution, the constitutionally compatible rules of common law are transplanted to 
replace those of customary law.  See Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 
(W). 
148 In Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1886) LR 1 P & D 130, the court expressed its exclusive 
recognition of civil marriage between a man and a woman.  The Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
recognised only a civil monogamous marriage. 
149 See Seedat's Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 
1006 (A).  Generally, customary marriages and Muslim marriages were deemed to be 
contrary to public policy or the principles of natural justice.  Common law and the Marriage 
Act 25 of 1961 prescribe a monogamous marriage but proscribed polygamy (i.e. polygyny 
and polyandry). 
150 Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
151 Dlamini 1985 SALJ 701.  See also Dlamini "Family Law" 49.  The same fate befell 
religious marriages such as Muslim marriages.  See, for instance, Seedat's Executors v 
The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
152 Bennett Customary Law 5. 
153 Koyana 2002 Obiter 98-115. 
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inequality between common law and customary law was manifest in the 
inequality between the civil marriage and customary marriage.154  The colonial 
and, later, apartheid government accorded customary law an inferior status.155  
Koker156 puts it thus: 
Die inheemse reg mag egter nie toegepas word indien dit in stryd is met 
die beginsels van staatsgedragslyn of natuurlike geregtigheid nie. 
As Bennett explained, 157  the courts treated customary law as if it were a 
common-law custom. 158   Parliament passed statutes that treated customary 
unions as marriages only for the purposes of those statutes.159  During the 20th 
century the government attempted to equalise spouses.160  Du Plessis161 puts it 
thus: 
The history of the recognition of indigenous law in the Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Republiek followed a pattern very similar to that in the Cape Colony.  
Initially the indigenous law of black people was not officially recognized.  
By 1885 [legislation] was adopted which recognized it (in so far as it did 
not conflict with civilized standards as recognized by the state and "the 
civilised world"). 
The authorities regarded customary law as savage law or the "childish notions of 
an uncultured people".162 
2.4.1.1 The Cape 
Britain occupied the Cape Colony twice: first in 1795 and again in 1806 under 
the 1806 Treaty of Capitulation in terms of which Netherlands ceded the Cape to 
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157 Bennett Customary Law 44. 
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161 Du Plessis Introduction to Law 68. 
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Britain.163  Britain confirmed Roman-Dutch law as the basic law of the Cape 
Colony164 and retained the local laws as the basic laws provided they were 
suitably "civilized".165  The Cape Colony included areas inhabited by indigenous 
peoples (Khoisan and other ethnic groups which are now generally known as 
the Xhosas).  The official view of the Colonial Administration was that 
differences between "those who lived according to [customary law] were settled 
in principle according to the official law of the colony".166  The courts did, in 
exceptional cases, recognise African customs provided that such customs were 
not inconsistent with the perceptions of the colonists of "morality, the public 
interest and fairness".167  Allott168 points out that the colonial powers were in 
favour of partial recognition of customary law for the following four reasons: 
i. fear of discontent; 
ii. economic considerations; 
iii. treaties with traditional leadership; 
iv. the belief that English law was too advanced to be applied to the 
indigenous people. 
2.4.1.2 Natal 
The Zulu law was recognised in Natal and codified in 1878 and 1891.169  The 
codification of the Zulu law obviously led to its ossification.  The courts of the 
chiefs, magistrates and special African higher courts were conferred with the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases among Africans.  The traditional authority courts 
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were subordinate to the magistrates' courts.  Here customary law was also 
subject to the European version of morality, public interest and fairness.170 
2.4.1.3 Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) 
Initially, the ZAR did not officially recognise the customary law of the indigenous 
peoples within its "area of jurisdiction".171  However, by 1885 it had adopted 
legislation which recognised customary law in so far as it was not inconsistent 
with "the civilized standards as recognised by the state and 'the civilized 
world'".172  Polygyny and lobola were regarded as being contrary to "the civilized 
standards as recognised by the state and 'the civilized world'".173  The ZAR 
recognised the traditional authority courts and established commissioners' 
courts empowered to settle disputes among the indigenous communities.  
During this phase, the Western courts in the ZAR had no jurisdiction over the 
disputes among Africans.  Higher Courts in the ZAR were conferred with appeal 
jurisdiction over disputes among African people for the first time only in 1907.174 
2.4.1.4 The Orange Free State (OFS) 
The OFS never officially recognised customary law.175  However, the failure to 
do so does not mean that the traditional communities did not practise customary 
law.  They continued to live in accordance with their living customary laws in 
spite of the attitude of the foreign state in authority over them. 
2.4.2 The Union of South Africa 1910-1961 
The Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910 in terms of the 
Union of South Africa Act of 1909.176  The Union retained a hybrid of Roman-
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Dutch law and English law as the common law of the Union.177  The Union 
passed the BAA as a Grundnorm for the South African customary law.  In Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha,178 per Ngwenya J, the court stated that the recognition 
and application of African customary law in South Africa was controversial, 
spasmodic and inconsistent until 1927, when the Union of South Africa enacted 
the BAA.  African civilisation and, by extension, customary law were subject to 
Western civilisation.179  Grenfell puts it thus: 
The repugnancy clause meant that the common law had always been 
regarded as the 'dominant' system while customary law had been 
relegated to the position of 'servient' law, applying only to 'blacks'.180 
According to section 11(1) of the BAA, customary law was applicable on the 
proviso that it was not repugnant to the principles of public policy or natural 
justice.  First customary law had to be proven by means of expert evidence181 
and, second, if proven it had to pass the test of the repugnancy clause.182  In his 
interpretation of section 11 of the BAA in Ex parte Minster of Native Affairs: In re 
Yako v Beyi,183 Schreiner JA noted that when the law of the colonisers became 
the law of a colony difficult questions of policy arose as to the proper extent of 
recognition and use at any particular period of the customary law of the 
inhabitants. 
2.4.3 The Republic of South Africa 1961-1994 
In 1986, on the recommendation of the Hoexter Commission for the abolition of 
the separate jurisdiction of the commissioners' courts, Parliament enacted the 
Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act,184 which substituted section 54A(1) of 
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the Magistrates' Courts Act185 for section 11(1) of the BAA.  As explained in 
paragraph 2.4 above, in 1988, section 2 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
repealed section 54A of the Magistrates' Court Act.  However, the Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act adopted a similar repugnancy clause.  Section 1(1) of 
the Law of Evidence Amendment Act provided that a court may apply customary 
law provided that such customary law must not be opposed to the principles of 
natural justice and public policy and provided further that it shall not be lawful for 
any court to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar custom 
was repugnant to such principles.186  It subjects the application of customary law 
to the discretion of the court.  Academics criticised this reinforcement of the 
repugnancy clause.187 
2.4.4 The recognition of customary law, 1994 to date  
There are two successive authoritative sources of the recognition of customary 
law for the period effective from the 27th of April 1994, namely the Interim 
Constitution and the final Constitution.  Almost all independence movements 
had, upon attaining liberation, demanded that customary law be recognised as a 
starting point of legal harmonisation.188 
2.4.4.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 2000 of 1993189 
The Interim Constitution recognised customary law as a law forming part of the 
legal system of South Africa.190  Principle XIII provided thus:191 
The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
indigenous law, shall be recognized and protected in the Constitution.  
Indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognized and applied by the 
courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution 
and to legislation dealing specifically therewith. 
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The courts were to apply customary law subject to the fundamental rights and 
legislation specifically dealing with customary law.192  Section 181 of the Interim 
Constitution provides: 
(1) A traditional authority which observes a system of indigenous law 
and is recognised by law immediately before the commencement 
of this Constitution, shall continue as such an authority and 
continue to exercise and perform the powers and functions vested 
in it in accordance with the applicable laws and customs, subject to 
any amendment or repeal of such laws and customs by a 
competent authority. 
(2) Indigenous law shall be subject to regulation by law. 
According to Bekker, the Interim Constitution put the African customary law on 
an equal footing with common law.193 
2.4.4.2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996194 
The new Constitution follows the trend set by the Interim Constitution by 
expressly recognising customary law and putting it on a par with the common 
law.195  Section 211 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
1. The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution. 
2. A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may 
function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which 
includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those 
customs. 
3. The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals 
with customary law. 
Section 212 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
1. National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership 
as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. 
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2. To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of 
traditional leaders, customary law and customs of communities 
observing a system of customary law- 
a) national or provincial legislation may provide for the 
establishment of houses of traditional leaders; and 
b) national legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders. 
The Constitutional Court held, in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa; In re: Ex parte Application of the President of the Republic of 
South Africa,196 per Chaskalson P, that there is only one legal system in South 
Africa of which the Constitution is the supreme law:197 
I cannot accept this contention, which treats the common-law as a body 
of law separate and distinct from the Constitution.  There are not two 
systems of law, each dealing with the same subject-matter, each having 
similar requirements, each operating in its own field with its own highest 
court.  There is only one system of law.  It is shaped by the Constitution 
which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common-law, derives 
its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control. 
Section 39(2) and (3) expressly refers to customary law.  It may be argued that 
the Constitution gives recognition to official customary law only, especially in the 
light of the wording of section 211(3) and that the Constitution thus applies only 
to official customary law.  Kerr even suggests that customary law should be 
exempted from the Constitution.198  However, the exemption would result in 
leaving a whole body of "living" customary law outside the scope of 
constitutional scrutiny.  Although this scenario turned out not to be true,199 
section 2 of the Constitution is broad enough to subject living customary law to 
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the muster of the Constitution as "conduct" which must be consistent with the 
Constitution.  The Bill of Rights binds both law and conduct.200  Clearly, the 
Constitution recognises and has given proper status to customary law which is 
bound by the justiciable Bill of Rights.  The import of this binding by the Bill is 
that the organs of state and individuals living under customary law must observe 
the Constitution, in general, and the Bill of Rights, in particular. 201   The 
Constitutional Court in Alexkor v The Richtersveld Community 202  had the 
following to say: 
While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, 
it must now be seen as an integral part of our law.  Like all law it depends 
for its ultimate force and validity on the Constitution.  Its validity must now 
be determined by reference not to common law, but to the Constitution. 
Section 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy and 
applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all 
organs of state.203  Every law must be construed through the prism of the Bill of 
Rights. 204   Customary law must pass the muster of the Constitution. 205  
However, customary law is largely inconsistent with the constitutional values and 
the individual fundamental human rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights in 
chapter 2 of the Constitution.206  As explained above, Kerr207 holds a view that 
customary law must: 
... by virtue of the contradictions in the Constitution (which does not apply 
to South African common law) be exempt from being treated in the same 
way as South African common law although, of course, the values of the 
Bill of Rights may influence a court when it considers, in terms of its 
general powers, the direction in which customary law should be 
developed. 
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According to Lehnert, the expressive reference to the superiority of the 
Constitution in section 211(3) leaves it beyond doubt that the drafters of the 
Constitution did not intend to give customary law special protection.208  The 
Constitution, therefore, fully recognises customary law as a part of the basic law 
of South Africa on a par with common law.209  Section 2 of the Recognition Act 
read with section 15(3) of the Constitution accords full recognition to registered 
and unregistered customary marriages.210 
In Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others,211 the court 
said that the Constitution "acknowledges the originality and directiveness of 
indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system" and 
recognises customary law as "part of the amalgam of South African law".212  In 
Pilane and Another v Pilane and Another,213 the Constitutional Court said: 
It is [well-established] that customary law is a vital component of our 
constitutional system, recognised and protected by the Constitution, 
while ultimately subject to its terms.  The true nature of customary law is 
as a living body of law, active and dynamic, with an inherent capacity to 
evolve in keeping with the changing lives of the people whom it governs. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court said that the history of South Africa is 
replete with instances in which customary law was not given the necessary 
space to evolve, but was instead fossilised and "stonewalled" through 
codification, which distorted its mutable nature and subverted its operation.  It 
further said that the Constitution is designed, firstly, to reverse the trend of 
codifying customary law in a way that essentially distorts it and, secondly, to 
facilitate the preservation and evolution of customary law as a legal system that 
conforms to the provisions of the Constitution. 
                                            
208 Lehnert 2005 SAJHR 244-245. 
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2.5 The nature of customary law 
Customary law is "a separate legal and cultural system which may be freely 
chosen by persons desiring to do so".214  Differently put, it is a "parallel system, 
different in concept and effect",215  which exists in a multi-cultural society in 
which various other legal systems are observed.216  Myburgh217 states that the 
divisions distinguishable in customary law are those typical of legal systems.  
The main divisions are public law and private law.  These divisions comprise 
various sub-divisions.  It is worth mentioning that, as shown later, customary law 
is underdeveloped and obscurely categorised.  In South Africa the "other" legal 
system is the common law.  Needless to state that common law constitutes a 
constitutionally recognised legal system218 which has its own area of application, 
rules, categories, concepts and principles, among others.  It is a hybrid law219 
that applies to South Africa without discrimination and to the exclusion of no 
community of people.  On the other hand, customary law has its own, unique 
salient features as well as its own sphere of application.  The central feature is 
that customary law consists of various systems of law, each regulating a 
particular indigenous community.220  Hosten et al221 put it as follows: 
The South African legal system is a mixed or hybrid system that has 
been likened to 'a three-layered cake' which consists of Roman law, 
Dutch and English law.  It would be appropriate to add a fourth layer, 
namely [customary] law, since a large proportion of the South African 
population adhere[s] to its principles.  However, indigenous laws 
(variously termed autochthonous, customary and African customary law) 
have, in the past, not been recognised as part of the general law of the 
land but only as part of a special system of law. 
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In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa; In re: Ex Parte 
Application of President of RSA222 the court declared: "all law derives its force 
from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control".  Maithufi223 puts it 
thus: 
Side by side with customary law exists what is termed the common law 
of South Africa.  This system of law is of Western origin in that its main 
source is Roman-Dutch tradition, coupled with certain influences of 
English law.  This is the law that is applicable, with a few exceptions, to 
the whole population of South Africa.  Courts in South Africa may 
therefore apply this system as well as customary law. 
The African peoples224 share common features.225  These commonalities are 
also manifest in the various systems of customary law.226  Hosten227 lists the 
following features: 
i. the communal character of the law. 
ii. the oral nature of the law. 
iii. the lack of abstract concepts. 
iv. a group as a legal subject. 
v. shared duties and rights. 
Customary law has the following salient features:228 
2.5.1 Specialised and non-specialised systems of law 
Common law is an example of a specialised legal system.  This is a developed 
system of law.  Its rules are, generally, readily ascertainable from legislation, 
judicial precedents, text books and, in some countries, codes of law. 229  
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Customary law is an example of a non-specialised system of law.  It is generally 
unwritten and does not have immutable rules.  Each system of customary law 
specifically applies to the community in which it is found. 
2.5.2 Language as a medium of description 
The Kenyan writer, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, says the following about language:230 
One of the basic, most fundamental means of individual and communal 
self-realisation is language.  That's why the right to language is a human 
right, like all the other rights, enshrined in the Constitution.  Its exercise in 
different ways, communally and individually chosen, is a democratic 
right. 
Language is an aspect and carrier of culture.  A dominant language reflects the 
superiority of its cultural basis and context.  The teaching and learning of 
language are accompanied by a direct or indirect teaching and learning of a 
culture of which the said language is part.  The marginalisation of a language 
translates into the marginalisation of the embodied culture.  For instance, in 
South Africa the English language in its varied social, political, economic, legal 
and other manifestations reflects the dominant Western culture.  Rukuni231 puts 
it thus: 
I also realised that the schools and the curriculum had become one big 
education system that created a bias to leave behind our Afrikan culture, 
and learn to live according to a Western culture.  Schools were basically 
used to wipe out our culture by teaching that the Western culture was 
supposedly more modern and therefore more advanced. 
English and Afrikaans were the exclusive official languages in South Africa for a 
long time.  This official status assured them of dominance in the government 
and business domains, at least.  It is noteworthy that, while Afrikaans is the 
mother-tongue of the Afrikaners and some coloured communities in the country, 
English enjoys a comparatively universal use by all races.  Moreover, English is 
a medium of instruction in many educational institutions, especially former black 
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universities and schools.  The sources of the official version of customary law 
are written in English and Afrikaans for obvious reasons.  Two of those reasons 
are: 
i. English- and Afrikaans-speaking peoples have been the dominant 
components of the South African nation for many centuries; and 
ii. most of the founding scholars in customary law are either English-
speaking or Afrikaans-speaking. 
The recorders of the systems of customary law see it "through the prism of legal 
conceptions that were foreign to customary law".232  It is for this reason that 
customary law is infused with structures, systems, concepts and principles of 
common law and not vice versa.  One notable exception is the African principle 
of Ubuntu, which has been seeping into the South African legal system through 
judicial adjudication and jurisprudence since 1994.233 
Bennett234 correctly points out that the practice of using European languages as 
a medium of description of customary law is firmly entrenched, both in legal 
practice and scholarly writings.  He indicates, furthermore, that the use of 
European languages is justified on the grounds that the use of vernacular is 
counterproductive, when a text is intended to be read by an international 
audience.  The disregard of an African language as a medium of description has 
provided impetus to the hegemony of European languages and European laws. 
It is submitted that, though it is a fact that customary law may be relatively more 
accessible to the international audience if it is written in English, it is not obvious 
that the use of Afrikaans as a medium of description improves the accessibility 
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of customary law to international audience.  The following points, among others, 
are noteworthy: 
i. First, unlike English, Afrikaans is neither an international nor a European 
language.  The Apartheid government purposefully elevated Afrikaans to 
the level of an official language as well as of one of the languages of 
instruction in public institutions of learning.  However, just as Afrikaners 
resisted Anglicisation, so Africans resisted "Afrikanerisation".  The 
imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools 
triggered the Soweto student riots which began on the 16th of June 
1976.235 
ii. Second, as Afrikaans is a foreign language in the international 
community, it would be illogical to justify its use instead of the vernacular 
as a medium of description of customary law on the grounds that 
Afrikaans has an international audience. 
2.5.3 Constant change and development 
The definitions of customary law show that it is not a static but a dynamic law.  
Bennett236 puts it thus: 
The most striking feature of nearly all customary laws is the fact that, in 
their original form at least, they are unwritten.  Laws of this nature have a 
distinctive character.  In the first place, they are, at one and the same 
time, both young and old.  Although the legitimacy of custom depends on 
its age, customary law is always up to date, because, ancient though it 
may seem, no custom is ever older than the memory of the oldest living 
person.  Systems of custom therefore have the remarkable ability of to 
allow forgotten rules to sink into oblivion, while simultaneously accepting 
new rules to take their place, always on the understanding that the new 
is old. 
According to Olivier et al237 the following factors contribute to the evolution of 
customary law: 
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i. changing community views and the demands of a changing world; 
ii. contact with societies that function within other legal backgrounds; 
iii. contact with and being influenced by other legal systems; and 
iv. the direct and indirect influence of foreign (non-indigenous) government 
structures. 
2.5.4 African government and administration 
While in the Western democratic system of government, the governmental 
authority is vested in the three branches of government, namely the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, in terms of the doctrine of the separation of power,238 in 
the African traditional system of government there is no separation of power.239  
Mandela240 describes a traditional community system thus: 
The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the whole 
tribe, and there was no individual ownership whatsoever.  There were no 
classes, no rich or poor and no exploitation of man by man.  All men 
were free and equal and this was the foundation of government.  
Recognition of this general principle found expression in the constitution 
of the council, variously called Imbizo, or Pitso, or Kgotla, which governs 
the affairs of the tribe.  The council was so completely democratic that all 
members of the tribe could participate in its deliberations.  Chief and 
subject, warrior and medicine man, all took part and endeavoured to 
influence its decisions.  It was so weighty and influential a body that no 
step of any importance could ever be taken by the tribe without reference 
to it. 
People, men and women, were assigned roles in society.  Both the traditional 
leader and ordinary community members were subject to the rule of law.  
Excesses were subject to censorship.  Myburgh241 puts it thus: 
… the chief cannot make laws, fulfil judicial functions, or call an assembly 
of the people without his council's cooperation …  
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In other words, popular participation in the affairs of the community was of 
paramount importance.  The court in Bangindawo v Head of Nyanda Regional 
Authority242 dispels the myth that the western notion of the separation of powers 
is the exclusive best practice model for democracy. 
2.5.5 Moments in time 
In common law, prescriptive time is of the essence.243  For instance, there is 
time within which to institute court processes.  Any lawsuit that is out of time-
lines may not be accepted by the courts.  On the contrary, customary law does 
not insist on rigid time-lines.  There are no time-frames in terms of seconds, 
minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years, decades, centuries and millennia.  
In other words, Africans have no numerical calendars but phenomenal 
calendars.244  Mbiti245 puts it thus: 
The question of time is of little or no academic concern to African 
peoples in their traditional life.  For them, time is simply a composition of 
events which have occurred, those which are taking place now and those 
which are inevitably or immediately to occur.  What has not taken place 
or what has no likelihood of an immediate occurrence falls in the 
category of 'No-time'.  What is certain to occur, or what falls within the 
rhythm of natural phenomena, is in the category of inevitable or potential 
time. 
Mbiti points out, furthermore, that the western linear concept of time, "with an 
indefinite past, present and indefinite future, is practically foreign to African 
thinking".246  African time comprises only the past and present.  Africans reckon 
time for a concrete and specific purpose in connection with events and not for 
the sake of mathematics.  People cannot and do not reckon time in a vacuum.247 
                                            
242 See, Bangindawo v Head of Nyanda Regional Authority 1998 3 SA 262 (Tk); Mhlekwa 
and Feni v Head of the Western Tembuland Regional Authority & Anorther 2001 1 SA 574 
(Tk).also, Mhlekwa and Feni v Head of the Western Tembuland Regional Authority & 
Anorther 2001 1 SA 574 (Tk). 
243 Myburgh Indigenous Law 2.3.4. 
244 Mbiti African Religions 17-19. 
245 Mbiti African Religions 16.  Italics omitted. 
246 Mbiti African Religions 16.  Italics omitted. 
247 Mbiti African Religions 16.  Italics omitted. 
 41 
2.5.6 Categorisation 
Bekker and Rautenbach248 indicate correctly that specialised legal systems are 
comparably well-developed and "clearly distinguish categories, institutions and 
concepts".  On the other hand, customary law does not have rigid categories, 
institutions and concepts. 
2.5.7 Traditional authority courts and procedure 
In common law the judiciary and administration of courts are staffed by trained, 
dedicated human resources.  The system of judicial precedent imposes pattern 
and consistency.  Legal representatives enjoy the right of audience.  The 
proceedings are regulated by a presiding judicial officer.  Only people with direct 
and substantial interest in the matter subject to adjudication or their witnesses 
participate in the proceedings, and they do so in an orderly, controlled fashion.  
Bekker and Rautenbach249 put it thus: 
In specialised legal systems, there are, for the most part, formal court 
structures, but in non-specialised legal systems, there are no such 
structures.  In the latter legal systems, there are neither professional 
judges nor legal practitioners.  As a matter of fact, the principal dispute 
settlement bodies can hardly be called courts. 
Usually, in customary law, the family is the structure of the first instance that 
adjudicates disputes among family members, and between family members and 
members of other families.  For instance, if a member of a family seduces a 
member of another family, the aggrieved will send an intermediary to bring to the 
attention of the other family the wrongs committed by their member.  The family 
council of the accused will deliberate upon the matter.  If needs be, the 
attendance of the girl and boy will be sought.  Both of them will be given the 
opportunity to give testimony in support of their respective sides of the story.  If 
the dispute remains unresolved, the aggrieved may refer the dispute to the local 
traditional authority court at the great place of a traditional leader (headman or 
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headwoman) of the village.  The traditional leader will convene the assembly of 
the community to serve as a court charged to adjudicate the dispute between 
the two families.  No legal practitioners represent the parties before a traditional 
authority court.  The court is not manned by professional judges.  All members 
of the assembly are allowed to participate in the proceedings.250  Historically, 
only adult circumcised married men were fit and proper members of the 
traditional authority court.  Women, uncircumcised men and minor children were 
disqualified on the grounds of sex, culture and age respectively. 
2.5.8 Marriage and family 
In common law marriage is a contract between an individual man and an 
individual woman to the exclusion of others while it lasts. 251   However, 
traditionally the parties to a customary marriage are the families of a man and a 
woman respectively.252  Bennett253 puts it thus: 
Traditionally, customary law treated marriage as an agreement between 
families, to be negotiated by senior males and sealed by payment of 
lobola. 
Both families are represented by their respective family heads.  However, each 
family usually has a delegation of negotiators who conduct and conclude the 
contract of marriage on behalf of their respective families.  Generally the 
spouses and their offspring become members of an already established family 
group.  Usually the household of a newly-wed couple exists within their marital 
family group.  Later the family head may give the couple the pots ("go fiwa 
dipitsa").254  This rite symbolises the emancipation of the spouses from their 
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patrilocal guardianship. 255   The man is then allowed to establish his own 
neolocal homestead.256  Bennett257  points out quite correctly that an African 
traditional family lay at the heart of the African socio-political order. 
2.5.9 Contract 
In customary law a contract is an agreement between two families.258  A family 
head concludes contracts on behalf of his family.  He exercises the rights and 
discharges the obligations in contractu or ex lege in community with other adult 
members of the family. 
2.5.10 Concrete as opposed to abstract legal facts 
Customary law is almost entirely based on the concrete performance of an act.  
For instance, after the conclusion of a valid marriage, her family physically 
hands a bride over to the family of a groom to physically symbolise the transfer 
of the bride from her family to the family of the groom.259 
2.5.11 Groups rather than individuals as legal subjects260 
In common law, without legal disabilities, individual persons enjoy the legal 
capacity to act, to litigate, and to enter into contracts.  The minor children may 
conclude valid marriages or contracts with the assistance of their natural or legal 
guardians. 
In accordance with customary law a family or community is a legal subject.  A 
family is represented by its family head, while a community is usually 
represented by its traditional leader.  The duty that customary law imposes upon 
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a family or community is a group obligation as opposed an individual obligation 
as in common law. 
2.5.12 Customary law and the values of Ubuntu 
According to Bennett 261  the constitutionalisation of the African philosophical 
normative value system of Ubuntu has provided a gateway for African ideas and 
values to infuse South African law.  The Constitution makes a passing reference 
to the doctrine of Ubuntu.  However, the judiciary and academia have given and 
continue to give Ubuntu serious consideration.  The courts have had reference 
to the doctrine in S v Makwanyane, for instance.262  There is a development of 
the common understanding of the notion of Ubuntu.  For instance, Pieterse263 
puts it thus: 
The Nguni word Ubuntu represents notions of universal human 
interdependence, solidarity and communalism which can be traced to 
small-scale communities in pre-colonial Africa, and which underlie 
virtually every indigenous African culture.  While the values the word 
encapsulates are not themselves unique to African thought, the 
significance for law and society is arguably much more pronounced in 
African communities. 
According to Van Niekerk264 the principles of Ubuntu require that people should 
live in harmony with one another, with nature, with the gods and with the 
ancestors.  The interests of an individual are served as part of a collectivity.  The 
life and welfare of an individual are inextricably linked with the life and welfare of 
the community and are in harmonious relationship with the ancestors and 
nature.  This is an anthropocentric view of the universe.  However, Van Niekerk 
puts emphasis upon the bi-dimensional universe in which the relationships have 
both vertical and horizontal dimensions (ie the dual and reciprocal relationships 
between the living human persons inter se, on the one hand, and the living 
human persons and the ancestors, gods or God, on the other). 
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In S v Makwanyane265 the Constitutional Court, per Langa J (as he then was), 
defined Ubuntu as follows: 
… a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of the community.  It recognises a 
person's status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community such 
a person happens to be part of.  It also entails the converse, however.  
The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, 
value and acceptance [to] each member of that community. 
Langa J argues, furthermore, that the notion of Ubuntu regulates the exercise of 
rights by putting the emphasis on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual 
enjoyment of rights by all.  Ubuntu places value on life and human dignity.  The 
life of another is as valuable as one's own.  Ubuntu puts the value of human 
dignity at the centre of human life. 
Clearly, Langa's concept of Ubuntu resonates with the African idiom, "a person 
is a person through other persons".  Mahomed J (as he then was) and Mogoro J 
also expressed profound understanding of the notion of Ubuntu in their 
concurring judgments in S v Makwanyane.  Ironically, these eminent jurists 
expounded this African philosophical value in a review of the constitutionality of 
the death penalty.  In Albut v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
and Others, 266  the Constitutional Court, per Froneman J, stated that the 
participatory system of government in South Africa is built upon an ancient 
principle of traditional African methods of government.  Ubuntu informs all 
African systems of government.  Restorative justice is rooted in the value of 
Ubuntu.  Ubuntu is an expression of group solidarity, compassion and 
communal orientation to problem-solving and crime control.  Crime control, for 
instance, resides in the community.267 
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In the area of family law the courts invoked the concept of Ubuntu in, among 
others, Ryland v Edros,268 Badenhorst v Badenhorst269 and Bhe and Others v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human 
Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another.270 
There are objections to Ubuntu as a metanorm on the grounds, among others, 
that it is too vague to be of any use, that it is redundant, and that its communal 
orientation undermines individual autonomy.271  However, Bennett272 concludes 
that Ubuntu as a lived system of norms is a metanorm that is almost similar to 
the English concept of equity.  Ubuntu involves mutual regard, compassion, 
respect, equal treatment and acceptance of the humanity and humaneness of 
all. 
2.6 The application of customary law in South Africa 
Each system of customary law applies to a local customary community and 
regulates the family relationships and relationships among the members of such 
a community.  It may happen that a member of one community, ethnic group or 
race migrates to another community.  If this were to happen, the immigrant 
would become a member of the community with the accompanying rights, duties 
and responsibilities.  In such an instance, the customary law of the receiving 
community would apply equally to such a member.  A different scenario may be 
that a non-member may choose to subject him/herself to the law and custom of 
another community in order to resolve a dispute that has arisen between him or 
her and a member of the said community. 
As explained already, the systems of customary law that regulate indigenous 
African peoples predate both the Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution.  
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They are part of the cultures of their respective indigenous peoples.  Before 
1994, systems of customary law applied to the communities they regulated, 
subject to the rules of common law as amended and supplemented by 
applicable legislation and court decisions.  Any rule of customary law which was 
repugnant to the principles of public policy and natural justice was invalid to the 
extent of the repugnancy.  If the rules of customary law were rendered invalid or 
a hiatus existed, common law applied.  It took a long time before customary law 
could assume full status as a legal system "living side by side with common law 
and legislation".273 
According to Anyebe, 274  customary law has always been applied with the 
following qualifications – 
i. It is applicable to the local community where it holds sway. 
ii. It must be an existing customary law and not a mere ancient custom. 
iii. It must not be contrary to public policy. 
iv. It must not be inconsistent with legislation applicable to customary law. 
v. It must not be repugnant to the principles of natural justice, equity and 
good conscience. 
Both the Interim Constitution and the Constitution have expressly recognised 
customary law.  Constitutional Principle XIII of Schedule 4 provides that 
customary law, like common law, must be recognised and applied by the courts 
subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights in chapter 3 of 
the Interim Constitution and to legislation specifically dealing with legislation.  
Section 211(3) of the 1996 Constitution provides that the courts must apply 
customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.  Both Constitutional 
Principle XIII of Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution and section 211(3) of the 
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1996 Constitution recognise customary law and elevate it to a position on a par 
with common law.275 
According to Bekker and Rautenbach, "[s] 211(3) is mandatory; in other words, 
the courts do not have discretion to apply customary law and they must apply it 
when the conditions (or qualifications) for its application have been met".276  
Customary law is recognised subject to the following qualifications:277 
i. It must be applicable.  Both customary law and common law are 
components of the South African legal system.  The court should 
determine, in accordance with the choice of law rules, whether customary 
law or common law is applicable. 
ii. It must be compatible with the Constitution.  For instance, the tradition of 
patriarchy or the principle of male primogeniture obtrudes the 
constitutional values of human dignity and equality as well as the 
fundamental rights to human dignity and equality.  The Constitutional 
Court, in Bhe, declared the customary rule of male primogeniture to be 
incompatible with the Constitution and thus invalid.278  In other words, the 
court must no longer apply the customary rule of male primogeniture to 
resolve customary law disputes. 
iii. It must not be superseded by any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law.279  The court has no discretion to apply customary law 
instead of such applicable legislation but must, perforce, apply the 
applicable legislation to the customary law dispute in question.  The 
legislature has enacted a number of items of legislation that specifically 
deal with customary law. 280   However, the legislation itself must be 
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consistent with the Constitution.  For instance, in Gumede, the 
Constitutional Court declared section 7 of the Recognition Act 
unconstitutional and invalid in so far as it discriminated between 
customary marriages entered into before the Recognition Act came into 
operation and customary marriages entered into after the Recognition Act 
came into operation. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The Constitution recognises customary law as part of the legal system of South 
Africa.281  In Mabena v Letsoalo282 the court acknowledged that the law had over 
time evolved to accommodate the contemporary affairs of a community to which 
the family of the prospective spouse belonged.  In the Shilubana283 case the 
Constitutional Court held that the traditional authorities are empowered to make, 
amend and repeal the rules of customary law of their communities consistent 
with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, in particular the Bill of Rights.  
The Reform of Customary law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters 
Act has extended the application of the Intestate Succession Act to Black 
Africans who die ab intestato.  In consequence, widows and extramarital 
children of the deceased may inherit ab intestato from the deceased.  Chapter 3 
deals with the forms of customary law. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FORMS OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 analyses the official and living versions of customary law.284  The Bill 
of Rights applies to both the official and living versions of customary law.285  
According to the report of the SALC (as it then was),286 the indirect application of 
the Bill of Rights would give the courts grounds for applying the living version of 
customary law.  According to Currie,287 the Bill of Rights may apply differently to 
the different forms of customary law. 
3.2 Ascertainment of customary law 
Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act288 provides, among others, 
that the courts may take judicial notice of customary law "insofar as it can be 
ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty".  As explained above, according 
to Bekker and Rautenbach, "[s] 211(3) is mandatory; in other words, the courts 
do not have discretion to apply customary law and they must apply it when the 
conditions (or qualifications) for its application have been met".289  Section 1(1) 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act290 is subject to the Constitution, which 
recognises customary law as part of the basic law of South Africa,291 and the 
court must apply customary law subject to the Constitution and any applicable 
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legislation.292  However, it is worth mentioning that, while the official version of 
customary law is easy to find, the living version cannot always be "ascertained 
readily and with sufficient certainty".293  According to the report of the SALC,294 
unlike the living version, the official version of customary law is disposed 
towards the interests of the state rather than the interests of the community 
living under it.295  The SALC296 reports, further, thus: 
Thus, the 'official' version of customary law described less what people 
previously did (or were actually doing) and more what the government 
and its chiefly rulers thought they ought to be doing.  As several 
historians of customary law have said, it is an 'invented tradition'. 
Molokomme points out that the difficulty about the ascertainment of the living 
version of customary law is that customs vary from community to community.297 
3.3 The forms of customary law 
According to Maithufi,298 there are two versions of customary law, namely the 
official and non-official versions.  Van Niekerk299 also divides customary law into 
two versions, namely the unofficial indigenous law and official indigenous law.  
The court in Mabena v Letsoalo, per Le Roux J, divided customary law into the 
official and unofficial versions of customary law.300  While Kerr,301 Maithufi,302 
Bekker and Maithufi 303  and Van Niekerk 304  divide customary law into two 
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versions, Bennett 305  divides customary law into three versions, namely the 
official customary law, the customary law recorded by anthropologists and 
lawyers, and living customary law.  According to Armstrong,306 there are three 
versions of customary law, namely official customary law, traditional law and 
living customary law.  According to Ngcobo J (as he then was), in Bhe, there are 
three forms of customary law, namely the customary law that is practised in the 
community, customary law that is found in statutes, case law and textbooks, and 
academic customary law (i.e. the customary law that is used for teaching 
purposes).  Closer scrutiny reveals that, in the final analysis, there are two forms 
of customary law, namely the living and official versions.  On the one hand, an 
analysis of the sources indicates that the so-called third form is, in effect, an 
official version of customary law, while, on the other, the traditional version of 
customary law is actually the living version.  This view will be borne out by the 
analyses of the forms of customary law in the following paragraphs. 
3.3.1 The official customary law 
Generally, the official customary law reflects state interests307 and is part of state 
law.308  The official version of customary law is found in statutes, law reports, the 
South African Law Reform Commission reports, text books, university lectures 
and other public documents. 309   According to Ndima, the official version of 
customary law depends on alien values for validity.310  Mogoro J, in Du Plessis v 
De Klerk,311 points out that customary law "has lamentably been marginalised 
and allowed to degenerate into a vitrified set of norms alienated from its roots in 
the community".  Costa puts it thus: 
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[C]ustomary law as it stands is corrupted, inauthentic and lacking 
authority.  It is a foreign imposition, a stranger in Africa.312 
In Fosi v Road Accident Fund,313 the court put it as follows: 
Indigenous African customary law has occupied an unfortunate position 
in the legal history of our country.  The fact is that it was hardly 
recognized by the law-makers and was accordingly scarcely applied in 
the South African courts.  It enjoyed the status of being known that it 
existed and its continued existence was merely tolerated as a necessary 
evil. 
In Sigcau v Sigcau,314 the Appellate Division held that the individual person was 
the owner of the royal family home and not merely the controller of the 
property.315  Ndima316 puts it thus: 
However, the learned Chief Justice refused to vacate his common law 
comfort zone, although he was dealing with an African customary law 
problem.  He continued to use the same institution, which his experience 
of common law made him use, to describe the rights of the defendant, in 
an African matter.  By doing this he unwittingly committed an 
unforgivable comparative law mistake, namely, looking at foreign law 
(African customary law) with the eyes of his own system (common law). 
The facts in Sibasa v Ratsialingwa317 and Ratsialingwa v Sibasa318 decisions are 
as follows: 
Chief Ramaremisa was a polygamist.  His community's headquarters had been 
at Mokumbani for many generations.  He was married among others to Nyapopi.  
Nyapopi was from the male side (i.e. a male house).  Another woman, namely 
Nyamoufe, was married to his mother's house.  She was from the female side 
(i.e. a female house).  She was later allocated to Ramaremisa as a junior wife. 
Ramaremisa had a son, namely Phiriphiri Sibasa, by his senior wife, Nyapopi.  
He died in 1930.  Sibasa stepped into his shoes and succeeded to the 
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chieftainship of that section of the vhaVenda.  However, there was a faction of 
the royal family that was intent on installing Ratsialingwa as a chief.  The Native 
Commissioner, Sibasa, objected on the grounds that the nomination of 
Ratsialingwa contravened the Venda law and custom of succession.  One of the 
requirements for a valid chieftainship was that an heir to the throne must 
swallow a stone retrieved from the bowels of a crocodile.  A successor inherits 
the stone retrieved from the decomposed corpse of his predecessor. 
The Governor-General recognised Sibasa as a senior traditional leader.  
However, in 1948 he deposed Sibasa.  He appointed Ratsialingwa in his place.  
The legal question was whether the appointment of Ratsialingwa amounted to 
both the assumption of chieftainship and the ownership of the property inherited 
by Sibasa from the deceased chief.  The courts in Sibasa v Ratsialingwa and 
Ratsialingwa v Sibasa held that the statutory appointment of a chief who was not 
an heir of the deceased chief did not affect the inheritance rights of the lawful 
heirs of the deceased at customary law. 
Notably, in Ratsialingwa v Sibasa the Appellate Division (as it then was) had 
reference to its own decision in Sigcau v Sigcau. 319   According to the 
Ratsialingwa v Sibasa decision, a traditional leader inherits the property of his 
father in his personal capacity and becomes the personal owner thereof.  This 
interpretive approach to customary law of succession contradicts the communal 
character of the indigenous customary law of property.  According to customary 
law of succession, the first son would step into the shoes of his deceased father 
in the capacity of a family head.  He would become the nominal owner of the 
family or house property.  He is obliged to administer the family or house 
property in the best interest of his family or house.  The family council would 
intervene if the family head transgressed the family code.  The Ratsialingwa v 
Sibasa decision approximates the common law of succession and inheritance, in 
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particular intestate succession.320  In any view, although a family head may 
express his will on his death bed, the indigenous living customary succession is, 
by operation of law, intestate succession. 
In Buthelezi v Minister of Bantu Administration, 321  Mathole Buthelezi, the 
hereditary chief of the Buthelezi community in the Mahlabathini area, Zululand, 
died in 1942.  His eldest surviving son was one Bongefile Buthelezi.  It was 
alleged that Bongefile was, in terms of the indigenous customary-law rule of 
male primogeniture, the heir-apparent/successor-apparent to Chief Mathole 
Buthelezi, the deceased.  The institution of traditional leadership among Africans 
was embedded in patriarchy.322  This means that the positions of traditional 
leadership were limited to male members of the chief's family and, in particular 
his first-born or eldest son of the senior wife.323  However, the customary law 
differs from one community to the next depending on the circumstances of the 
community in question.  Allegedly, according to the law of the Buthelezi 
community, Bongefile had to step into the shoes of his deceased father.  If he 
were appointed he would have become the head of the family and community 
composed of males and females.  It was not to be. 
By virtue of the powers vested in him as the statutory paramount chief, the 
Governor-General chose to appoint Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi 324  as the 
chief of the Buthelezi community instead of Bongefile Buthelezi.  Bongefile did 
not, therefore, succeed his deceased father, Mathole Buthelezi, as hereditary 
chief of the Buthelezi community. 
Hoexter ACJ (as he then was) held that there was "nothing in the Act which 
gives the son of a hereditary chief any claim whatever to the chieftainship; on 
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the contrary, the object of the legislation appears to have been to put an end to 
hereditary chieftainship for the purposes of this Act".  Literally construed, the 
court held that the Governor-General could appoint anyone to the position of a 
traditional leader irrespective of whether or not he/she was of royal blood and/or 
the most senior surviving son.325 
Mgoza v Mgoza326 is another example in which the court preferred common law 
to customary law.  The facts are as follows.  Cornelius, the deceased, died 
intestate.  His eldest son, Mgoza, stood to become the sole and general heir in 
accordance with "Black law and custom".327   In terms thereof, males would 
inherit from males but females would not inherit at all.  Needless to say, in 
indigenous African customary law a person did not inherit in his personal 
capacity but in his nominal capacity as a representative of a family group.  Put 
simply, he supposedly entered into the shoes of the deceased family head.  The 
successor could not "inherit," and neither could the deceased "bequeath" to his 
nominal successor. 
The matter went through the former Native Commissioner's Court, then the now 
defunct North-Eastern Bantu Appeal Court and, lastly, the Appellate Division.  
The latter court held that Mgoza had inherited the land to the exclusion of all and 
had the right to eject whosoever occupied his property because he was "the sole 
and general heir" of the property.  At the outset, the notions of "stepping into the 
shoes of the deceased" and "the sole and general heir" are mutually exclusive.  
The first notion is a customary law concept of group-oriented succession, while 
the latter is an individualistic common law concept of succession. 
Indeed, the holding of the court sounds more like an adoption of a principle of 
common-law intestate succession in terms of which property devolves upon an 
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heir to the exclusion of grandchildren during the lifetime of such an heir.  It put 
emphasis on individual rights rather than on collective family rights to what was 
otherwise family property.  This holding misses the point that indigenous 
customary law recognises three types of property, namely general, family and 
personal property.  In indigenous customary law, land is either general or family 
property.  The family head administers the estate in the interest of the given 
house or family.  The rights to the property vest in the given house or family 
represented by the family head.  The heir cannot inherit more or better rights 
than the deceased had.  If the deceased was a vicar of the family the successor 
or heir cannot, at succession or inheritance, succeed to a higher status and 
inherit better rights than the ones the deceased had at the time of death.  This is 
so because, in terms of indigenous customary law, a successor/heir steps into 
the shoes of the deceased. 
The law of intestate succession prohibits the inheritance of the grandchildren 
from their grandparents, without the authority of a will to the contrary, if such 
grandparents predecease the parents of their grandchildren.  Differently put, if a 
parent survives his own parent his children are incompetent to inherit from their 
paternal grandparent.  Thirdly, in terms of the customary-law rule of male 
primogeniture, the younger sons are discriminated against.  Fourthly, the 
customary-law rule of male primogeniture discriminates against women.  These 
legal questions never arose in the Mgoza case.  Seemingly, it was not yet their 
time. 
It is incontrovertible that the Appellate Division decided the question of 
indigenous customary law through the common-law lenses.  In other words, 
while it paid lip service to the fact that the applicants and respondent were 
members of a traditional community whose dispute fell to be determined within 
the purview of customary law rules, it had recourse to common law rules and 
remedies to answer what were clearly customary law questions between 
tribesmen.  The approach maimed the rules of customary law, in particular, the 
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customary law of property and customary law of succession and the customary 
law rule of male primogeniture. 
In Tshabalala v Estate Tunzi328 the court said: 
According to pure native law no woman can own property but the native 
Appeal Court has held that the widow is entitled to retain in her own right 
property earned by her [husband upon her] husband's death; the court 
was aware that this is in conflict with native custom, but when native 
custom is repugnant to justice and equity it must give way. 
The courts, generally, justified their marginalisation of the rules of customary law 
on the grounds that where the rules are repugnant to justice and equity 
(previously "western civilization") they must give way to statutory law and the 
rules of common law. 329   According to Ndima, African customary law's 
adaptation in practice to accommodate women, many of whom are now heads 
of households, was ignored.330  Mqeke,331 in his comments on Thembisile v 
Thembisile,332 highlighted a myriad burial disputes: between a widow and her in-
laws; 333  between a father-in-law and the relatives of his daughter-in-law; 334 
between a widow and the children of the deceased from his previous 
marriage;335 between the deceased's families in a polygamous marriage;336 and 
between the deceased's children inter se.337  The grandfathers, granduncles, 
uncles and brothers of the deceased decide as to where, when and how the 
remains of the deceased are to be interred.  Though the women of the extended 
family are consulted, the public faces of the extended family are males.  Often 
the widow and her in-laws would differ about the burial place of the deceased.  
Generally, if she produces a marriage certificate the police would protect her 
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rights to bury her husband.  However, if the burial rights disputes are referred to 
courts, the courts often adjudicate them in accordance with common law.  
Indeed, in common law it is the widow, as an individual spouse, who enjoys the 
burial rights in respect of her husband and vice versa.  Simply put, common law 
individualises the burial rights of a widow. 
3.3.2 Living customary law 
Living customary law is the "law actually observed by African communities".338  It 
is the unwritten law that is passed on from generation to generation and is part 
of the culture and tradition of the community.339  It evolves as the circumstances 
of society change.340  However, a change of legislation, in particular, and written 
law, in general, often if not always requires legislative intervention.  Ndima341 
puts it as follows: 
When it comes to the pervasive problem of developing African customary 
law, the judiciary faces the additional challenge of determining the living 
version of customary law for the community concerned.  One of the 
injustices of the past, which our constitutional interpreters must reject in 
striving to heal our historical divisions, is the distortion caused to African 
law by the application of the interpretive technique of repugnancy.  This 
method removed the philosophical underpinnings (which the colonial 
officials perceived to be in conflict with Western morality) from African 
customary law. 
The development of the law is not only a catholic but is also an age-old world-
wide phenomenon.  For instance, according to Hahlo, 342  western European 
marriage law developed in three stages.  During the first stage, marriage was a 
private matter between spouses and their families.  During the second stage, 
marriage was under the jurisdiction of the church.  During the last stage, 
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marriage passed under the control of the state.  The court, in Rolfes, Nebel and 
Co v Zweigenhaft,343 said: 
This court would be loath to upset a [contemporary] practice that had 
become a general custom of South Africa, even if it were somewhat 
different from the Roman-Dutch [legal] practice. 
In the case under discussion,344 a principle of Roman-Dutch law in question had 
fallen into disuse and an indigenous "customary"345 legal principle had come into 
effect.  The court accepted that the law had developed and that the established 
contemporary legal custom overrode the Roman-Dutch legal practice which had 
fallen into disuse.  The legal development was not legislated but had evolved in 
response to the changing circumstances of society.  In Henderson v 
Hanekom,346 Sir Henry de Villiers CJ put it thus: 
[T]here must, in the ordinary course, be progressive development of the 
law keeping pace with modern requirements. 
In Blower v Van Noorden,347 Sir James Rose-Innes CJ put it thus, in his classic 
dictum: 
There come times in the growth of every living system of law when old 
practice and ancient formulae must be modified in order to keep in touch 
with the expansion of legal ideas, and to keep pace with the 
requirements of changing conditions. 
It follows from the Blower dictum that, where the law is outpaced by the 
requirements of the changing conditions of a given society, the legislature must 
develop the law consistent with those requirements of a changing society to 
avoid the probable irrelevance of the law.  The law is meant to serve the people 
and not the other way round.  If a rule of law outgrows its usefulness and 
purpose, it becomes a misrule of law, which people may defy consciously or 
unconsciously.  The Henderson and Blower cases indicate that, though there 
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344 Rolfes, Nebel and Co v Zweigenhaft 1903 TS 185 206. 
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346 Henderson v Hanekom 1903 20 SC 513 519.  Hereafter the Henderson case. 
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were conservative and purist judges on the bench, there were quite influential 
modernist judges who recognised the progressive development of the law, in 
particular in the sphere of custom.  The law responds to the changing values of 
society.  The evolution of law sustains its legitimacy.  The recognition of the 
evolution of the living law in response to the changing conditions of societies is, 
therefore, not a new phenomenon imposed by the Constitution.  The living law is 
subordinate to the democratic constitution.  Frederick Maitland states the 
following in respect of the continual development of the English law:348 
Hardly a rule remains unaltered and yet the body of law that now lives 
among us is the same body of law that Blackstone described in the 
eighteenth century, Coke in the seventeenth, Littleton in the fifteenth, 
Bracton in the thirteenth, Glanville in the twelfth. 
In MM v MN and Another,349 the Constitutional Court said: 
Paradoxically, the strength of customary law – its adaptive inherent 
flexibility – is also potentially difficult when it comes to its application and 
enforcement in a court of law. 
The Constitution imposes a duty upon a competent court to develop customary 
law consistent with its provisions.350  "It follows implicitly that, wherever common 
law or customary law deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights the courts have an obligation to develop it by removing the deviation."351  
In other words, the courts in carrying out their section 39(2) developmental 
function must have regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
Section 39(2) provides:352 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Customary law, essentially the customs of indigenous communities, is also 
subject to change and may be developed by the court and the legislature.  In a 
                                            
348 Maitland "Origins of Legal Institutions" 6 cited in Mqeke 2003a Speculum Juris 25. 
349 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 25. 
350 S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
351 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC). 
352 S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
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minority judgment Ngcobo J, in Bhe, pointed out that there are two instances in 
which customary law should be developed:353 
i. where customary law should be aligned with the Constitution; and  
ii. where the changing needs of society demand development.354 
Van Niekerk355 states that: 
State regulation, which often resulted in distortion, could not suppress 
the natural development of indigenous law and its institution.  The 
unofficial application of indigenous law by both official and unofficial 
institutions bears witness to the tenacity of indigenous law and to its 
inherent ability to adapt to changing circumstances without losing its 
character.  This is apparent in the administration of justice by the 
community courts of the metropolitan areas.  It is also evidenced by 
various indigenous institutions which still find application in black 
metropolitan areas. 
Legal norms regulate the conduct of persons against a socially acceptable value 
system.  The values of society are dynamic.  The living version keeps pace with 
the changing circumstances of the community it serves.356  Juma357 puts it as 
follows: 
Living law is a concept which reflects the understanding of African law as 
an evolving phenomenon.  Thus, it is often used to distinguish the 'official 
customary law' from the 'law actually lived by people'. 
Bennett puts it as follows:358 
Nowadays people are more sceptical of the provenance and authenticity 
of customary law they find in official legal text.  The modern legal order is 
now openly acknowledged to be a pluralistic one, a series of interrelated 
normative spheres.  It includes the formal legal code, containing a written 
version of customary law, and of course the common law, both of which 
are regularly applied in official courts and in the state bureaucracy.  Then 
there is a version of customary law that has been recorded by 
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anthropologists and lawyers.  This is used in more informal contexts and 
for teaching purposes.  And finally there is the customary law that is 
actually lived out by the people and applied in the various traditional and 
informal tribunals.  The legal orders are not unconnected, nor should it 
be assumed that the people concerned are unaware of how to 
manipulate the resources offered them by legal pluralism. 
In Hlope v Mahlalela,359 the applicant entered into marriage with the daughter of 
Mahlalela.  One child, a daughter, namely, Sihle, was born to the couple.  Sihle's 
mother died.  In casu there was a dispute between the biological father of their 
girl-child and her maternal grandparents as to who should get her custody.  Both 
parties invoked the rules of the Swazi customary law and called Swazi law 
expert witnesses to give evidence in their cases.  According to the court the 
basic principles of the Swazi law have to a certain extent been excluded in 
favour of the common law.  It appears to be uncertain whether the common law 
has been incorporated into customary law or whether customary law has simply 
been excluded in favour of common law. 
A father of an extra-marital360 child may deliver a beast for such a child and the 
extra-marital child would then be handed over to her biological father.  Section 
28(2) and (3) of the Constitution provides that "[a] child's best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child".  Accordingly, the 
court awarded the custody of the child to the father on account of the dictates of 
the best interest of the child.361  It is noteworthy that section 28 mirrors human-
rights norms of foreign and international law orientation, in particular the 
Romano-Germanic and Anglo-American hybrid of law and international human 
rights law.362 
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Mabena v Letsoalo363 is a typical "daughter-in-law" and "parents-in-law" dispute.  
The respondent and her husband married in accordance with the rules of the 
living customary law of marriage.  Traditionally, such a marriage required the 
consent of both family groups in addition to those of the bridegroom and bride.  
On both sides, family heads would represent their respective family groups.  
Over the years, as the living customary law evolved in response to the 
"changing circumstances" of the traditional communities, the consent of the 
fathers of the bridegroom and bride was substituted for that of the family groups 
as represented by family heads.  In the matter under discussion, the fathers of 
both the bridegroom and bride did not give their consent.  On the one hand, the 
father of the bridegroom refused to give his consent and, on the other, the father 
of the bride had deserted their family.  Her mother was "the family head".  Living 
customary law accepts the family headship of women.  The court held that the 
mother could give consent to the customary marriage and receive magadi364 in 
respect of the customary marriage of her daughter. 
The synopsis of the facts of Zondi v President of the RSA365 is as follows.  In 
terms of the repealed section 22(6) of the BAA, Africans could enter into three 
types of marriage, namely marriage entered into by antenuptial contract (ANC); 
in community of property; or out of community of property.  Regulation 2 of the 
Estate Regulations366 provides different succession rules for these three types of 
marriage.  The Intestate Succession Act 367  governed ANC and marriage in 
community of property, while customary law governed marriage out of 
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community of property.  In the particular case Simon Mfana Ngidi (the 
deceased) and Beauty Ngidi (born Ngcobo) (the wife) married on 24 July 1953.  
The marriage had no consequences of community of property, profit and loss.  
He was not a partner to a customary union.  The couple had no children.  The 
deceased, however, had two extra-marital children.  The wife died in 1992.  He 
died intestate on 24 July 1995.  The estate fell to be administered in terms of 
Black law and custom.  The deceased's brother was, in terms of the customary-
law rule of primogeniture, the only "heir".  Extra-marital children were 
incompetent to inherit because their parents were not married.  The court held 
that the distinction between extra-marital children and children born in marriage 
in relation to intestate succession (ie Regulation 2) was unconstitutional and 
declared the equality of the rights of both "categories" of children in that 
regard.368 
In the instance of Mthembu v Letsela369 the court held that the principle of male 
primogeniture did not constitute unfair discrimination.  In Mthembu v Letsela,370 
the court held that discrimination on the basis of extra-marital birth was not 
unfair.  In Mthembu v Letsela371 the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the 
decisions in Mthembu v Letsela372 and Mthembu v Letsela.373  Such a holding 
went against the grain of the equality rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.  In 
this case, the deceased was not survived by a male child.  In consequence, the 
"inheritance" "ascended to his father" in accordance with the common-law rules 
of succession.  The decision of the court breached the living primogeniture 
jurisprudence, which does not recognise the transfer of ownership rights to 
property from the deceased to his heirs in their individual capacities.  Living law 
recognises communal ownership of family property.  In other words, the family is 
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the dominant legal unit, which is composed of members of the family, at whose 
helm is the family head.  The death of a family head does not change the 
collective nature of the ownership of family property.  What it changes is the 
incumbent of the position of the head of the family.  In other words, the status of 
the deceased family head devolves from the deceased to his eldest surviving 
child. 
It is trite that, under the pre-colonial law, the deceased, unless he was 
emancipated, would have been subordinated to a family head (his father, in this 
case).  Be that as it may, his father would have been in control of the family 
property without the stricture of personal ownership.  On the other hand, the 
deceased would be the family head "in his own right" if he were emancipated.  In 
those circumstances, the proverbial shoes of the deceased would ascend to the 
deceased's father, who would step into those shoes in the interest of his family.  
This customary-law rule is distinguishable from the common-law one in that 
"inheritance" in common law amounts to personal ownership of the inheritance 
(the property). 
During the pre-constitutional era, customary law was a system of law parallel to 
the official South African legal system, namely statutes and common law.  This 
accounts for the concept of legal pluralism.  The erstwhile principle of the state 
law was that if the indigenous customary law was inconsistent with common law, 
common law prevailed to the extent of the inconsistency.  Put differently, in 
accordance with a repugnancy rule, indigenous customary law was subordinate 
to common law and statutes, on the one hand, and statutes overrode both 
common law and indigenous customary law, on the other.  The court actions in 
the Bhe case sought to "set the legal position straight".  It is worth mentioning 
that the Constitution recognises the indigenous customary law and the 
concomitant rights.  The question is whether the residual indigenous customary 
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law374 is of any consequence extraneous to the purview of common law and 
statutes.375 
The Constitutional Court adjudicated the disputes in the Bhe case through the 
prisms of the Constitution and applicable statutory law, in particular the Intestate 
Succession Act. 376   Historically, the general principle was that, unless the 
statutes or common law provided otherwise, the succession to and inheritance 
of the status and estate of a Black person had to take place in terms of "Black 
law and custom".  Generally, if not always, the Black law and custom imposed a 
hierarchical social class system in which, among other issues, men were 
superior to women.  Olivier et al submit correctly that in traditional society and its 
legal system gender was and still is a differential factor, because a woman was 
and is:377 
... regarded as a perpetual minor, always under the guardianship of a 
male (her father when she was unmarried; her husband when married; 
and again her father or his successor should she become widowed or 
divorced). 
In 2004, Ngwenya J, in Bhe and Others v The Magistrate Khayelitsha, 378 
declared the provisions of the BAA regarding the principle of male primogeniture 
unconstitutional and invalid.  In Shibi v Sithole and Others,379 Maluleke J held 
that intestate succession rules that discriminate on the grounds of sex or gender 
were unconstitutional and invalid.  The decisions in both Bhe and Others v The 
Magistrate Khayelitsha380 and Shibi v Sithole and Others381 were confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court in Bhe.382 
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The facts of Bhe and Other v Magistrate, Khayelitsha,383 are as follows.  Ms 
Nontupheko Maretha Bhe cohabited with one Vuyo Elius Mgolombane.  They 
were poor and lived in a temporary informal shelter in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.  
He was a carpenter and she was a domestic worker.  The liaison produced two 
daughters, namely Nonkululeko Bhe, born in 1994, and Anelisa Bhe, born in 
2001.  Vuyo obtained a state housing subsidy to build a family house on the site.  
Unfortunately, he died intestate in October 2002 before he could build the 
house.  The magistrate of Khayelitsha appointed Vuyo's father, Maboyisi Nelson 
Mgolombane, as the representative of the deceased's estate in terms of the 
official version of the indigenous customary law.384  Nontupheko and her two 
daughters were excluded by operation of the law from being appointed as the 
representatives of the intestate estate of Vuyo Mgolombane on the grounds that 
they were women and, therefore, perpetual minors in terms of the indigenous 
customary law.  The relationship between Mr Mgolombane, the deceased's 
father, and Nontupheko broke down.  Mgolombane intended to sell the 
residential property and building material to defray the funeral expenses of the 
deceased, Vuyo.  The applicants challenged the appointment of Mgolombane as 
heir and representative of the estate.  The interpretation of the magistrate was, 
to all intents and purposes, ex facie the BAA and its accompanying regulations 
correct.  However, the magistrate disregarded the fact that the relevant 
provisions of the BAA and its regulations were inconsistent with the Constitution, 
in particular section 9 in the Bill of Rights.  The Constitutional Court had to 
determine whether such an apparent inconsistency and, therefore, contravention 
of section 9 were unconstitutional and invalid. 
In the second case, Shibi v Sithole, Daniel Solomon Sithole died intestate in 
Pretoria in 1995.  He was neither married nor a partner to a customary union.  
He was not survived by descendants or ascendants.  He was survived only by 
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his sister, Ms Charlotte Shibi.  His nearest male blood relations were his two 
cousins, namely Mantabeni Sithole and Jerry Sithole.  In terms of the indigenous 
customary-law rule of male primogeniture, section 23 of the Black Administration 
Act, read together with its regulations as well as the Intestate Succession Act, 
Ms Shibi was disqualified as an heir of her uterine brother's intestate estate.  
Her cousins were the only competent heirs.  This position was confirmed in 
Mthembu v Letsela.  The Bhe case followed the Mthembu case and appointed 
the cousins, one after the other.  Ms Shibi challenged the decision of the 
magistrate. 
In the matter of the South African Human Rights Commission v President of the 
RSA, the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women's Legal 
Centre Trust acted in their own interest and in the public interest.  The 
applicants sought that the whole of section 23 of the Black Administration Act or 
alternatively sections (1), (2) and (6) of section 23 be declared unconstitutional.  
Section 23 of the Black Administration Act, its Regulation 2 read together with 
section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act, provided a legislative framework for 
the intestate succession and inheritance of Blacks. 
As shown in chapter 2 above, customary law is not only subject to the 
Constitution but is also recognised by it as an integral part of the South African 
legal system.385  There is no question of parallel legal systems, one subject to 
the Constitution and another outside the ambit of the Constitution.386  On the 
one hand, customary law rules that are not consistent with the Constitution are 
invalid and, on the other hand, the customary law rules which are consistent with 
the Constitution are valid.  Common law cannot invalidate customary law rules. 
Statutory provisions which are unconstitutional cannot override customary law 
rules because such statutory provisions are themselves invalid and therefore of 
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no force and effect.  The question of law that fell to be determined was whether 
section 23 of the Black Administration Act, its Regulation 2, and section 1 of the 
Intestate Succession Act were consistent with the Constitution, in particular 
section 9 (the right to equality).  The Constitutional Court declared section 23 of 
the BAA and, therefore, the customary rule male primogeniture unconstitutional 
and invalid on the grounds that it unfairly discriminated against widows, 
daughters, younger sons and the extra-marital children. 
Ngcobo J delivered a dissenting minority judgement.  He held that the 
customary law of succession including the customary law rule of primogeniture 
is capable of being developed to a level consistent with the Constitution.  
Customary law succession consists in the succession to the status of the family 
head and control of property.  The narrow notion of "inheritance" is different from 
the notion of the state law of succession (the so-called official version of the 
customary law of succession). 
In its original customary law sense, succession or inheritance does not involve 
the transfer of the property of the deceased to the successor/heir in his personal 
capacity.  Family headship is a nominal office.  However, living customary law 
has generally evolved to the point of equalising the rights of males and females.  
Women (daughters, widows and sisters) inherit from the deceased in the deep 
rural villages.  Primogeniture no longer determines succession.  Generally, 
succession is no longer communal but individual.  In this sense, all children of 
the deceased born in marriage share in the inheritance of the deceased's estate.  
Children do not contribute as a matter of customary law to the common family 
property but to private property (owned individually).  This being the case, the 
majority decision in the Bhe case, per Langa DCJ (as he then was), albeit a 
mirror of the common law principles, is a closer reflection of the grassroots 
experiential and existential intestate succession.  Bennett states that the official 
version of customary law does not reflect the law at the grassroots level.387 
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As previously indicated, Shilubana v N'wamitwa 388  concerned a hereditary 
chieftainship succession dispute.  According to the principle of primogeniture, 
males succeed males to the positions of traditional leadership.  Females do not 
qualify to succeed their family heads, headmen, ward heads or chiefs/kings.  
Furthermore, the eldest son succeeds his father.  If the former predeceases the 
latter, the eldest son of the former succeeds the latter and so on.  If the former 
predeceases the latter without a male descendant, his most senior younger 
brother succeeds him.  If the latter died without a male issue, his brother, the 
former's uncle, succeeds the latter.  In other words, a brother succeeds a 
brother. 
In the instant case, the chief of the Valoyi tribe had two sons in the senior house, 
namely Fofoza N'wamitwa, the elder son, and Richard N'wamitwa, the younger 
son.  Hereditary succession among the Valoi tribe has always been patrilineal.  
After the death of their reigning father, Fofoza became the chief.  He married 
three wives.  The senior wife, Queen Favazi, bore only one child, a daughter 
called Tinyiko Philia.  The two junior wives did not bear him sons.  He left no 
male issue.  His younger brother, Richard, succeeded him in terms of the Valoyi 
tribal law.  Had the customary law rule of primogeniture of the Valoi tribe been 
predicated upon non-sexism, gender equality and equalitarianism at the time of 
the decease of Hosi Fofoza, his eldest daughter, Philia, would have been a 
logical successor and "heiress" to her father.  But the tribal law of the Valoi tribe 
was not gender neutral.  After the death of Hosi Fofoza, Philia could not succeed 
her father as Hosi because she was a woman.  Her uncle, Richard, succeeded 
Hosi Fofoza.  He died in 2001.  His eldest son, Sidwell N'wamitwa, survived him.  
Philia and a section of the tribe decided that she should assume the office of 
traditional leadership.  Her cousin, Sidwell, contested her claim. 
The succession of Hosi Richard to Hosi Fofoza took place under the living 
Tsonga-Shangana law, which at the material time did not recognise matrilineal 
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succession to traditional leadership.  The question of whether the Constitution, 
in general and the Bill of Rights, in particular have retrospective effect was 
besides the point before the Constitutional Court.  The salient question decided 
by the court was whether the traditional authority had the authority to make, 
amend or repeal customary law within the limit of the Constitution and legislation 
which specifically deals with customary law. 
The principle of male primogeniture was declared unconstitutional in the Bhe 
case because of its lack of constitutional consistency.  The Constitutional Court 
substituted the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act for the rules of 
customary law of succession based on the principle of primogeniture.  In 
Shilubana v N'wamitwa389 the Constitutional Court recognised three organs of 
state that may change the customary law of a tribe, to wit the legislative branch 
of government, the judiciary and the traditional authority.  Of course the 
executive may formulate policy and subordinate legislation which impact on 
customary law within the limit of the Constitution and legislation dealing with 
customary law.  The Constitutional Court deferred to the power of the traditional 
authorities to determine their domestic affairs.  In this case, the Valoi traditional 
authority resolved to appoint Philia to the position of senior traditional leader.  
The Constitutional Court held that the traditional authority acted intra vires its 
powers and that its resolutions were not unconstitutional.  Philia succeeded Hosi 
Richard, not Hosi Fofoza. 
If the living version is not consistent with the Constitution, it must be developed 
to the extent of the inconsistency.  It must be mentioned, in passing, that 
Principle XIII of the Interim Constitution recognises cultural pluralism390 and, 
therefore, legal pluralism.  Nowadays, individual members of families or 
communities are replacing groups as legal subjects in many spheres of life.  
There are statutes that regularise this trend of individualising legal subjects.  For 
instance, the Natal Code of Zulu Law, 1967, the Natal Code of Zulu Law 151 of 
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1987 and KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 391  individualise the legal 
persons.  Maithufi states that the piecemeal recognition and enforcement of 
customary law was occasioned by the predominance of Roman-Dutch law.392  
All customary law was applied subject to public policy or the principles of natural 
justice or bonos mores.393  However, it is not an easy task to develop living 
customary law.  Ndima394 puts it thus: 
When it comes to the pervasive problem of developing African customary 
law, the judiciary faces the additional challenge of determining the living 
version of customary law for the community concerned.  One of the 
injustices of the past, which our constitutional interpreters must reject in 
striving to heal our historical divisions, is the distortion caused to African 
law by the application of the interpretive technique of repugnancy.  This 
method removed the philosophical underpinnings (which the colonial 
officials perceived to be in conflict with Western morality) from African 
customary law. 
In addition, the living version of customary law as a part of an oral tradition and 
an ever-changing culture is difficult to pin down.  It is the law that is actually lived 
by a community.395  According to Ndima,396 in construing customary law the 
courts relied on: 
their own perceptions of justice and equity in order to determine that a 
particular African customary practice was repugnant to civilized 
behaviour, and therefore should be 'elevated' to their standard of 
morality. 
Ndima believes that the Constitutional Court in Bhe failed to debunk this 
particular colonial construct before it decided to strike down the rule of 
primogeniture.  Juma397 puts it thus: 
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The contest between African law and western law in plural legal societies 
is an enduring clash of cultures played out on an uneven socio-legal 
field. 
In Gumede v President of the RSA398 the Constitutional Court referred to some 
of the difficulties customary law faced during the previous epochs in South Africa 
and declared:399 
… [D]uring colonial times, the great difficulty resided in the fact that 
customary law was entirely prevented from evolving and adapting as the 
changing circumstances of the communities required.  It was recorded 
and enforced by those who neither practised it nor were bound by it.  
Those who were bound by customary law had no power to adapt it.  
Even when notions of spousal equality and equity and the abolition of the 
marital power of husbands over wives were introduced in this country to 
reform the common law, 'official' customary law was left unreformed and 
stone-walled by static rules and judicial precedent, which had little or 
nothing to do with the lived experience of spouses and children within 
customary marriages.  With the advent of democratic rule much had to 
give away. 
The Constitution puts common law and customary law on an equal footing.400  In 
Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community the Constitutional Court stated:401 
While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, 
it must now be seen as an integral part of our law.  Like all law it depends 
for its ultimate force and validity on the Constitution.  Its validity must now 
be determined by reference not to common-law, but to the Constitution. 
And again in Gumede v President of the RSA, 402  the court confirmed that 
customary law "lives side by side with the common law and legislation".  
However, the worrying trend is that the courts sometimes substitute the rules of 
common law for the rules of customary law.403  In Mthembu v Letsela, the court, 
per Mynhardt J, said the following: 
I believe the aforesaid rule cannot be looked at in isolation.  It must be 
seen in perspective.  If regard is had to the relevant customary family law 
                                            
398 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC). 
399 Gumede para 20.  Footnotes omitted and emphasis added. 
400 Bennett "Conflict of Laws" 22. 
401 Alexkor para 51. 
402 Gumede para 22. 
403 For example Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W). 
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rules then it becomes apparent that the rule of succession fits in with 
those rules. 
In Bhe, Ngcobo J (as he then was) held that it was possible to develop the 
customary rule of primogeniture consistent with the Constitution.  He put it 
thus:404 
In my view, the rule of male primogeniture should be developed in order 
to bring it in line with the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
He suggested that African customary law has adapted to accommodate women.  
Many women are now heads of households.  The courts ignore this fact.  Ndima 
contradicts both the majority decision, per Langa DCJ (as he then was) and the 
minority decision, per Ngcobo J (as he then was) in Bhe.  The majority decided 
that the rule of male primogeniture is not capable of development consistent with 
the Constitution, while the minority decided that, although it was 
unconstitutional, the rule was capable of development consistent with the 
Constitution.  Ngcobo J alluded to Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security,405 in which the Constitutional Court demonstrated that where a rule of 
common law deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights the 
courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove the deviation.  He held 
that the Carmichele case applies equally to the development of indigenous law.  
Ngcobo406 stated, further, that: 
By contrast, the development of indigenous law in order to adapt it to the 
changed circumstances requires the courts to have regard to what 
people are actually doing.  It is here where the living indigenous law – 
law as actually lived by the people – becomes relevant.  It is here, too, 
where the problem of identifying living indigenous law arises.  The court 
must have regard to what people are actually doing in order to adapt the 
indigenous law to the ever-changing circumstances. 
However, Ngcobo J407 emphasised that that "is not to say that in this process 
the courts should not have regard to the Constitution".  Ndima concludes that 
                                            
404 Bhe 636 para 139. 
405 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC). 
406 The Bhe case. 
407 The Bhe case. 
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both the majority and minority decisions in Bhe are wrong because living 
customary law had already developed consistent with the Constitution at the 
time of judgment. 
The Court in Leboho and Others v Premier of Limpopo and Others408 had to 
decide as to who should be the rightful successor of Kgosi Seiphi Leboho.409  As 
it is shown in chapter 6 below, Seiphi and his senior wife, Mosima Rangata, 
were not survived by any heir-apparent because they lost their biological 
children in their infancy.  Matome, Seiphi's cousin, acted as a senior traditional 
leader.  The Royal Family sought a nubile for Seiphi.  The Rangata family was 
one of the families designated to provide the Royal Family with a nubile.  
However, the Rangata family could not provide the Royal family with a nubile.  
Fortunately, the Mokgobu family provided them with a nubile, Mmangako 
Mokgobu.  They nominated Matome as her tsena husband "in order to revive 
the house of Mosima".  The liaison produced a son, named Ngako.410  Matome 
and his senior wife had three sons, Ramamphu Matee Leboho, Pheeha Ben 
Seraki Leboho and Tlabo Joseph Leboho.  Matome died in 1979.  Matee 
succeeded his father and acted as a senior traditional leader on behalf of Ngako 
who was still a minor.  Matee died in 1999.  Ben Seraki Leboho acted as a 
senior traditional leader.  Sadly, Ben Seraki died in or about 2005.  Tlabo 
Joseph Leboho succeeded Seraki.  Ngako successfully took court action and 
removed Tlabo from the throne.411 
The court, in Leboho and Others v Premier of Limpopo Province and Others, 
pointed out the following requirements for a valid appointment of a person to the 
position of a senior traditional leadership among the Hananwa of Maleboho – 
                                            
408 Leboho and Others v Premier of Limpopo Province and Others (37898/07) [2011] ZAGP.  
Hereafter Leboho. 
409 The facts of the case and historical background are dealt with below. 
410 Leboho and Others v Premier of Limpopo Province and Others (37898/07) [20011] 
ZAGPPHC 22 (28 January 2011) para 30. 
411 Leboho and Others v Premier of Limpopo Province and Others (37898/07) [20011] 
ZAGPPHC 22 (28 January 2011) para 30. 
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i. The candidate must be the eldest son of the deceased traditional leader 
and his senior wife (masechaba). 
ii. Masechaba must come from a family designated by the royal family across 
generations. 
iii. The candidate must have completed his initiation school of which he was a 
leader. 
iv. The candidate must be a leader of a regiment. 
v. The candidate must have a traditional healer of the family lineage 
designated by the royal family across generations. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Customary law has two versions, namely the official customary law and the 
living customary law.  The official version is customary law that is found in 
statutes, textbooks, publications and other scholarly writings.  It leans towards 
common law and is not in keeping with the changing or changed circumstances 
of society.  On the other hand, the living version is the lived law.  It reflects the 
actual goings-on in society and changes commensurate with the changing 
circumstances of society.  Since the advent of constitutional democracy, the 
living version has been growing in prominence.412  However, the living version is 
not in a better condition, either.413  The courts have recourse to it subject to the 
Constitution. 414   The court, tribunal or forum may develop customary law 
consistent with the Constitution.415  The most cardinal distinction between the 
two versions is the dynamic nature of living customary law as against the vitrified 
nature of the official version of customary law.416 
                                            
412 See, for instance, Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T); Alexkor. 
413 Poulter Basotho Society 167ff. 
414 Poulter Basotho Society 167ff. 
415 S 39(3) of the Constitution. 
416 In Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC), Mogoro J said that "official customary 
law has degenerated into a vitrified set of norms alienated from its roots in the 
community". 
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CHAPTER 4 
OFFICIAL CUSTOMARY FAMILY LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 examines the requirements for and consequences of a customary 
marriage entered into in accordance with the official customary law.  While the 
family as an institution is the cornerstone of a community, marriage perpetuates 
the family as its foundation-stone.  Every person has a right to freely marry and 
to establish and raise a family.  In The Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, the court said, among other things, that any 
arbitrary prohibitions on the right to freely marry and to establish and raise a 
family; or any oppressive interference of the state in the institutions of marriage 
or family would be constitutionally invalid.417  A customary marriage entered into 
voluntarily by a woman and a man in accordance with a constitutionally 
compatible customary law and the Recognition Act will pass the muster of the 
Constitution.418  Although it is not provided for in constitutionalised terms, the 
freedom to marry and establish and raise a family is protected.419 
Section 15(3) of the Constitution provides thus: 
(a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising – 
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of 
religious, personal or family; or 
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or 
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. 
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this 
section and other provisions of the Constitution. 
                                            
417 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) paras 96-103. 
418 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) paras 96-103. 
419 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC); 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) paras 96-103. 
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Section 15(3) of the Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of legislation 
such as the Marriage Act, the Recognition Act and the Civil Union Act.  It 
recognises different systems of matrimonial law such as the customary law of 
marriage, common law of marriage, Hindu law of marriage and Muslim law of 
marriage.  However, the Constitution expressly recognises the statutory law, 
common law and customary law.  The recognition of other systems of law is 
inferred from sections 15(3), 30 and 31 of the Constitution.  It follow, therefore, 
that the members of cultural, religious and linguistic communities who regard 
these religious and other systems of law as obligatory may negotiate, enter and 
celebrate marriage in accordance with them. 
4.2 The forms of customary marriage 
The Recognition Act recognises two main categories of customary marriage, 
namely monogamy and polygamy.420  For the present purposes, monogamy is 
divided into civil marriage concluded in accordance with the Marriage Act421 and 
customary monogamous marriage concluded in terms of the Recognition Act.  
On the other hand, polygamy is divided into polygyny and polyandry. 422  
Polygyny is concluded under customary law, Hindu law or Muslim law. 423  
Although the Constitution recognises religious marriages such as Hindu and 
Muslim marriages, the legislature has not yet passed legislation that recognises 
those marriages. 
African customary law recognises the custom of engagement or betrothal.424  In 
the usual order of events, the conclusion of an engagement precedes the 
formation of a customary marriage and addresses the preliminary issues 
                                            
420 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 20.  There are only two parties to a monogamous marriage.  
However, polygyny comprises more than one marriage between a man and each woman 
as parties to each marriage. 
421 Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
422 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 20.  Polygyny differs from polyandry.  Polygyny involves a man 
and more than one woman.  Polyandry involves a woman and more than one man. 
423 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 20. 
424 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 47-49. 
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requisite to pave the way for a future marriage.425  There are such other forms of 
conjugal associations as same-sex unions426 and life partnerships as well as 
supplementary marriages such as hlatswadirope (sororate) and substitute 
unions such as seyantlo (levirate) and tsena marriage (cognate union).  The 
examples of a revival or seed-raising union are ukuvusa union (ghost marriage) 
and go nyalwa ke lapa (family marriage).  The wife of a family marriage is called 
ngwetsi ya lapa. 427   There may also be some forms of woman-to-woman 
marriages.428 
4.3 The recognition of customary marriages 
Previously, unless a conjugal association complied with the provisions of the 
Marriage Act429 or was not repugnant to the principles of public policy or natural 
justice,430 it was not recognised as a marriage in the proper legal sense.  As 
time went by, Parliament passed statutes that treated customary unions as 
marriages only for the purposes of those statutes.431 
However, surprisingly, in spite of the provisions of section 15 of the Constitution, 
Muslim and Hindu marriages have not been statutorily recognised as  
 
                                            
425 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 47-49. 
426 See Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 20.  This is a union entered into by people of the same sex 
(ie homosexual people).  Traditionally, homosexual relationships are not popular among 
African traditional communities.  Traditionally, only heterosexual relationships are 
regulated by marriage.  The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation.  The court declared the restriction of civil marriage to heterosexual spouses 
invalid.  The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 has legislated same-sex unions. 
427 Family wife.  The family wife is wedded to the family and not a specific man.  The family 
will establish her house within the household and appoint a tsena husband for her. 
428 This is a marriage between a woman (usually with considerable wealth) and another 
woman aimed at bearing children for the former.  The former woman is regarded as the 
husband.  Generally, a brother or close relative is appointed as a consort of the wife.  See, 
among others, Oomen 2000 THRHR 274; Bennett Customary Law 197-198. 
429 Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
430 Koyana 2002 Obiter 98-115. 
431 S 5(6) Maintenance Act 23 of 1963; s 1 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; s 27 Child Care Act 
74 of 1983; s 31 of the BAA. 
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marriages.432  In Moola v Aulsebrook,433 Ex parte L434 and Desai v Engar and 
Engar435 the court declared a Muslim marriage to be a putative marriage with 
juristic consequences.  In Solomons v Abrams436 the court held that only a 
marriage solemnised in accordance with the Marriage Act is valid and refused to 
even declare a Muslim marriage a putative marriage.  In Ramayee v Vandiyar,437 
Didcott J held that, notwithstanding that the parties had concluded their marriage 
in accordance with their Hindu religion and were recognised as husband and 
wife by their family groups and communities, the Hindu marriage was still not a 
marriage but a mere liaison because of its non-compliance with the Marriage Act 
or any other applicable legislation.  Six years or so later, Van Reenen J 
confirmed this legal position in Ismael v Ismael438 and described the Muslim 
marriage as a "sexual cohabitation".  He stated, further, that the legislature had 
tolerated such a "sexual cohabitation" because it could not be considered contra 
bonos mores.439  In Davids v The Master,440 Vivier J held that the word "spouse" 
in section 59(1) of the Administration of Estates Act excluded women married in 
accordance with Muslim rites.  In Kalla v The Master,441 the court restated the 
upholding in Ismail v Ismail that polygynous marriages are contra bonos mores 
and void ab initio. 
Farlam J, in Ryland v Edros,442 rejected the decision in Ismail v Ismail443 and 
concluded that, based on the Constitution, a Muslim marriage is not contra 
bonos mores.  In Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 
                                            
432 Solomons v Abrams 1991 4 SA 437 (W). 
433 Moola v Aulsebrook 1983 1 687 (N). 
434 Ex parte L 1947 3 SA 50 (C). 
435 Desai v Engar and Engar 1965 4 SA 81 (W). 
436 Solomons v Abrams 1991 4 SA 437 (W). 
437 Ramayee v Vandiyar 1977 3 SA 77 (D) 78. 
438 Ismael v Ismael 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
439 Ismael v Ismael 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
440 Davids v The Master 1983 1 SA 458 (C). 
441 Kalla v The Master 1995 1 SA 261 (T). 
442 Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C). 
443 Ismael v Ismael 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
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(Commission for Gender Equality Intervening),444 Mohamed CJ held that the 
decision that a customary marriage (or Muslim marriage) was contra bonos 
mores on the grounds of its potentially polygynous nature was not consistent 
with the Constitution.  The Constitution recognises all law and, therefore, the 
marriages in terms of all law subject to the Constitution.445  It is noteworthy that 
the Constitutional Court, per Sachs J, in Daniels v Campbell,446 in its purposive 
interpretation, held that section 15(3)(a) of the Constitution: provides for the 
recognition of marriages concluded under any tradition or system of religion, 
personal or family law. 
The court decisions in Khan v Khan, 447  Hassam v Jacobs, 448  Mahomed v 
Mahomed 449  and Hoosein v Dangor 450  confirmed the recognition of section 
15(3)(a) of "marriages concluded under any tradition or a system of religion, 
personal or family law".  The constitutional interpretation is therefore shaped and 
informed by the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.451 
Previously, the legal position was that the potentially polygynous customary, 
Hindu and Muslim marriages were against the principles of public policy and 
natural justice or were contra bonos mores.452  Bennett453 puts it thus: 
A marriage may have complied with customary law but may none the 
less have fallen foul of public policy.  General considerations of policy 
have always been used to judge the validity of juristic acts, and, unlike 
the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, which are notionally at least 
                                            
444 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality 
Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA). 
445 S 8 read together with s 15(1)-(3) of the Constitution. 
446 Daniels v Campbell 2004 4 BCLR 735 (CC). 
447 Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T). 
448 Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC). 
449 Mahomed v Mahomed 2009 JOL 23733 (ECP). 
450 Hoosein v Dangor 2010 4 BCLR 362 (WCC). 
451 Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 705D-E. 
452 Nqgobela v Sihele (1893) 10 SC 346; Kaba v Ntela 1910 TS 964; Docrat v Bhayat 1932 
TPD 125; Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A); Seedat's Executor v The Master (Natal) 
1917 AD 302; Nkambula v Linda 1951 1 SA 377 (A); Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 
(AD); Malaza v Mndaweni 1974 BAC (C) 45; Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63; Zulu v 
Minister of Justice 1952 2 SA 128 (N). 
453 Bennett Customary Law 197; Bennett Application of Customary Law 84, 86. 
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timeless, the content of public policy may change to suit the needs of the 
moment. 
4.4 Defining official customary family law 
Official customary family law is a division of official customary law which 
regulates the relationships among members of a family group inter se and a 
family group and third parties.454  According to Armstrong:455 
…family law must be investigated not by looking at court cases or into 
legal textbooks, but by looking at the customary legal norms of individual 
families and communities, the practices that both follow the values and 
principles of traditional law and have crystalised into 'law' by repetition. 
The point made by Armstrong is valid insofar as the living version of customary 
law is concerned.  According to Bennett,456 there are two forms of families: 
nuclear families and extended families.457  The nuclear family comprises at least 
one parent and his/her child or children.  The extended family comprises more 
than one or two parents and their children as well as other relatives such as 
blood relatives and/or affine relatives. 
While a nuclear family is usually associated with modern industrial societies, an 
extended family is generally associated with traditional agrarian societies.458  In 
South Africa, the nuclear family system among African peoples is a product of 
colonisation and its concomitants.459  Urbanisation gave impetus to the evolution 
of a traditional form of family into a nuclear family among Africans, especially in 
                                            
454 Myburgh Indigenous Law 83. 
455 Armstrong Law and Family 2-5. 
456 Bennett Customary Law 180. 
457 Bennett Customary Law 180-186. 
458 Bennett Customary Law 180.  For further analysis of the impact of industrialisation and the 
migrant labour system see, among others, Durand Swartman; Eekelaar and Katz 
Marriage and Cohabitation; Mayer Black Villagers; Meulders-Klein and Eekelaars Family; 
Moller and Welch Polygamy and Well-being; Murray Families Divided; Pauw Second 
Generation. 
459 Bennett Customary Law 180. 
 84 
far-flung urban settlements.460  Urban marriage has generally become a union of 
two individual spouses.461 
4.5 A definition of customary marriage 
According to Bekker:462 
Customary marriage is a relationship which concerns not only the 
husband and wife, but also the family groups to which they belonged 
before marriage.  The consummation of the customary marriage brings 
into being reciprocal rights and obligations between the spouses for 
which their respective family groups are collectively responsible. 
In 1989, Bekker's definition was already identifying the spouse-specific 
reciprocal rights and obligations.  However, the role of the family groups was 
also prominently and manifestly defined.  Bekker's conception of reciprocal 
rights and obligations leans towards the common law concept of consortium. 
According to Mbiti,463 marriage is a complex affair which has interrelated and 
inseparable economic, social, legal, cultural and religious aspects.464  It is the 
focus of existence and the point where all the members of a given community 
meet: the departed, the living and those yet to be born.465  Mbiti466 argues that 
customary marriage: 
... is a 'process'.  In many societies that 'process' is complete only when 
the first child is born, or when all the marriage presents have been paid, 
or even when one's first children are married.  Marriage involves many 
people, and not just the husband and wife, and the transfer of gifts in the 
form of livestock, money or labour. 
Mbiti approaches customary marriage from the African religious viewpoint, 
according to which marriage involves at least the respective families of spouses 
                                            
460 Bennett Customary Law 180. 
461 Bennett Customary Law 182. 
462 Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 96. 
463 Mbiti African Religions 130. 
464 Mbiti African Religions 130. 
465 Mbiti African Religions 130. 
466 Mbiti African Religions 45.  See also Bekker and Van Niekerk 2009 SAPR/PL 214, 215. 
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and at most the living, the dead and the not-yet-born.  In Gumede,467 Moseneke, 
DP, put it thus: 
In our pre-colonial past, marriage was always a bond between families 
and not between individual spouses.  Whilst the two parties [husband 
and wife] to the marriage were not unimportant, their marriage 
relationship had a collective or communal substance.  Procreation and 
survival were important goals of this type of marriage and indispensable 
for the well-being of the large group.  This imposed peer pressure and a 
culture of consultation in resolving marital disputes.  Women, who had a 
great influence in the family, held a place of pride and respect within the 
family.  Their influence was subtle although not lightly overridden.  Their 
consent was indispensable to all crucial family decisions.  Ownership of 
property was never exclusive but resided in the collective and was meant 
to serve the familial good. 
According to Gough, "[m]arriage is a union between a man and a woman such 
that children born to the woman are recognised legitimate offspring of both 
parents".468  It is worth mentioning that neither marital nor extramarital children 
are illegitimate on account of the fact that their biological parents were not 
married to each other at the time of their conception, birth or subsequent 
thereto.  The marriage of their parents to each other determines the marital or 
extramarital birth and not the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the children.  The 
demands of equality and dignity of the Constitution dictate that the rights of a 
child should not depend on the marital or extramarital nature of his or her 
birth.469  By like token, the rights to equality and dignity of a spouse should not 
depend on his or her gender.470 
However, at face value the law restricts the right to consortium omnis vitae471 to 
spouses for the duration of the marriage.  One of the most important aspects of 
consortium is sexual intercourse.  The fact that customary marriage is potentially 
                                            
467 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC). 
468 Gough 1959 JRAS 49.  The contemporary and judicially correct terms are marital and 
extramarital children.  See, for instance, Bhe in which the Constitutional Court deliberately 
substituted the term "extramarital child" for the term "illegitimate child". 
469 S 9 read with ss 10 and 28 of the Constitution. 
470 Ss 9 and 10 of the Consition.  See, also, s 6 of the Recognition Act. 
471 See Visser and Potgieter Family Law 74-75 in which the concept of consortium omnis 
vitae is dealt with from the perspective of common law. 
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polygynous obtrudes on the concept of consortium omnis vitae in that while the 
polygynous husband enjoys the right to have sexual intercourse with all his 
wives, none of his wives enjoys an equally exclusive right to consortium. 
In MM v MN and Another,472 however, without deciding on the constitutionality of 
polygyny, the Constitutional Court said: 
The potential infringement of the dignity of and equality of rights of wives 
in polygynous marriages is undoubtedly present. 
However, the Recognition Act does not prohibit polygyny in spite of its apparent 
unconstitutionality.473  It is noteworthy that in Gumede the Recognition Act was 
hailed as a praiseworthy exercise in the reform of customary law.  According to 
Bekker, under the guise of recognising customary marriages the Recognition Act 
has converted them into civil marriages in all but name.474 
The BAA475  defined "customary union" as "the association of a man and a 
woman in a conjugal relationship according to Black law and custom, where 
neither the man nor the woman is a party to a subsisting marriage".476  Clearly, 
the BAA saw customary marriage through a common law lens and not a 
customary law one.  The phrase, "where neither the man nor the woman is a 
party to a subsisting marriage" betrays the adoption of the ethos of the civil 
marriage.477 
In Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee,478 the court defined marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, 479  as being a legally recognised "voluntary union for life in 
                                            
472 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
473 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
474 Bekker and Van Niekerk 2009 SAPR/PL 214. 
475 S 1 of the BAA. 
476 S 5 of the BAA; Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 112. 
477 See also Ex parte Inkley and Inkley 1995 3 SA 528 (CC) 535-536; Seedat's Executors v 
the Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302, 309; Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
478 Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1886) LR 1 P & D 130 133; Van Heerden et al Boberg's 
Law of Persons 164; Costa 1994 De Rebus 914. 
479 The notion of Christendom betrays the bias of common law towards Christianity.  This 
approach to marriage rubbishes the value-systems of other religions such as traditional 
African Religion, Hinduism, Islam, Taoism and Judaism. 
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common of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others while it 
lasts".480  Previously the term "marriage" excluded polygyny, same-sex marriage 
(civil union) 481  and extramarital relationships (cohabitation). 482   Dlamini 483 
defines customary marriage as a marriage concluded in accordance with 
customary law.  In conclusion, nowadays customary marriage may be defined 
as a marriage concluded between a man and a woman negotiated and 
celebrated in accordance with a system of customary law of a particular 
traditional community subject to the Constitution and applicable legislation such 
as the Recognition Act. 
4.6 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
According to Bennett,484 the two most important provisions in the Recognition 
Act are sections 2 and 3.  Section 2 gives full recognition to all existing 
customary marriages and section 3 stipulates the requirements for all future cus-
tomary marriages.  The Recognition Act sets out, among others, the provisions 
on the recognition of customary marriages,485 the requirements for the validity of 
customary marriage, 486  the registration of a customary marriage, 487  the 
determination of the age of a minor, 488  equal status and the capacity of 
spouses,489 the consequences of a customary marriage,490 the dissolution of a 
customary marriage, 491  the consequences of the dissolution of a customary 
marriage,492 and the change of the marriage system.493 
                                            
480 See also Ex parte Inkley and Inkley 1995 3 SA 528 (CC) 535-536; Seedat's Executors v 
the Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302, 309; Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
481 Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
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487 S 4 of the Recognition Act. 
488 S 5 of the Recognition Act. 
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490 S 7 of the Recognition Act. 
491 S 8 of the Recognition Act. 
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4.6.1 The requirements for a valid customary marriage 
The Recognition Act recognises a customary marriage "which is a valid 
marriage at customary law and is existing at the commencement of this Act".494  
However, the marriage must have been valid to earn the recognition of the Act.  
In other words, such a marriage must have met the customary law requirements 
for a valid customary marriage.495  Prior to the Recognition Act, while the codes 
of Zulu law496 applied to the traditional communities in KwaZulu-Natal, the BAA 
applied country-wide.  While the BAA did not disregard spousal consent, it 
emphasized parental consent more than spousal consent.497  However, neither 
a man nor a woman was compelled to marry against their will.498 
Bekker and Van Niekerk499 submit that the requirements for a valid marriage 
under the Marriage Act500 and the Recognition Act are almost the same because 
"customary marriages have become civil marriages in all but name". 501  
Heaton502 puts it thus: 
Many of the requirements and consequences the [Recognition] Act 
imposes in respect of customary marriages are the same as those of 
which apply to civil marriages. 
Section 3 of the Recognition Act stipulates the requirements for a valid 
customary marriage.  The individual spouses are the parties to the marriage to 
the exclusion of their respective families or parents.  The Act is silent on the role 
of parents or guardians of a major spouse in the formation of his or her 
                                                                                                                                
493 S 10 of the Recognition Act. 
494 S 2(1) of the Recognition Act. 
495 S 2(1) of the Recognition Act; Heaton South African Family Law 206. 
496 See KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and the Natal Code of Zulu Law, 
1987 (Proc 151 in GG 10966 of 9 October 1987). 
497 Bennett Customary Law 199. 
498 Presenti v Mashalaba 1941 NAC (C&O) 78. 
499 Bekker and Van Niekerk 2009 SAPR/PL 214; s 3 of the Recognition Act. 
500 Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
501 Heaton South African Family Law 205. 
502 Heaton South African Family Law 205. 
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customary marriage.  However, the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and 
Another, said:503 
Customary law may thus impose validity requirements in addition to 
those set out in subsection 1(a).  In order to determine such 
requirements a court would have to have regard to the customary 
practices of the relevant community.  The Recognition Act does not 
regulate, in some detail, various aspects and incidents of customary 
marriages. 
Customary law thus determines other rules.504  The communities may develop 
their rules subject to the Constitution.505  It follows, therefore, that customary law 
will be able to retain its living nature.506  The requirements for a valid customary 
marriage must be sourced from the legislation (i.e. the Recognition Act), the 
living customary law of the community concerned, and the Constitution.507 
A customary marriage must be registered.508  However, the failure to register it 
does not result in nullity.509  The registration of customary marriages may provide 
proof of the existence of such marriages.510  The court in Ramoitheki v Liberty 
Group Ltd t/a Liberty Corporate Benefits and Others 511  indicated that the 
following factors prove the existence of a valid customary marriage: 
i. the payment of lobola; 
ii. the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
iii. the formal nature of the relationship; 
                                            
503 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) paras 29-30. 
504 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 32. 
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iv. the involvement of the customary wife in the affairs of the family of the 
husband. 
However, these factors are not validity requirements.  The following are the 
requirements for a valid customary marriage: 
4.6.1.1 Customary marriage must be negotiated512 
The representatives of the parties to a customary marriage negotiate and take 
steps to ensure compliance with the requirements for a valid customary 
marriage.  There are three phases of negotiation. 
4.6.1.1.1 The first stage of negotiations: the marriage proposal 
The first stage involves the introductory interactions between the two family 
groups.513  Traditionally, the parents of prospective spouses arrange marriages 
for their children.514  A young man must seek the approval of his father for his 
marriage to his love-match.515  The family of the prospective husband proceeds 
to negotiate with the family of his prospective wife.516  The affinition agreement 
comes into being when the parties agree on the payment of lobola.517 
Although there are incidents of premarital sex, the initiation schools teach 
chastity. 518   The chastity of a prospective spouse is a sign of honour. 519  
Premarital pregnancy is an abomination.  The prospective husband may refuse 
to proceed with marriage negotiations on the ground that his future wife has 
                                            
512 See Bennett Customary Law 209-213; Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 63-67; Jansen 
"Customary Family Law" 47, 55-56. 
513 Jansen "Customary family law" 56. 
514 Bennett Customary Law 209. 
515 Bennett Customary Law 209. 
516 Bennett Customary Law 209. 
517 Bennett Customary Law 209. 
518 Hammond-Tooke Bantu-speaking Peoples 236ff. 
519 Particularly a bride. 
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engaged in premarital sex.  However, if he condones her misconduct he will lose 
his claim.520 
The marriage negotiations are usually set in motion by sending the emissaries of 
the family of the man to the family of the woman.  According to Sila v Masuku,521 
the first stage "involves visits, pourparlers and the exchange of social 
courtesies, all designed to establish concord between the groups, [and] 
culminates in the consent of the groups to the marriage".  Mofokeng522 puts it 
thus: 
This stage involves the first visits and exchange of social courtesies 
designed to create a unity and friendship between the groups, which 
culminates in the second stage. 
The first stage culminates in mutual consent to the marriage.  Previously, family 
consent or parental consent constituted sufficient consent for a valid customary 
marriage.  Nowadays, the spousal consent is a peremptory validity requirement.  
The lack of spousal consent to the marriage renders it void ab initio.  The 
parental consent or consent of a legal guardian is requisite if one or both 
prospective parties to the marriage were minors.  It is worth mentioning that the 
marriage negotiators must always act with the authority of a prospective spouse 
they represent. 
4.6.1.1.2 The second stage of negotiations:  lobola agreement 
According to Dlamini, the engagement or wedding becomes official once lobola 
has been agreed on.523  The second stage involves the agreement about the 
kind and amount of lobola.524  The parties must agree on lobola.  However, the 
delivery of lobola to the family of a woman is not a prerequisite for the formation 
of a customary marriage.  Traditionally, the families perform rituals and 
                                            
520 Mlakalaka v Bese 1936 NAC (C & O) 32. 
521 Sila v Masuku 1937 NAC (N&T) 121. 
522 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 64. 
523 Dlamini "Family Law" 42; De la Harpe et al Zulu 122; Vorster, Prinsloo and Van Niekerk 
Urbanites' Perceptions of lobola. 
524 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 65; Jansen "Customary Family Law" 52. 
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ceremonies.525  In Mabuza v Mbatha,526 the court rejected the attempt to elevate 
the performance of a ritual or conduct of a ceremony to the level of a 
requirement for the validity of customary marriages. 
However, in Fanti v Boto527 the court intimated that the performance of rituals, 
ceremonies and other customary practices is valuable.  However, it is submitted 
that this performance of rituals is a directory requirement whose non-
performance is not necessarily fatal.  In Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs,528 a 
man died before his customary marriage was celebrated.  The court held that 
the parties had entered into a valid customary marriage in spite of the lack of its 
celebration in accordance with customary law.529 
4.6.1.1.3 The third stage of negotiations: approved cohabitation 
The parties agree to the choice of the marital home of the spouses.  For 
instance, among the Hananwas the marital home is patrilocal.  In this context, 
after the conclusion of the marriage negotiations and the performance of the 
requisite rituals, the family of the woman must transfer her to her husband's 
family.530 
4.6.2 Consent 
Traditionally, parties to customary marriages were groups, particularly families of 
the prospective husband and prospective wife.531  Nowadays, there are two 
main forms of consent, namely spousal consent and parental consent. 
                                            
525 Fanti v Boto 2008 5 SA 405 (C). 
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527 Fanti v Boto 2008 5 SA 405 (C). 
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529 Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W). 
530 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 65; Jansen "Customary Family Law" 52. 
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4.6.2.1 Spousal consent 
Spousal consent is consent proffered by a man and a woman in regard to their 
marriage to each other.532  Traditionally, the consent of a spouse was, strictly 
speaking, irrelevant.533  However, the authorities at the Cape of Good Hope 
came to duly accept the relevance of the spousal consent, as was the case in 
Europe.534  Any marriage contracted without the consent of one of the spouses 
was deemed "repugnant to our civilized conscience".535  The law did not permit 
of a forced marriage or marriage under duress. 536   In the same vein, child 
betrothals were deemed against the principles of public policy and natural 
justice.537  Nobody could be married against his or her will.538  However, to avoid 
immediate payment of lobola, the bride and groom might elope together.539  
Needless to say, the abduction of a bride was a mechanism used among some 
African communities in the past.540 
4.6.2.1.1 The consent of the prospective husband 
The consent of the prospective husband is essential for the validity of the 
customary marriage. 541   No customary marriage may be validly concluded 
without the voluntary participation and therefore the consent of the prospective 
husband.  It is only after the prospective husband and prospective wife have 
reached an agreement to marry each other that they may separately inform their 
respective families of their intention to enter into marriage with each other.542 
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4.6.2.1.2 The consent of the prospective wife 
A woman is a party to her customary marriage.  No marriage may be validly 
concluded without the consent of the prospective wife.543 
4.6.2.2 Parental consent 
The Black Administration Act544 substituted parental consent for the communal 
consent of the family. 
4.6.2.2.1 The consent of the parents of the man 
The consent of the parents of the man is divided into paternal consent and 
maternal consent. 
4.6.2.2.1.1 The consent of the father of the man 
Previously, the non-approval of the marriage by the father or a mere lack thereof 
was sufficient to show that there was no marriage.545  It might show that there 
was no agreement between the families of the man and the woman. 546  
However, if the man were to provide for his wife-to-be with his own money, he 
would be exempted from the strictures of the requirement of the consent of his 
father.547 
Nowadays, the consent of the father or legal guardian of a man who has 
achieved his majority is no longer a requirement for the validity of the customary 
marriage.548  Traditionally, the family of the man was obliged to pay lobola to his 
in-laws, particularly for his first wife.549  Dlamini550 points out that the paternal 
                                            
543 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 52. 
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545 Dlamini "Family Law" 43. 
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consent became a sine qua non to the validity of the customary marriage.  
Nowadays, the general trend is that the grooms pay lobola for their brides out of 
their own treasuries.551  Historically, uncles and aunts are common role-players 
in the marriage of their nieces or nephews.552 
4.6.2.2.1.2 The consent of the mother of the man 
The Recognition Act does not provide for the parental consent as a sufficient 
consent for the validity of a customary marriage.  However, traditionally the 
communal consent of the family group was a legal requirement for the validity of 
the customary marriage of a man.  The customary law of marriage evolved to 
the extent that the paternal consent became the substitute for the communal 
consent.  The need for the maternal consent was obviated by the perpetual 
minority of the mother.  However, the father would give his consent after 
consultation with the mother of the man.  The Constitution has laid the 
foundation for an equal society and prohibits unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of gender.  The Recognition Act imposes spousal equality upon the 
man and the woman.  On this point only, the parents of the man are equal 
before the law and may, if it were required of them, enjoy equal rights to consent 
to the marriage of their minor son.  In Fanti v Boto553 the court held that the 
mother of the woman had the legal capacity to negotiate and receive lobola in 
respect of the woman. 
4.6.2.2.2 The consent of the parents of the woman 
4.6.2.2.2.1 The consent of the father of the woman 
Previously the non-approval of the marriage by the father or a mere lack thereof 
was sufficient to show that there was no marriage.554  It might show that there 
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was no agreement between the families of the man and the woman. 555  
Dlamini556  points out that the paternal consent was a sine qua non to the 
customary marriage irrespective of the age of the man.  The consent of the 
father of the woman is equally no longer a statutory requirement for the validity 
of a customary marriage.557  However, the marriage must be negotiated, entered 
into and celebrated in accordance with customary law. 
4.6.2.2.2.2 The consent of the mother of the woman 
Nowadays, the mother of the woman enjoys equal status in relation to, among 
others, the marriage negotiations and attendant agreement on lobola in 
consideration of her daughter's marriage.  A mother is competent to give 
consent to the marriage of her child if the child is under the age of 18 years. 
4.6.2.3 The transfer of a bride to her matrimonial home 
Historically, the handing over of the woman amounted to the transfer of the 
woman from her natal family home to the parental home or the home of the 
man.558  The converse is unheard of in South Africa.  According to customary 
law in South Africa, a bride is expected to live with her husband, either at his 
own or his father's homestead.559 
The purpose of the handing over of the woman is to integrate her into her marital 
family group.560  In Mabuza v Mbatha,561 there was a dispute about whether the 
woman had been integrated into her marital family because ukumekeza custom 
had not been performed.  The court held that the non-compliance with 
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ukumekeza custom was not fatal.562  The parties might waive it.563  Jansen564 is 
of the view that the court missed the point.  He argues that it is the integration 
into the man's family through the handing over of the bride and not necessarily 
the ukumekeza custom that is a requirement for a valid customary marriage.  
However, ritual and ceremonies are important.565 
Neither the Constitution nor the Recognition Act provides for the custom of the 
handing over and transfer of a woman to the man or vice versa.  However, the 
right to equality in the Constitution and spousal equality in the Recognition Act 
proscribe unfair discrimination on the grounds of gender.  As explained above, 
according to MM v MN and Another, 566  customary law may impose rules 
additional to those set out in the Recognition Act provided they are not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. 
4.6.2.4 The lobola agreement 
According to Ramphele:567 
The cornerstone of 'traditional' control of women by men among Africans 
in most parts of South Africa is the system of lobola (bridewealth), which 
is used to secure control of the reproductive power of women.  Lobola 
also plays an important role in ordering relations between men, both as 
individuals and as groups. 
The custom of lobola is a well-entrenched practice among traditional African 
communities.568  Prior to the enactment of the Recognition Act, the SALC (as it 
then was) conducted consultations on customary marriages including the 
custom and practice of lobola. 569   Divergent views were expressed on the 
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custom of lobola as a validity requirement for a customary marriage.570  The 
pros and cons of lobola were aired. 571   While traditionalists advocated its 
retention, modernists and women's lobby groups were vehemently opposed to 
the retention of lobola as a validity requirement for customary marriages.572 
The Recognition Act does not abolish lobola but only defines it.  The parties 
must agree that the family of the man or the prospective husband will pay lobola.  
However, the actual payment of lobola is not a requirement for the validity of a 
customary marriage.573  However, although, the delivery of lobola may happen 
long after the conclusion of the marriage,574 the payment of lobola is still socially 
and culturally essential.575  In any view, section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act exempts custom of lobola from the repugnancy clause despite 
that the payment of lobola may be mistaken for the sale of a woman to a man.576 
Maithufi577 says the following regarding the purposes of lobola: 
Lobola is believed to have various purposes in customary law.  Among 
others, it is used to stabilize the marriage, legitimate the children, act as 
a form of compensation, place the responsibility upon the father or 
guardian of the wife to support should it become necessary, and ensure 
proper treatment of the wife by her husband and his family. 
Save for one question, that which regards lobola as an act of compensation, all 
of the other purposes listed by Maithufi are not controversial.  The compensatory 
purpose may turn lobola into a contract of sale.  It is worth stating in passing that 
in some communities the value of lobola is commensurate with the extent of the 
education of the woman.578 
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According to Ellenberger and McGregor,579 the notion of lobola originated from 
the fact that in ancient times the family head (the paterfamilias) had the right of 
life and death over his children and had the power to sell them in bondage or 
give them away in marriage. 
Chinyenze580 submits that lobola reduces a woman to a position subordinate to 
that of a man and renders her inferior in all spheres of life including spousal, 
family and social power relations.  According to this viewpoint, lobola therefore 
serves to confirm the traditional perpetual minority of a woman in a patriarchal 
system.  However, the anthropologists "of the functionalist school showed that 
lobola was no more than a consideration for a wife's reproductive potential".581  
Lobola was therefore a quid pro quo that compensated the woman's family for 
the loss of their daughter.582  It is paid in cash or kind.583  The use of livestock as 
lobola has declined drastically among urban and peri-urban communities.  
However, among rural communities the payment of lobola through livestock is 
still a respectable option. 
According to Dlamini584 traditional communities do not regard a relationship as a 
marriage unless the man or the family of the man has paid or agreed to pay 
lobola to the family of the woman.  Bennett states that lobola is the most 
important aspect for a valid customary marriage.585  Lobola gives customary 
marriage a distinctive African character.586 
According to Welch and Sachs,587 a survey of the practice of the custom of 
lobola in Mozambique indicates that it has three fundamental characteristics: 
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cultural, economic and legal dimensions.  They state, further, that Junod, a 
Christian priest, divides the Christian attitude towards lobola into two world-
views, namely the Christian individualist world-view and the pagan collectivist 
world-view.  He categorises lobola as a pagan practice.  He propounds that 
while pagans are at liberty to pay lobola and conclude polygynous marriages, 
such practices as lobola and polygamy are abominations among Christians.  To 
him and to like-minded people of the West lobola is a pure purchase price for 
the woman.  It reduces a woman to a slave and she is therefore an object over 
whom the husband has rights.  Clearly, Junod was caught in the contradictions 
between the Christian and traditional African belief systems.  He viewed lobola 
as pagan because it was not practised in the Western churches.  This smacks of 
prejudice and intolerance of diversity. 
According to Prinsloo, Van Niekerk and Vorster588 lobola has frequently been 
discussed in terms of its social, psychological and legal significance.  It has 
been construed as a contract of sale, a requirement for the validity of a 
customary marriage, and as legitimating children.  According to indigenous 
African customary law, marriage determines the marital or extramarital status of 
the birth of a child.  The marital or extramarital birth of a child determines its 
position in the family (the natal or marital family of the mother) or society.  The 
lobola agreement is a requirement for the validity of a customary marriage.  In 
traditional African communities in Southern Africa, lobola has had an impact not 
only on the validity of a customary marriage but also on the rights of the African 
woman and her children.  In the United States, Bell589 submits, there is no 
causal nexus between the marital or extramarital birth of a child and his or her 
entitlement to fundamental rights.  The fact that a child has had an extramarital 
birth does not affect his or her rights.  Bell590 puts it thus: 
In the United States the children of never-married mothers are 
'illegitimate' in customary speech, but the citizenship rights of children, 
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their rights to support of their father (and to his legacy if he dies 
intestate), and other rights do not require marriage to the mother.  Legal 
fatherhood, with its attendant rights and responsibilities, exists without 
modification in the absence of the relationship between the father and 
the mother. 
Ashton591 submits that the main objection to lobola is that a woman is sold as a 
commodity to her husband.  Lobola derogates the inherent dignity of women and 
imposes upon them an inferior status.  Ashton, however, acknowledges that the 
Basotho do not regard lobola as a purchase price for the woman.  African 
peoples do not regard a woman as a commodity.592  Among African peoples, 
lobola is regarded as a token of appreciation of the family of the man for the role 
played by the family of the woman in bringing up the woman as well as an 
appreciation of the value that the woman brings to the family of the man.593 
No marriage is socially acceptable among the traditionalists if lobola is not at 
least agreed upon.594  Urbanised or industrialised African people may look down 
upon lobola but it is a custom that still enjoys universal recognition and 
appreciation among traditional communities.  Africans often agree on lobola 
even prior to entering into civil or Christian marriages.595 
4.6.2.5 The non-existence of civil marriage 
A civil marriage is entered into in terms of the Marriage Act.  The Marriage Act 
prohibits a party to a civil marriage from entering into another civil marriage 
stante matrimomo.596  Nobody may enter into a customary marriage while he or 
she is a party to a civil marriage.597  Before 1988, the effect of the conclusion of 
a civil marriage by a husband or wife in a customary marriage was the 
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annulment of the existing customary marriage between the parties inter se598 
However, section 1 of Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment 
Act599 improved the position of a customary wife.600  Further to the above, a 
party to a civil marriage could not enter into a valid customary marriage during 
the subsistence of the civil marriage.601  If it were concluded, such a marriage 
would be null and void.602  However, a party to a customary marriage could 
enter into a valid civil marriage.  It is worth mentioning that the annulment of 
customary marriages through civil marriages had a negative impact on 
customary wives.603  The Recognition Act does not prohibit polygyny.604  As 
customary marriages are potentially polygynous, a man may marry more than 
one customary wife605 but on the proviso that the first wife must consent to any 
subsequent marriage. 606   Polygyny was regarded as a source of wealth. 607  
There are pros and cons for the practice of polygyny.608  For instance, polygyny 
is discriminatory and morally reprehensible because it confers a right to marry 
more than one spouse upon males only. 609   It is said that polygyny is 
obsolescent, but migrant workers resort to cohabitation in the urban areas while 
their wives languish in loneliness back in the rural villages.610 
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4.6.2.6 Parties must not be related within prohibited degrees 
The prohibited degrees of relationship are defined in terms of consanguinity and 
affinity.  A relationship of consanguinity is a relationship by virtue of birth, while a 
relationship of affinity is a relationship through marriage.  According to 
Bekker,611 the prohibited degrees often differ from community to community or 
from clan to clan.  Among the Thembu, Xhosa and Bomvana a marriage or 
sexual intercourse is prohibited between a clansman and a clanswoman.  
Among the Zulu, no marriage or sexual intercourse between blood relations or a 
clanswoman and a clansman is allowed.  No marriage of cross-cousins is 
allowed.  Among the Pondo, no marriage or intercourse between members of 
the clan on both the maternal and paternal sides is allowed.  One may not marry 
or have sexual relations with one's mother's or grandmother's clansman or 
clanswoman.  Among the Venda it is a practice for cross-cousins to marry.  
Among the Tsonga a man may not marry the daughter of his maternal uncle's 
family.  Among the Sotho and the Tswana, a man may not marry an antecedent 
or descendant nor his sister, half-sister, father's sister or mother's sister.  The 
marriages of cross-cousins are allowed. 
4.6.2.7 Parties must be above the age of 18 years 
Traditionally, customary law did not set a marriageable age.  But, as already 
pointed out, one of the determinants of marriageable age was graduation from 
the initiation school.612  The rite of passage conferred the status of adulthood 
upon the initiates.613  The age of puberty is another indicator of a marriageable 
age.  However, the age of puberty is unique to each woman.614  The Age of 
Majority Act615 prescribed the age of majority as the 21st birthday.  A person 
aged 21 years or above was a major and a person aged below 21 years was a 
                                            
611 Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 123-125. 
612 Bennett Customary Law 203. 
613 Bennett Customary Law 203. 
614 Bennett Customary Law 203. 
615 The Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972. 
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minor.  The question was whether this Act applied to customary law.  The courts 
answered in the affirmative.616  As shown below, the Constitution, Recognition 
Act and Children's Act now prescribe the age of majority.  The purpose of the 
prescription of the age of majority is to protect the interests of the minors. 
4.6.2.7.1 The Constitution 
Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that the term "child" means a person 
under the age of 18 years.  A child is subject to parental authority.  Parental 
authority includes guardianship, custody, access and maintenance. 
4.6.2.7.2 Statutory recognition of the age of majority 
Section 9 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act provides that a child is 
a person under the age of 18 years.  Section 17 of the Children's Act617provides: 
A child, whether male or female, becomes a major upon reaching the 
age of 18 years. 
In other words, the age of majority is 18 years for all men and women. 618  
Marriage confers the status of majority upon a party to a valid marriage.  Unless 
there are other legal disabilities, a major has full competencies: legal capacity, 
the capacity to act and the capacity to litigate. 
4.6.3 The consequences of customary marriage 
Section 6 of the Recognition Act provides as follows: 
                                            
616 Mnyandu v Mnyandu 1974 BAC (C) 459; Mpanza v Qonono 1978 AC (C) 136; Khumalo v 
Dladla 1981 AC 95 (NE).  See also Katekwe v Muchabaiwa 1982 2 ZLR 112 (S) in which 
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, per Dumbutshena CJ held that, according to the Legal 
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completely independent and emancipated so that she does not require the assistance of a 
parent or guardian to enter into marriage, contracts or perform juristic acts, and may even 
negotiate and receive in her own right. 
617 Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
618 Heaton South African Family Law 207. 
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On the basis of equality with her husband and subject to the matrimonial 
property system governing the marriage, [a wife has] full status and 
capacity, including the capacity to acquire assets and to dispose of them, 
to enter into contracts and to litigate, in addition to any powers that she 
might have at customary law. 
4.6.3.1 Personal consequences 
There are a number of consequences on the person of a spouse.  The Marriage 
Act619 and the Recognition Act620 find expression within the Constitution and the 
family relationships.  They equalise the personal relations of family and 
community members, in general, and spouses, in particular.621  These personal 
relations manifest in the legal capacity, the capacity to act, the contractual 
capacity, and the freedom (the capacity) to marry.622  In our pre-colonial past 
these capacities resided communally in the family represented by a male family 
head.623  Generally the husband as the family head was liable for the actions of 
his family members and responsible for the fulfillment of the contractual 
obligations of his family and family members.624  Whelpton625 submits that the 
Western legal concept of representation is not consistent with the customary law 
concept of representation among the Bakwena Ba Mokgopa of Hebron.  
Bekker 626  argues that the keeper and intermediary are examples of 
representation. 
The BAA began the process of individualising familial, personal and spousal 
relations, and by extension, capacities.  However, family headship and 
traditional leadership generally continued to exist subject to the customary rule 
of male primogeniture.627 South Africa signed the International Convention on 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on 21 
                                            
619 The Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
620 The Recognition Act. 
621 S 6 of the Recognition Act gives effect to the provisions of ss 9 and 10 of the Constitution. 
622 See s 6 of the Recognition Act. 
623 Bekker "Customary Law of Contract" 93. 
624 Prinsloo and Vorster "Parties" 21.  See also Whelpton Swazi Law of Contract 14. 
625 Whelpton Inheemse Kontraktereg 121. 
626 Bekker "Customary Law of Contract". 
627 Bennett Human Rights 80-83. 
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January 1993.628  The Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds 
among others of gender, sex and marital status. 
4.6.3.1.1 Legal capacity 
This is the capacity of a person to have and enjoy rights and have duties.  A 
person has rights and responsibilities towards other persons.  A right imposes 
duties on other persons, to respect the right of the right-holder.  The notion of 
individual rights constitutes a departure from a customary law notion of group 
rights.  In customary law a group is a vestee of rights.  These are group rights as 
opposed to the common law notion of individual rights.  In the same vein, our 
pre-colonial customary law did not recognise the exclusively individual rights of 
spouses.  There were no matrimonial spousal capacities that existed 
adventitious to the collective capacities of the families of husbands and wives. 
The Recognition Act individualises and equalises capacities.  Husband and wife 
enjoy equal capacity.  In other words, they enjoy equal rights as parties to 
customary marriage and community members. 
4.6.3.1.2 Capacity to act 
Historically a family used to have the capacity to perform juristic acts on behalf 
of its members.  The family head represented the family in, among others, 
contracts, suits of law, criminal matters and public arenas.  He acted in 
consultation with the adult members of family group, in particular males.  
Patriarchy imposed perpetual minority on women (in general, and wives in 
particular).  The capacity of a woman, as a minor, was an incomplete capacity to 
act.  She required the assistance of her husband, parent or guardian to perform 
a valid juristic act.  The Matrimonial Property Amendment Act abolished 
inequality between a man and a woman, particularly at common law.  The 
                                            
628 See the Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972; s 8 of the Interim Constitution and s 9 of the 
Constitution. 
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Recognition Act put into effect the equality clause of the Constitution in regard to 
husband and wife married in accordance with customary marriage.  The spousal 
equality finds expression in, among others, the capacity of the spouses to act. 
4.6.3.1.3 Contractual capacity 
The Matrimonial Property Amendment Act abolished the marital power.  
However, it did not proscribe patriarchy and the customary rule of male 
primogeniture altogether.  The Constitution ushered in the ideal of an equal 
society.  The Recognition Act equalises the contractual capacities of husband 
and wife.  In the result, husband and wife enjoy equal status and capacities. 
4.6.3.1.4 Freedom to marry 
Freedom to marry is an aspect of the capacity to act.  At common law, a spouse 
cannot marry another person while a marriage to which he/she is a party still 
subsists. 629   While a woman cannot enter into more than one marriage 
contemporaneously, a man is at liberty to enter into more than one marriage. 
4.6.3.2 Proprietary consequences 
According to Pienaar,630 customary law recognises three categories of property, 
namely family property, house property and personal property.  While personal 
property is vested in an individual member of a family group, the family property 
and house property are the objects of shared group rights.  These are 
communal property rights.  However, the customary law communal property 
rights must "be understood within the framework of family relationships". 631  
Historically, the individual family member acquires and protects rights through 
the family at whose helm is a male family head.  The individual rights are 
submerged in the family group rights.  Family members owe their family a duty 
                                            
629 Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P & D 130 133.  For a South African position, 
see, inter alia, Seedat's Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 307-308. 
630 Pienaar "Customary Law of Property" 77-79. 
631 Maithufi "Law of Property" 54. 
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to co-operate and foster unity among family members and to act in unison in the 
name of the family.  The actions of each member are imputed to the family.  No 
member is more of a group rights-holder than others.  The family head's 
hegemony is nominal and is exercised in the best interest of the family group.  
The system has entrenched checks and balances that curb the excesses of any 
member including the family head.  The family head accounts to the family 
group.  His abuse of power is subject to the veto of the family council.  The 
family head is, therefore, not above the law.  Bekker632 puts it thus: 
In original customary law, both in theory and practice, a family head was 
in control of the family home and its property.  An unemancipated 
individual could not own anything individually, and whatever he might 
have acquired vested in the family head.  Yet, as has been shown, the 
property of the family home was not owned outright by the family head, 
but was held in communal ownership by the family as a unit, under his 
administration and control. 
While common law recognises individual ownership, co-ownership and a 
matrimonial property system, traditional customary law recognises communal 
ownership.  Customary law does not vest property in the individual spouses after 
a husband and wife have entered into marriage.  Upon the formation of the 
marriage, a woman becomes a full member of her marital family.  In other 
words, her matrimony endows her with an indivisible share in the communal 
property of the family group, namely the family and house property.  Section 6 
read together with section 7 of the Recognition Act substitutes the individual 
matrimonial property for the customary law communal property. 
The Constitutional Court in Gumede 633  was called upon to determine the 
constitutionality and validity of the provisions of the Recognition Act, that 
distinguish between the rights of women who entered into customary marriage 
before the coming into operation of the Act and those of women who entered 
into customary marriage after the coming into operation of the Act.  The Court 
held that the Act discriminated unfairly against the women who entered into 
                                            
632 Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 82. 
633 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC). 
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customary marriages before the coming into operation of the Recognition Act.  
In other words, the Gumede judgment equalises all wives in customary 
marriages.  The right to equality is brought to bear upon the person and property 
of the spouses of a customary marriage.  In this context, the Act founds spousal 
equality.  Having founded spousal equality as a core value of customary 
marriage, the value of equality permeates all subjects and objects of customary 
marriage.  The personal relations as much as property relations are constructed 
on the footing of equality. 
Unless the parties have concluded an antenuptial contract or the husband is a 
party to an existing marriage to another woman, a customary marriage entered 
into in terms of the Recognition Act is a marriage in community of property and 
of profit and loss.634   Sections 14 to 20 and section 24 of the Matrimonial 
Property Act635 apply to customary marriage.636  Heaton637 puts it thus: 
Thus, the rules that govern administration of the joint estate, litigation by 
or against a spouse who is married in community of property, damages 
paid or recovered by such a spouse, the spouse's delictual liability, and 
the statutory protective measures one spouse can employ against the 
other are exactly the same in civil and customary marriages in 
community of property. 
The parties are equal co-owners of undivided and indivisible half-shares of their 
matrimonial property: all the assets and liabilities they had at the time of 
concluding the marriage and all the assets and liabilities acquired during the 
subsistence of the marriage. 638   Upon concluding marriage, their separate 
estates merge.639  Section 11 of the Matrimonial Property Act640 abolished the 
marital power of the husband.  By like token, section 6 of the Recognition Act 
equalises the spouses of customary marriages.641  The husband of a customary 
                                            
634 S 7 of the Recognition Act. 
635 The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
636 S 7(3) of the Recognition Act. 
637 Heaton South African Family Law 209-210.  Notes omitted. 
638 Heaton South African Family Law 66-74 and authorities in it. 
639 Heaton South African Family Law 66-74 and authorities in it. 
640 The Matrimonial Property Act 88 0f 1984. 
641 See also the Gumede case. 
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marriage is no longer a family head by operation of the law.642  The spouses are 
equal co-administrators of the joint estate.643  Both spouses must consent to the 
alienation of any asset of the joint estate.  Of course, a spouse does not require 
the consent of another spouse for the purposes of acquiring or purchasing the 
household necessaries.  In any view, nowadays, women are competent to hold 
land and other property on their own account.644 
However, it is noteworthy that a marriage in community of property, profit and 
loss is unsuited to polygynous households.  It is for this reason that a 
polygynous marriage is automatically a marriage out of community of property.  
In fact, the traditional communal property system is suitable for a polygynous 
household in which each house has its own property (i.e. house property).  The 
family as a whole has general (family) property.  The family head may allot 
assets of family property to houses to create house property for each house 
within the polygynous household. 
4.7 The dissolution of a customary marriage645 
According to Bekker,646 customary marriage may be dissolved in any of the 
following ways: 
i. by the death of a spouse or both spouses; 
ii. by common consent; 
iii. at the instance of the husband; 
iv. at the instance of the wife and her guardian. 
Nowadays customary marriage may be dissolved through divorce or death. 
                                            
642 S 6 of the Recognition Act. 
643 S 6 of the Recognition Act. 
644 Monnig Pedi 153; Letsoalo Land Reform 20; Duncan Sotho Laws 87, 90-1; Kuper African 
Aristocracy 149; Schapera Tswana Law 202; Schapera Native land Tenure 150; Sheddick 
Land Tenure 164; Wilson and Mills Land Tenure 10. 
645 Jansen "Customary Family Law" para 3.3.7. 
646 Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 171-194. 
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According to Myburgh:647 
Marriage is dissolved by cessation of the woman's membership of her 
husband's group owing to her death or to forfeiture or abandonment of 
the marital guardianship on recognized grounds or return of such 
guardianship with the consent of the woman's father and husband's 
groups, the return or provision of marriage-goods depending on the 
performance of the wife and her group during the marriage. 
Myburgh has captured the ways of dissolving a customary marriage relatively 
well.  However, it must be mentioned that at customary law death does not 
necessarily terminate the membership of the woman of the husband's family 
group.  In accordance with African customs and religion, marriage is a meeting 
point of the dead, the living and the yet-to-be-born.648  The dead retain the 
membership of their family in spite of death. 
4.7.1 The dissolution of a customary marriage through divorce 
It is a moot question whether or not the pre-colonial Southern African peoples 
recognised divorce, particularly if the concept of divorce is assessed against the 
maxim of lebitla la mosadi ke bogadi.649  According to Mofokeng "[t]raditionally, 
divorce as we understand it today was unknown".650  If there were differences 
between husband and wife, he could return her to her natal family group.651  
However, such a separation did not amount to divorce in the common-law sense 
as the marriage was entered into between the family of the husband and the 
family of the wife and not between an individual husband and an individual 
wife.652  That being the case, a husband could go to fetch the wife again if she 
wished to return.  However, she could always refuse to return to him.653  Bennett 
puts it thus:654 
                                            
647 Myburgh Indigenous Law 111-112. 
648 Mbiti African Religions 130. 
649 The grave of a married woman is at her natal family.  In other words, marriage is 
permanent. 
650 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 85. 
651 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 85-87. 
652 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 85-87. 
653 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 87. 
654 Bennett Customary Law 266 and authorities cited in it. 
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Some works on customary law avoid this word ['divorce'] altogether, on 
the ground that the common-law concept of divorce was unknown in 
Southern Africa, where marriages where either indissoluble or, at least, 
very rarely dissolved. 
The Recognition Act departs fundamentally from this traditional customary law 
position and provides for the dissolution of a marriage through divorce.655  A 
party to a customary marriage may apply to the High Court, Family Court or 
Divorce Court for the dissolution of the marriage.656 
4.7.1.1 Grounds for divorce 
The Recognition Act provides for only one ground for divorce, namely the 
irretrievable breakdown of a marriage. 657   The desertion or continuous 
unconsciousness of a spouse is not a customary law ground for divorce.658 
4.7.1.1.1 The irretrievable breakdown of a marriage 
The Recognition Act provides that customary marriage may be dissolved by 
court on the grounds that it has irretrievably broken down.659  Previously, the 
conception of irretrievable break-down of marriage was not a ground for divorce 
in customary law.660  The court is required to satisfy itself that the marriage 
relationship between the parties has reached such a state of disintegration that 
there is no prospect of restoring a normal marriage relationship between 
them.661  It is noteworthy that, correctly construed, the irretrievable breakdown of 
marriage is not necessarily exclusive of the pre-constitutional customary law 
grounds for divorce.  At customary law the husband could divorce the wife on 
any of the following grounds, among others: adultery by a wife (more than one 
incident), incest, pregnancy and abscondence by the wife and refusal to return.  
                                            
655 S 8(1) of the Recognition Act. 
656 S 8(1) read together with s 1 of the Recognition Act. 
657 S 8(1) of the Recognition Act. 
658 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 87. 
659 S 8(1) of the Recognition Act.  See also Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 87. 
660 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 64; Bekker 1976 CILSA 346; Whelpton and Vorster 2001 
SA Journal for Ethnology 56-61. 
661 S 8(2) of the Recognition Act. 
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The wife may raise the following as some of the grounds for divorce: serious 
assault and physical ill-treatment by the husband, the husband's accusing the 
wife of witchcraft, expulsion, long-term desertion, and impotence, if the wife was 
unaware of the husband's condition at the time of their marriage.  This is not a 
closed list.662 
4.7.1.2 The consequences of the dissolution of a customary marriage through 
divorce 
There are two categories of consequences of the dissolution of a customary 
marriage through divorce, namely the personal consequences and the 
patrimonial or proprietary consequences. 
4.7.1.2.1 Personal consequences 
After the dissolution of their marriage, the status of a former husband and a 
former wife changes to that of an unmarried man and an unmarried woman.  
They can perform juristic acts, enter into contracts and even marry without the 
consent of each other.  The capacities of a man and a woman are dealt with, 
with the necessary differences, in paragraph 4.6.3 above. 
4.7.1.2.2 Proprietary consequences 
The control of the matrimonial property is a controversial issue.  It is the source 
of social power.663   Traditionally, women had no capacity to act as and no 
contractual capacity.664  The control of communal property (family property and 
house property) was vested in the male family head, who administered and 
alienated it in consultation with the male members of the family.665  He was 
enjoined to act in the interest of the family group.666  Traditionally, the proprietary 
                                            
662 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 65. 
663 Hirschon Women and Property 1. 
664 Hirschon Women and Property 1. 
665 Bekker "Customary Law of Contract" 93-94. 
666 Bekker "Customary Law of Contract" 93-94. 
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consequences of divorce were less favourable for women than for men.  The 
Recognition Act altered the property system.  The Recognition Act governs the 
contemporary customary marriages and their consequences, including their 
dissolution by death or divorce.  The Act provides that all customary marriages 
are marriages in community of property unless the parties thereto enter into ante 
nuptial contracts antecedent to the formation of the marriage.  If the matrimonial 
property system was a joint estate, the dissolution of the marriage would result 
in the division of the estate into two equal shares.  Section 8(4)(a) provides that 
sections 7 to 10 of the Divorce Act and section 24(1) of the Matrimonial Property 
Act667 are applicable in the dissolution of customary marriages through divorce 
and the attendant division of property.  If the contrary was the case and the 
spouses kept two separate estates, the individual spouses would retain their 
own separate estates. 
4.7.1.2.3 The interests of children 
The Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act668 and section 6 of the Divorce 
Act 669  apply to the interests and welfare of the children of the spouses at 
divorce.  The law equates all children at the divorce of their parents regardless 
of whether the parents married in accordance with civil marriage or customary 
marriage.670  In terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act,671 the 
court may decide on the guardianship, custody, access and maintenance of a 
minor child.  The decision must be made in the best interests of the child672 on 
the advice of the family advocate and family counselors.  Jansen673 states that, 
                                            
667 The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
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670 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 65.  See also Van Schalkwyk 2003 De Jure. 
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Afr J Ethnol 62-66; Jansen "Customary Family Law" 66. 
673 Jansen "Customary Family Law" 66. 
 115 
in determining the best interests of the child, the court may take into account 
African cultural values and belief systems. 
4.7.2 The dissolution of a customary marriage by death 
Historically, death does not terminate a customary marriage.  If a man dies the 
wife remains a member of his family and, if she is still of a child-bearing age, she 
may even enter into a substitute marriage with a close relative of her deceased 
husband, particularly his uterine younger brother.674  This substitute marriage is 
called a tsena marriage.675  The substitute husband is called a tsena husband 
and the widow of the deceased is called a tsena wife.  However, for all legal 
purposes she is still the wife of the deceased and her tsena children belong to 
her deceased husband. 
Historically, if a wife of a customary marriage predeceases her husband, the 
marriage does not dissolve.  The husband may marry a seyantlo (levirate).676 
The levirate steps into the shoes of the deceased wife. 
Nowadays there are two categories of the consequences of the dissolution of a 
customary marriage through the death of a spouse, namely the personal 
consequences and the patrimonial or proprietary consequences.  These 
categories of consequences are discussed seriatim in the following paragraphs: 
4.7.2.1 Personal consequences 
Among some Pedi and other Northern Sotho groups, the wife mourns her 
husband for about a year and becomes his perpetual window.  She may even be 
allocated a tsena husband among her deceased husband's closest male 
relatives of comparable age.  However, the death of a spouse does not 
                                            
674 Koyana Customary Law 83-84 indicates that the Xhosa prefer a stranger as ukungena 
husband other than a deceased's brother or relative.  See also Bekker and Koyana 2012 
De Jure 568, 577. 
675 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 87. 
676 Phillips Survey of African Marriage xi-xii. 
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terminate their marriage.  The Recognition Act regulates the personal 
consequences of the dissolution of customary marriage by death. 
4.7.2.2 Proprietary consequences 
Unless the parties concluded an antenuptial contract or the husband is a party to 
an existing marriage to another woman, a marriage entered into in terms of the 
Recognition Act is a marriage in community of property and of profit and loss.  
The parties are equal owners of the matrimonial property.  In the absence of a 
will, the property of the marriage is dissolved and the estate of the deceased, 
which is the equal part of the joint estate, is abstracted from the joint estate and 
distributed ab intestato. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The customary marriage in terms of the Recognition Act must be negotiated and 
celebrated in accordance with customary law. 677   However, nowadays the 
individual spouses must consent to it.  However, in accordance with the 
Recognition Act, parental consent is necessary for the validity of the marriage of 
a minor party to a customary marriage.  The Recognition Act does not prohibit 
lobola and polygyny. 
                                            
677 S 3(1)(b) of the Recognition Act. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE OFFICIAL CUSTOMARY LAW OF PARENT AND CHILD 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the official version of the customary law of parent and 
child.  The children in a traditional community setting are affiliated either to their 
mother's family group or their father's family group.678  The father may pay a 
special lobola for his extramarital child.  Among other functions, lobola 
establishes a family relationship between the family of the father and the 
child.679 
5.2 Defining a child 
The occurrence of majority has changed from the 21st birthday to the 18th 
birthday.  For instance, in terms of section 17 of the Children's Act680 "[a] child 
whether male or female, becomes a major upon reaching the age of 18 years".  
Section 28 of the Constitution provides that a child is a person who is under the 
age of 18 years.681  A parent or guardian may assist a minor to enter into valid 
contracts.  In its section 3(1)(a)(i), the Recognition Act provides that "the 
prospective spouses must both be above the age of 18 years".  The Civil Union 
Act682 provides, in its section 1, that a civil union is "the voluntary union of two 
persons who are both 18 years of age or older …".  Even section 2(3) of the 
Domicile Act683 provides that a child is "any person under the age of 18 years, 
excluding such a person who by law has the status of a major". 
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683 The Domicile Act 3 of 1992. 
 118 
Bekker684 correctly points out that African people never viewed childhood in 
terms of chronological age.  Among other African customs, initiation and 
circumcision constitute a step into adulthood.685  From time immemorial, African 
females were regarded as perpetual minors.686  In the original customary law, 
the following factors used to determine a person's status of majority: 
i. initiation; 
ii. marriage; 
iii. emancipation; 
iv. own family home. 
5.3 The legal status of a child 
Kruger and Robinson687 state that the legal status of a child revolves around two 
basic factors, namely: 
i. the commencement of legal subjectivity; and 
ii. what the legal status of a child or young person entails. 
5.3.1 Legal subjectivity 
The legal subjectivity of a person starts at birth while that of a juristic person 
starts at registration or incorporation.  Common law protects the interests of an 
unborn child through nasciturus fiction 688  on the proviso that the child was 
conceived at the material time and is born alive.  It is noteworthy that, without 
giving a name to the factual situation, customary law recognises the rights due 
to a posthumous child. 
                                            
684 Bekker 2008 Obiter 398. 
685 Bekker 2008 Obiter 398. 
686 Bekker "Children and Young Persons" 191. 
687 Kruger and Robinson "Legal Status of Children" 1. 
688 Kruger and Robinson "Legal Status of Children" 3-7; Gordon and Shapiro Forensic 
Medicine 379; Davel and Jordaan Law of Persons 12; Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 
1963 2 SA 254 (W). 
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5.3.2 The legal status of a child 
The law of persons determines the status of a legal subject.689 
5.3.2.1 The capacities of a child 
The capacities of a child are generally the same as the capacities of a man and 
a woman dealt with in chapter 4 of this thesis.  This chapter gives only the 
highlights that are specific to a child. 
5.3.2.1.1 The legal capacity 
The legal capacity begins at birth.690  Legal capacity means that a person is the 
bearer of juridical competencies, subjective rights and legal obligations.691 
5.3.2.1.2 The capacity to act 
According to the Children's Act, a child may perform juristic acts with the 
consent of his or her parent or guardian.  The Children's Act does not 
discriminate on the ground of gender. 
5.3.2.1.3 The contractual capacity 
According to the Children's Act, a child may enter into contracts with the consent 
of his or her parent or guardian.  The law does not discriminate on the ground of 
gender. 
5.3.2.1.4 The capacity to litigate 
According to the official version of customary law, a child may litigate with the 
consent of his or her parent or guardian. 692   A child may even have legal 
                                            
689 Barnard, Cronjé and Olivier Law of Persons 39. 
690 Davel "Status of Children" 15-16. 
691 Davel "Status of Children" 15-16. 
692 Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2002 10 BCLR 1006 (CC). 
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representation693 and voice in a court of law.694  The law does not discriminate 
on the ground of gender. 
5.4 Categories of children 
There are two main categories of children, namely marital and extramarital 
children.  According to the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act,695 marital and extramarital children enjoy 
equal status and may inherit ab intestato irrespective of their gender. 
5.5 Maintenance and support 
Previously only a father had a duty to maintain his marital children.696  Upon 
divorce the fact that the father compensated the child-care provider had to be 
taken into account. 697   The maintenance for the child was called maswi a 
ngwana or isondlo. 698   The family head maintained the family out of the 
communal property, that is, the family property and the house property.  
However, while the family property was used to maintain the entire family, the 
house property was used to maintain the members of a house only.  In this 
context, isondlo for an extramarital child was defrayed from the communal 
property of the family,699 while isondlo for the maintenance of a marital child was 
defrayed from the treasury of the house to which the child was affiliated. 
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430 (W); Seodin Primary School v MEC of Education, Northern Cape 2006 1 All SA 154 
(NC). 
694 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC). 
695 Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 
2009. 
696 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 91-92; Hlangabeza v Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S); Gujuluwa v 
Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S); Hlengwa v Maphumulo 1972 BAC 58 (NE). 
697 Maithufi 2000 THRHR 515. 
698 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 91-92; Hlangabeza v Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S); Gujuluwa v 
Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S); Hlengwa v Maphumulo 1972 BAC 58 (NE). 
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Nowadays parents and their family group must provide their dependent children 
with maintenance within their respective means while the State may provide 
care to the children if their parents or family group is incapable of doing so due 
to a lack of or inadequate means.700   Section 5(6) of the Maintenance Act 
imposes upon the parents the obligation to maintain their children within their 
means on a pro rata basis.701  The Constitution provides that every child has a 
right to "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health services and social services".702 
Maintenance generally includes a common list of necessities of life (food, 
clothing and shelter).703  The standard of living of the rights-holder is a critical 
and essential factor in the determination of the right and extent of maintenance 
of an indigent dependent.704  In this sense, adequate care consists of food, 
clothing, shelter, medical care and education, amongst other things. 705  
Depending on the objective circumstances of each case, the duty of support 
may even include the duty to offer a child a university education.706 
5.5.1 The duty of support 
The duty of support rests with the members of the family in the following order: 
i. parents;707 
ii. ascendants (e.g. grandparents);708 
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iii. descendants (e.g. children and grandchildren); 
iv. collateral relatives (e.g. brothers, sisters, aunts and uncles);709 
v. care providers;710 
vi. step-parents.711 
A duty bearer contributes towards the maintenance of a dependant according to 
his or her ability.712  Firstly, the duty to support a child rests upon his or her 
biological parents or adoptive parents in the case of an adopted child.  The 
parents contribute towards the child's maintenance on a pro rata basis.  The 
duty of support is reciprocal.  Simply put, also a biological or adopted child has a 
primary duty to support his biological or adoptive parents within his or her 
means. 
Secondly, if the parents have no means to provide maintenance and support to 
their child, are deceased or unable to maintain their dependent child for 
whatsoever reason, the duty shifts to the paternal and maternal ascendants.  
The ascendants are to contribute to the child's maintenance on a pro rata basis. 
Thirdly, if there are no ascendants or if the ascendants have no means to 
support the child, the duty of support shifts to the child's collateral relatives (i.e. 
the paternal or maternal uncles and aunts) who must contribute towards the 
maintenance of the child on a pro rata basis.  If there is no natural duty-bearer to 
provide adequate maintenance to a child, the duty of support shifts in toto or pro 
tanto713 even to the state. 
5.5.2 The extent of maintenance 
The following are the factors that must be taken into consideration to determine 
the extent of maintenance: 
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i. the standard of living; 
ii. the social status; 
iii. the means (ability) of the duty-bearer to maintain a dependent. 
5.6 The Bill of Rights 
While prior to Bhe customary law differentiated the rights of support or 
inheritance of marital children from those of the extramarital children, common 
law was no longer discriminating between children on the grounds of birth, age, 
or gender.714  Section 28 of the Constitution provides specifically for the rights of 
children to the exclusion of everyone else.  According to Bekink and Brand,715 
section 28 constitutes a mini-charter of children's rights.  However, section 28 is 
not the only mini-charter in the Constitution.  Section 28 does not discriminate 
between marital and extramarital children. 
5.7 Conclusion 
There are two main categories of children, namely marital and extramarital 
children.  Previously, the right to support or succession and inheritance was 
exercised in accordance with the customary rule of male primogeniture.  
Nowadays, children are equal before the law and enjoy full and equal protection 
and benefit of the law.  They enjoy equal status including competencies such as 
the legal capacities, the capacity to act and the capacity to litigate.  The law no 
longer discriminates on the grounds of gender or birth.  Nowadays, the duty to 
support a child rests primarily with the biological parents.  If the biological 
parents do not have the means to maintain their children, the law obliges 
siblings with the requisite means to do so. 
Chapter 6 deals with the general principles and history of Hananwa law.  It 
shows that Hananwa law is part of a broader body of customary law.  It gives 
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attention to the historical development of the Hananwa community, the definition 
of Hananwa law, the sources of Hananwa law, the status of Hananwa law, the 
nature of Hananwa law and the application of Hananwa law. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND HISTORY OF HANANWA LAW 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an historical background to the Hananwa law.  Hananwa law 
is the indigenous law of the Hananwa community.  The tradition of patriarchy 
dictated the status of African women among the Hananwas, to a great extent.  
One of the manifestations of the tradition of patriarchy is the role of the 
customary rule of male primogeniture716 in the succession of an heir apparent to 
the positions of family heads and traditional leaders. 
6.2 The constitutional and legal status of the Hananwa community 
This study acknowledges that the Hananwa community is indeed a community 
in terms of sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution read together with section 2 of 
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act.717  Sections 2(1) 
and (2) of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act718 provide 
as follows: 
1. A community may be recognised as a traditional community if it- 
a. is subject to a system of traditional leadership in terms of that 
community's custom; and 
b. observes a system of customary law. 
2. (a) The Premier of a province, by notice in the Provincial Gazette, 
in accordance with provincial legislation and after consultation 
with the provincial house of traditional leaders in the province, 
the community concerned, and, if applicable, the king or queen 
under whose authority that community would fall, may 
recognise a community envisaged in subsection (1) as a 
traditional community. … 
                                            
716 See, among others, Rautenbach and Du Plessis "Customary Law of Succession" for an 
in-depth discussion of the customary law of succession and inheritance; Bekker and 
Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" para 2.3.10. 
717 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003. 
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 126 
3. A traditional community must transform and adapt customary law 
and customs relevant to the application of this Act so as to comply 
with the relevant principles contained in the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution, in particular by- 
a. preventing unfair discrimination; 
b. promoting equality; and 
c. seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the 
succession to traditional leadership positions. 
The Premier may recognise a traditional community which adheres to a system 
of customary law. 719   The investiture of the power to recognise traditional 
communities and appoint categories of traditional leaders in the Premier "after 
consultation with provincial house of traditional leaders in the province, the 
community concerned, and, if applicable, the king or queen under whose 
authority that community would fall" amounts to the subordination of the 
traditional communities, traditional council and royal house to the government of 
the day. 
The Constitution recognises the institution of traditional leadership,720 cultural, 
religious and linguistic communities, 721  customary law, 722  religious law, 723 
customary and religious marriages724 and the rights to culture,725 language726 
and religion.727  According to Olivier et al "… [the] membership of a community 
is determined by, at least, birth". 728   This is true, also, with regard to the 
Hananwa community.  The Hananwa of Maleboho thus qualifies as a community 
for a number of reasons: 
i. they have a recognised senior traditional leader;729 
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ii. the senior traditional leader has a substantial number of followers and 
headmen; 
iii. the followers constitute a cohesive group with a common culture, 
including a common language;730 
iv. the official language of the community is Northern Sotho.  Its distinct 
dialect is, however, Sehananwa;731 
v. the community occupies a defined territory; 
vi. the community observes a system of customary law called the Hananwa 
law. 
The Hananwa community is subject to the Constitution and legislation dealing 
specifically with customary law.732  Hananwa law is not specifically recognised in 
terms of section 211 of the Constitution but it falls under the general term 
customary law.  Hananwas may thus conclude valid customary marriages in 
terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act733 and may insist on the 
application of their laws by the courts when applicable.734 
6.3 The role of patriarchy and male primogeniture in the origin and 
development of the Hananwa 
The tradition of patriarchy and its corollary of male primogeniture played a 
critical role in the coming into being and development of the Hananwas into an 
independent community.  The two principles influenced the social, political, 
economic and legal culture of the Hananwas.  While patriarchy emphasised 
male dominance of society, the doctrine of male primogeniture confers the right 
                                            
730 S 31 of the Constitution. 
731 According to informants, the Hananwa are Sehananwa-speaking.  Sehananwa is a dialect 
of Tswana.  It is the language that the Hananwa spoke in Botswana.  The language 
evolved over the centuries into a unique language.  However, due to cross-cultural 
diffusion, Sehananwa is distorted.  The vernacular that is used in schools among the 
Hananwa is Northern Sotho as opposed to Sepedi.  It must be stated, in parenthesis, that 
Sepedi is the language of the Pedi in the Sekhukhune District.  It is not necessarily the 
common language of all Northern Sotho-speaking people of Limpopo Province. 
732 S 211 of the Constitution. 
733 The Recognition Act. 
734 S 211 of the Constitution. 
 128 
to succeed to the family headship first and foremost to the first-born son of the 
family or house.  Both patriarchy and male primogeniture prescribe that males 
succeed males.  It follows, therefore, that according to the customary rules 
women do not enjoy equal inheritance rights.  The following paragraphs 
examine the effect of these customary rules on the historical development of the 
Hananwa community. 
6.3.1 The early roots of the Hananwa 
The early roots of the Hananwas are causally linked to the history and legal 
system of the pre-colonial Malete community.  This being the case, this rubric 
surveys this causal link and the cause for the secession from the Malete people 
of a section of the community that came to be known as the Hananwas. 
According to Setumu, the Hananwa originated from the Malete community in the 
present-day Botswana. 735   The Malete people are a community within the 
broader "Bahurutse branch of the Batswana nation". 736   There are various 
reasons for the emigration of the Hananwa from the Malete community.  One 
reason was that the senior wife could not produce a male issue for the purposes 
of succession to the position of a senior traditional leader and family head.  
Setumu737 puts it thus: 
Oral history has it that this break away was caused by the fact that Kgosi 
Malete had no sons by his senior wife to succeed him in his throne.  This 
wife only had one child, Mmatsela, a girl. 
The proximate cause of the rupture was cultural-legal in nature.  According to 
the Malete law of succession, an heir to the throne had to be an eldest son of 
the senior traditional leader and his senior wife.  The designated family provided 
a senior wife to the Royal House.  Put differently, the two family groups entered 
an agreement that provided that one would provide a senior wife to the other.  In 
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the ultimate, a web of closely related families was established.  In most 
instances, the royal marriages involved cross-cousins.  In other words, if a 
man's sister was married to a senior traditional leader as a senior wife, her son 
would later marry the daughter of his paternal uncle.  Usually, this took place by 
arranging a marriage between the eldest surviving son of the senior wife and the 
daughter of her brother (preferably the eldest surviving daughter of her brother's 
senior wife).  In the final analysis, the marriage of these cross-cousins would 
remain endogamous over generations.  Any departure from this system of inter-
family marriages was frowned upon by the clan and the community at large. 
The age and chronology of the marriage of a woman who married within the 
extended family of her aunt or in that of any other close relative did not affect her 
seniority in the polygamous household or extended family at large.  She 
assumed the rank of her family and, in particular, her household in her marital 
family group.  It was for this reason that a young woman might be a senior to a 
woman who had married her husband even before she was born.  The children 
of the senior wife were also senior to those whose parents were junior to their 
parents within the extended family group. 
It is worth mentioning that the customary obligation of a senior wife in the royal 
house was to bear a future senior traditional leader of the community and future 
head of the royal family.  In the normal course of events, a senior traditional 
leader would marry a senior wife from a senior house of their equivalent royal 
house in other communities.  Females were disqualified from succeeding to the 
throne on account of their gender. 
As shown above, Malete had more than one wife.  The mother to Mmatsela was 
his senior wife.  Mmatsela was therefore senior to all of the women in the 
community except her own mother.  She was even senior to all of the the 
daughters of her father by all other women.  However, according to the Malete 
law, Mmatsela was junior to all of the men in the community including all of the 
the sons of her father by all other women.  She could not succeed to the position 
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of a senior traditional leader of the community because the customary rule of 
male primogeniture dictated otherwise.  Kgosi Malete was of the view that the 
customary rule of male primogeniture had to be suspended in order to make it 
possible for Mmatsela to succeed him as a senior traditional leader at the 
opportune time.  Setumu738 puts it thus: 
Without sons, Mmatsela was the natural heir to succeed her father.  
However, there were people who strongly opposed the fact that they 
could be ruled by a woman.  As a result, there were plots to kill 
Mmatsela, especially by Kgosi Malete's son by a junior wife. 
Mmatsela fled to South Africa.  Her flight led to the founding of the Hananwa 
community.  Her group duly appointed her as their senior traditional leader.  
Nonetheless, having been uprooted from their traditional setting, the Hananwa 
royal house practised endogamy. 739   The Hananwas met, intermingled and 
intermarried with the Morudu community at a place called Thabana ya 
Morudu.740  The Morudu community was relatively small in size.  It was therefore 
easily swallowed by the Hananwa community.  However, the two communities 
concluded a covenant that provided that, thenceforth, the Hananwa Royal 
House would marry a senior wife from the Morudu family.  Mmatsela had a 
liaison with one of one Kgwedjana.741  It is unclear whether Kgwedjana was a 
Morudu or not.  It is worth noting, in parenthesis, that the situation was 
complicated at the beginning because Mmatsela was a woman and not a man.  
The Hananwa Royal House, therefore, could not marry a senior wife from the 
Morudu in terms of the covenant.  There is neither evidence that a woman-to-
woman marriage was arranged between Mmatsela and another woman nor that 
ngwetsi ya lapa was married to produce an heir to the throne. 
The liaison between Mmatsela and Kgwedjana produced a son, named Leboho.  
Mmatsela became Maleboho.742  Thereafter, every senior traditional leader, with 
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the exception of the Hananwa of Kibi, had to assume the name "Maleboho".  
Leboho succeeded Mmatsela.  Thenceforth, Maleboho began to marry a senior 
wife from the Morudu family. 
The Hananwas spent an inordinate period in the wilderness en route to an 
unknown secure environment.  After settling at Thabana ya Morudu the 
Hananwas proceeded farther into the hinterland in search of a safe land for 
residential and agricultural purposes.  The elders conserved the traditions and 
secrets of the community, generation after generation.  Over the years they 
were generally blessed with capable leaders who safeguarded the interests of 
the Hananwa community every step of the way.  Leadership disputes were kept 
in check and nipped in the bud.  Community customs regulated dispute 
resolution.  Absent any community custom to resolve a particular dispute, the 
community developed rules in response to the changing circumstances of the 
community. 
Other key figures who helped to lead and guide the Bahananwa during their 
exodus included Sebudi and Lerokolole.743 
The Hananwas kept migrating from one place to the other, mainly for security 
reasons.  They even stayed at Baltimore before they migrated finally to Blouberg 
(their present-day headquarters).  In the middle of the 19th century, 
Matswiokwane led the Hananwas to Blouberg.  Matswiokwane built his "Great 
Place" on the summit of Blouberg.  Setumu744 puts it, further, thus: 
They moved slowly until they eventually reached the Blouberg Mountains 
which they turned into their permanent home until the present day. 
The Hananwas interacted with other communities before and after they arrived 
at Blouberg.  For instance, the Morudu and Madibana communities practised 
their own cultures and laws.  The Hananwas learnt from these communities and 
vice versa.  As shown below, the Hananwas met the Europeans in the form of 
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the citizens of the ZAR, a Boer Republic, and members of a Western church.  
The ZAR and the Western church provided a fillip to the diffusion of Western 
culture, religion and laws and African culture, religion and laws. 
Cultural exchanges played significant roles in the development of the Hananwa 
law.  The change in culture and religious ethos gave impetus to the change in 
the legal norms.  These cultural exchanges were generally the exchange and 
diffusion of African traditional culture.  However, as was bound to happen, 
different African communities met Western communities at different places and 
times.  These meetings led to the diffusion of the African and European cultures 
at different paces and to different degrees.  During the 19th century, while some 
communities were fighting one another for tribal supremacy, others were waging 
wars of resistance against the ZAR.  The following paragraphs deal with the 
encounter between the Hananwas and the Europeans. 
6.3.2 The Maleboho-Boer War: the African war of resistance745 
The Hananwas met the white people in the 19th century.  For instance, they met 
the Native Commissioner of the Zoutpansberg district, Barend Vorster, and 
missionaries such as Rev Beyer in 1868 and Rev Stech in 1874.  Rev 
Trumpelmann established the Makgabeng Mission in 1870.  The Europeans had 
already established themselves in South Africa.  The establishment of the ZAR 
paved the way for advent of the missionaries.  In effect, there was cooperation 
and collaboration between the ZAR and the missionaries.  The culture, religion 
and legal system which the missionaries and the Boers abided by were almost 
similar.  They emphasised the notion of individual rights above that of group 
rights.  In other words, in their system the individual played a greater role as a 
legal person than a group in legal, political, social, economic, cultural and similar 
matters.  This paradigm was diametrically opposed to the modus vivendi of the 
Hananwas, which was communalistic in focus.  The missionaries were 
Christians, while the Hananwas were African traditionalists.  The Hananwas 
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practised customs foreign to the missionaries, such as polygamy, magadi 
(bogadi), koma (the initiation school) and similar customs.  The missionaries 
regarded these customs as backward, savage, evil and heathen.  They 
interfered in community politics, incited leadership power struggles and applied 
divide-and-rule tactics in order to weaken the Hananwas.  Setumu746 puts it 
thus: 
The attacks of the ways of life of the communities by the missionaries 
created divisions and confusion among the communities.  Those who 
were converted began to look down upon those who resisted conversion.  
Tensions among communities due to missionaries varied.  In most 
instances, the missionaries used the political interventions of the 
colonialists in order to overthrow the Black tribal system which disabled 
them to achieve their goal of converting Blacks into Christianity. 
The attacks on the ways of life of the Hananwa community went directly against 
the essence of the African philosophy of life: motho ke motho ka batho ba 
bangwe;747 kgosi ke kgosi ka batho;748 maoto a kgobe ke bana;749 mahlaku a 
maswa a ema ka a matala 750  and rutang bana ditaola le se ye le tsona 
badimong. 751   As indicated the missionaries targeted customary marriage, 
magadi (so-called bridewealth) and koma (the initiation school).  However, their 
attacks were ontological and spiritual.  It follows therefore that they struck out at 
African traditional religion and bongaka (traditional medical practice).  An African 
traditional community is a spiritual system.  For instance, a traditional leader is 
at the helm of the community.  His inner circle includes people who play spiritual 
roles in the life of the royal house: the royal traditional doctor and rakgadi 
(female father).752  Both these persons intermediate between the living and the 
living dead, the ancestors.  The importance of the roles they play reposes in a 
system of African spirituality.  African spirituality integrates a community of 
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particular the traditional leader. 
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ancestors, a community of the living and a community of the-not-yet-born.  
These communities interface, intersect, interrelate and interdepend.  The 
interconnectedness of these communities ontologically pervades kinship in the 
three spheres of life: the anteriority, the living and the posterity. 
The African God is believed to be both the apical ancestor and the creator of the 
heavens and earth.  The African traditional communities involve the community 
of ancestors in the life of a family, clan and community, everywhere, every step 
of the way, always and every time.  An African traditional family is because God 
is.  The ancestors are the departed members of the family.  Death is regarded 
as a gateway to the ancestral realm.  Every person has a guardian angel which 
guides him or her throughout his or her earthly life.  The guardian angel leads 
the person to the community of ancestors and through the initiation into 
"ancestorhood".  The living and the living dead maintain an eternal communion.  
An attack on African spirituality amounts to an attack on this integrated system. 
Customary marriage, bogadi, koma, 753  komana, 754  kgopa, 755  bongaka, 756 
mephato,757 masolo758 and similar customs are some of the manifestations of 
this system of spirituality.  An attack on one is an attack on all of them.  
Obviously, the Europeans attacked African customs, primarily because they 
were relatively inconsistent with their European equivalents.  For instance, the 
African customary marriage is potentially polygynous; the common law dowry is 
obsolete; koma is more than circumcision; and bongaka is more spiritual than 
mental.  The Europeans set both the anthropologists and the missionaries on 
the African traditional communities ahead of the colonisers.  The anthropologists 
turned the African culture upside down and showed it up as barbaric, savage, 
primitive and uncivil.  The missionaries demonised these aspects of African 
                                            
753 Undergraduate initiation of males. 
754 Postgraduate initiation of males. 
755 Special initiation for a woman. 
756 Traditional medical and spiritual practice. 
757 Regiments or military companies. 
758 Military campaigns. 
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spirituality in order to pave the way for Western spirituality.  The attack on 
African spirituality and religion was an onslaught on the realm of the African 
ancestry.  Truth be told, a society without anteriority is a society without history 
or a spiritual anchor. 
The clash between European culture and African culture was, in essence, a 
conflict of two types of spirituality.  One wanted the other to bend a knee before 
it.  It was the battle for supremacy.  The foreign invaded the domestic.  The 
intercultural conflicts reached a boiling point.  Matswiokwane ordered Rev Stech 
to leave his jurisdictional area.  The latter obliged.  Rev Stech then coordinated 
the mission activities from the Makgabeng Mission.  Matswiokwane was 
assassinated in 1879.  Matswiokwane was a polygamist.  According to 
informants he had eleven or so wives.  His senior wife, Maseketa, hailed from 
the Morudu family.  He had an heir to the throne, named Ratshatsha Masilo 
seketa Kgalushi Leboho, who was the son of Maseketa.  Ratshatsha married, 
among others, Maserule Morudu and Mamphoku Rangata.759  Maserule was 
married as a senior wife, but after she was allegedly involved in an adulterous 
relationship Ratshatsha demoted her and elevated Mamphoku to the position of 
senior wife.  The elevation of Mamphoku indirectly upgraded the Rangata family 
a notch above the Morudu family.  However, as the study shows, it was Mabea 
who would directly and overtly substitute the seniority of the Rangata family for 
that of the Morudu family.760 
Mamphoku was not married as a senior wife.  Ratshatsha elevated her to the 
position of senior wife only after his senior wife, Maserule, allegedly committed 
adultery.  There is a dispute about whether or not Maserule bore an extramarital 
child from the adulterous relationship.  If there was such a child, there is no data 
as to whether he repudiated it or accepted it as his marital child.  The saying 
goes thus, "ngwana ke wa dikgomo".761  What is clear is that, after consulting his 
                                            
759 See Leboho. 
760 Leboho. 
761 A child is a child of magadi cattle. 
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people, Ratshatsha conferred the position of senior wife upon Mamphoku 
Rangata and demoted Maserule to the position of junior wife.  In the result, 
Mamphoku's son, Mabea, became an heir apparent to the throne. 
A senior wife is a candle wife.  The community treasury defrays the expenditure 
for her bridewealth.  The community treasury is distinct from the communal 
property of the family, namely the family property, house property and personal 
property.  The senior wife is "the mother of the nation" because she is married 
by the community at its own expense so that she should bear a kgosi for them.  
A kgosi is both the father and child of the community.  The saying goes thus: 
"kgosi ke kgosi ka batho".762 
After the death of Matswiokwane traditional leadership disputes arose between 
the two members of the royal family, namely Ratshatsha and Kibi.  Ratshatsha 
emerged victorious. 
The support-base of Kibi was the Christian group.  Following Ratshatsha's 
victory, Kibi fled.  He formed his own community which he led as a senior 
traditional leader. 
In 1892 Rev Christoph Sontag was allowed to resume missionary activities 
among the Hananwas in Blouberg.  The ZAR was divided into districts and the 
Hananwa chiefdom fell within the Zoutpansberg district.  Government desired 
that the Hananwas should submit to the authority of the ZAR, but Maleboho 
resisted these attempts.  Rev Sontag was unsuccessful in his attempts to 
persuade Maleboho to submit to the political authority of the ZAR.  The 
Hananwas suspected that Sontag was gathering intelligence for the ZAR. 
The Maleboho-Boer War broke out in 1894.  Kibi joined the Boer commandos 
against his father's people.  As he had personal knowledge of the lifestyles and 
the ins and outs of the Hananwa territory, he was important for intelligence-
                                            
762 A king is a king through his people. 
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gathering purposes.  It was this intelligence that ultimately decided the war.  Oral 
history has it that the basic need for water was a determining factor in the 
Maleboho-Boer War.  The commandos besieged the Hananwas, who were 
fighting a rear-guard action on mountaintops.  The vulnerable community 
members, such as women and children, were hidden in the caves.  
Unfortunately, the Hananwas were cut off from the basic water sources.  
Setumu763 puts it thus: 
These large numbers of commandos were also aided by Black warriors 
from allied chiefs such as Kibi and Mabena.  With these numbers on the 
side of the Boers it was inevitable that the Bahananwa were going to 
lose. 
Of course, the Maleboho-Boer War of 1894 aggravated the split.  Maleboho 
regarded Kibi as a traitor and never forgave him.  Maleboho surrendered and 
was jailed in a Pretoria prison in 1894.  During the interregnum his mother led 
the Hananwas as a regent.  She was assisted by Maleboho's son and heir-
apparent, named Mabea.  The great place was temporarily relocated to 
Kwarung at the foot of Blouberg. 
During Maleboho's incarceration Mabea decided to get married.  His choice was 
unorthodox.  He did not ask his family to choose a wife for him in accordance 
with the Hananwa custom and family practice.  Of course he was free to marry 
any woman of his choice as a junior wife.  However, tradition required his family 
to conclude a customary marriage with the Morudu family or a historically 
designated family for a senior wife, otherwise known as the candle wife.  Mabea 
departed from the tradition of the Royal House and married a senior wife from 
the Rangata family.  This rebellious behaviour offended the Hananwas.  
However, the Hananwas eventually reconciled themselves to it.  The saying 
goes thus: "ngwana llela nakana ya mokhure sehla o mo fe".764 
                                            
763 Setumu Our Heritage 15. 
764 Literally, this means if a child weeps for a penny whistle, cut it out and give it to the child. 
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Unfortunately, Mabea was killed a short while after the war.  It is alleged that he 
was killed by the Boers while he and others were pushing a cannon left by the 
Boer commando after the war to a nearby royal homestead.  He was survived by 
his son named Seiphi, among others.  Maleboho was released from prison in 
1900.  He resumed his position and returned his headquarters to the mountain 
summit.  He died in 1939.  His grandson, Seiphi, succeeded him as a senior 
traditional leader in 1939.  Seiphi married Mosima Rangata as a senior wife.  
Seiphi died in the 1950s. 
Mosima acted as a regent.  After the removal and death of Mosima, the 
community was ruled by a succession of regents.  Matome was the first of such 
regents, while three of his sons by his senior wife succeeded him, one after the 
death of the other.  It is noteworthy that the ngwetsi ya lapa produced a son, 
named Ngako.  After a protracted leadership struggle Ngako was enthroned as 
the senior traditional leader.  It is noted, in parenthesis, that the followers of 
Maleboho and Kibi are now independent communities.765 
6.3.3 Non-cooperation and the marginalisation of the Hananwas 
As the Leboho case indicates, the dispute between the ZAR and the Hananwa 
did not end when the Maleboho-Boer War ended.  The Maleboho-Boer War was 
followed by a "cold war": an ideological conflict between Western and African 
culture, Western and African religion, common law and Hananwa law, and so 
forth.  There was a protracted dispute between Maleboho and native 
commissioners, magistrates and similarly situated government officials over 
governance issues.  After the death of Ratshatsha the Union government 
delayed the installation of Seiphi as a senior traditional leader of the Hananwa 
on the grounds, among others, that he was unco-operative and insubordinate.  
He was inaugurated only in 1946.  He died in 1953.  After his death the 
government refused to install his widow, Mosima.  Later she was installed only 
to be deposed in 1957.  Manchako's son, Matome, replaced Mosima.  However, 
                                            
765 Ss 31 and 211 of the Constitution. 
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he was appointed as an acting kgosi.  Mosima died in 1960.  According to 
informants the Hananwas did not apply the rules of common law to resolve 
disputes among themselves.  They administered living Hananwa law as a matter 
of course.  A family council existed which was "a court of first instance".  If 
disputes were not resolved at its level, they were referred to the 
headwoman/headman's traditional authority court and from there to the apex 
traditional authority court at the King's great place. 
6.3.4 Social classification 
According to informants, the Hananwa community is hierarchical and patriarchal.  
For instance, nowadays the community is stratified into higher, middle and lower 
classes.  The higher class comprises the traditional leadership (ie the nobility) 
such as members of the royal house, bakgoma,766 bakgomana767 and headmen 
and headwomen.  The middle class comprises business people and intellectuals 
such as teachers, nurses and doctors.  The lower class comprises ordinary 
village peasantry and the blue-collar working class.  Most of the latter group are 
migrant workers.  The members of each social class relate to one another 
according to the order of seniority.  The families are ranked in order of seniority 
based on their blood relationship or affinity to the traditional leadership.  
Members of the family and agnatic group relate to one another according to a 
system of age differentiation and family ranking.  Informants indicate that gender 
discrimination is found among all the social classes of the Hananwa. 
Women as a social category are reduced to positions of subservience.  They 
constitute a subordinate class.  It is ironic that women as a social category 
among the nobility and commoners in the Hananwa community are equally 
subjected to the public and private authority of men.  However, there are also 
systems of seniority among women within any class whatsoever.  The higher 
class women are regarded as superior to the women in the other classes.  The 
                                            
766 A council of senior councillors. 
767 A council of junior councillors. 
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middle class women are regarded as superior to the women in the lower class.  
Men often use law as a tool in their domination of women. 768   It is worth 
mentioning that the social profile of the Hananwa mirrors that of other similarly 
situated communities in South Africa. 
6.3.5 The place of the Hananwa in society 
Historically there are two major population groups in South Africa, namely white 
people and black people.  The black people are generally divided into Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians.769  The court has extended the term 'black people' to the 
Chinese people.770  
African peoples are heterogeneous and multi-cultural.  Bekker and 
Rautenbach771 put it as follows: 
African peoples are usually grouped on the basis of language and other 
cultural features such as clothing.  They comprise groups and 
communities that speak African (formally called Bantu) languages.  They 
occupy virtually the whole of the Southern part of Africa, but differ from 
other African groups in that all of them speak the languages of one family 
of languages. 
The African peoples in South Africa are divided into four main groups, namely 
the Nguni, Venda, Tsonga (Shangana) and Sotho.772  While the Nguni group 
comprises the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele, the Sotho group is further 
                                            
768 For instance, after the death of a husband, first his widows are enjoined as a matter of law 
and custom to wear mourning attire (called diswiswi) for a period as a symbol of mourning 
the deceased.  This tradition is known as go roula.  Second, his widows are proscribed 
from engaging in sex during the mourning period.  However, if a wife predeceases her 
polygamous husband, he is not prohibited from engaging in sex with his other wives and 
even concubines, for that matter.  Second, the surviving husband is not enjoined to put on 
mourning attire.  He may sew a black patch on his sleeve as a symbol of bereavement. 
769 S 1 of the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003; Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
770 Chinese Association of South Africa v Minister of Labour [2008] ZAGPHC 174 (18 June 
2008). 
771 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" para 2.2.2.  Notes 
omitted. 
772 Myburgh Indigenous Law 1.  See also Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African 
Customary Law" para 2.2.2. 
 141 
divided into Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho and Western Sotho (Tswana).773  
The Venda, Tsonga-Shangana and Northern Sotho groups are found mainly in 
Limpopo Province.  The Northern Sotho group comprises, among others, the 
Pedi, the Kgaga, the Lobedu, the Birwa, the Tlhaloga, the Roka-Kwena, the 
Tlokwa, the Kone and the Hananwa.  Each constituent community in a group 
has its own system of law.  However, these systems of law have important 
similarities and dissimilarities.774  It is for this reason that customary Hananwa 
law is distinguishable from other systems of customary law. 
6.4 The status of Hananwa law 
The Constitution recognises customary law as a part of the legal system of the 
country and consequentially any customary law of a community is a part of the 
basic law of South Africa.775  It follows, therefore, that Hananwa law is a part of 
the legal system of this country subject to the Constitution and legislation that 
deals specifically with customary law.  If there is inconsistency between the 
Constitution and Hananwa law, Hananwa law is invalid to the extent of the 
inconsistency.776 
6.5 The nature of Hananwa law 
The main sources of Hananwa law are also the Constitution, legislation, custom 
and practice, case law (judicial precedents) and text books written by 
anthropology scholars.  The salient features of Hananwa law are generally 
similar to the salient features of customary law as discussed in chapter 2 of this 
thesis.777 
                                            
773 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" para 2.2.2.  I must submit 
that there are, in fact, three Sotho sub-groups, namely Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho 
and Western Sotho (Tswana).  The Pedi are but a component within the Northern Sotho. 
774 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" para 2.2.2. 
775 See discussion in ch 2. 
776 The supremacy of the Constitution is confirmed in s 2 of the Constitution. 
777 Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" para 2.3. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The Hananwas originated in Botswana and migrated to South Africa because a 
leadership dispute.  In South Africa they encountered white people and other 
African communities.  In 1894, they were involved in a colonial war, commonly 
known as Maleboho-Boer War.  The Hananwas were defeated.  After the war, 
Maleboho was arrested and jailed.  After his release, he resumed his chiefly 
leadership.  The community split into the Hananwas of Maleboho and the 
Hananwas of Kibi.  Each section lives according to its system of Hananwa law 
which is a form of customary law. 
The Hananwa law is a mirror of what goes on in the Hananwa community.  It 
evolves consistent with the conditions of the Hananwas.  It is a form of personal 
law.  Previously, a group and not an individual was a legal subject.  Family 
heads and traditional leaders acted on behalf of their groups.  Obviously, the 
tradition of patriarchy together with its corollary of male primogeniture dictated 
the power relations in private and public spheres among the Hananwas over 
centuries.  Accordingly, women had acted as regents for male senior traditional 
leaders only on a few occasions.  The Hananwas are part of the Northern Sotho-
speaking people in Limpopo Province. 
The following chapter deals with the Hananwa family law. 
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CHAPTER 7 
HANANWA FAMILY LAW 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 deals with the Hananwa law of marriage.  Hananwa family law 
comprises, mainly, the law of marriage (the law of husband and wife) and the 
law of parent and child (guardianship, custody, access and maintenance).  
Nowadays women act as household heads together with or without their 
husbands.  Nevertheless, as this chapter shows, the major decisions of the 
family are generally taken in community with other members of their family 
groups. 
7.2 Hananwa law of marriage:  general principles 
According to the informants, traditionally and historically a Hananwa marriage is 
a marriage entered into between the family of a man and the family of a woman 
in terms of which a man and a woman are joined together as husband and wife.  
Properly construed, a family acts as a legal subject with corporate competencies 
such as the legal capacity, the capacity to act and the capacity to litigate.  
However, as will be shown below, Hananwa law is constantly undergoing 
change. 
7.3 The parties to engagement 
According to the informants, traditionally Hananwa marriage is usually preceded 
by a contract of engagement.  The parties to a Hananwa contract of 
engagement are the family of a prospective husband on the one side, and the 
family of a prospective wife on the other.  Engagement is known among the 
Hananwa as go beeletsa mosadi,778 go ageletsa motshidi779 or go thiba sefeko 
                                            
778 To lodge a claim for a woman one proposes to marry in advance. 
779 To safeguard one's interests in a woman one intends to marry. 
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(sefero).780  Usually, it is the family of a man that proposes marriage to the 
family of a woman (go kgopela sego sa meetse).781  The parties may agree to 
conclude the marriage immediately or on a specific or determinable future date.  
If both families are ready, a marriage is negotiated, lobola is paid and a bride is 
subsequently transferred to a groom's family. 
7.4 The requirements for a valid Hananwa marriage 
According to the informants, the following are the salient requirements for a valid 
Hananwa marriage: 
i. The consent of the family of the prospective husband; 
ii. The consent of the family of the prospective wife; 
iii. A Lobola agreement; and 
iv. The transfer of the bride to the family of the groom. 
In Hananwa law, the term "father" or "mother" does not mean only the biological 
father or mother of a child.  A father of a child could be a tsena husband of his or 
her mother, or his or her adoptive father or his or her social father, while the 
mother of a child could be a seyantlo (levirate) of his or her widowed father, or 
his or her adoptive mother or his or her social mother.782 
7.4.1 The consent of the family of the prospective husband 
According to the informants, traditionally the consent of males is required for the 
validity of the marriage of their family member.  However, the parents of the 
groom have to consent to his customary marriage.  If one parent has deceased, 
the consent of the surviving parent would be a sufficient parental consent.  If a 
parent unreasonably withholds the requisite consent, an aggrieved person may 
                                            
780 To block the gateway.  The family of a man gives the family of a woman engagement gifts 
to ensure that nobody else takes her hand in marriage. 
781 To ask for a jug of water. 
782 For the discussion of a social or community parentage, see, among others, Bekker 2008 
Obiter 399-400. 
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have recourse to the family council for relief.  If the family council were to fail to 
resolve the dispute, he or she may take his or her suit to the traditional authority 
court for relief.  The family council or traditional authority court may substitute its 
consent for that of a "defaulting" parent.  Nowadays, a spouse must consent to 
his or her own marriage. 
7.4.2 The consent of the family of the prospective wife 
Historically it was male members of the family group who would finally decide 
whether to accept or reject the marriage proposal of the family of a prospective 
husband to their daughter.  Nowadays the bride's parents must consent to the 
marriage.  However, the bride must personally consent to her own marriage 
after consultation with her family group, particularly her parents. 
7.4.3 The Lobola agreement  
The parties on both sides must agree on the payment of lobola.  The actual 
payment of lobola is not a requirement for a valid customary marriage.  
Nowadays lobola is paid in cash or in kind.  Historically livestock such as cattle, 
goats and sometimes sheep served as lobola.  However, only the groom pays 
lobola for a prospective wife. 
The Constitution, the Recognition Act and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) ipso iure equalise husbands 
and wives.  This being the case, the question is: is the custom of lobola not 
inconsistent with the rights in the Bill of Right, in particular the rights to human 
dignity, equality and freedom? There is a cogent view that lobola degrades 
women and consolidates the domination of women by men in a patriarchal 
social system.783 
The question is whether or not any discrimination that emanates from the 
custom of lobola is not unfair in that it cannot be justified by the limitation clause 
                                            
783 Chinyenze 1984 ZLR 229-230. 
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in section 36 of the Constitution.  It may even be argued that the right to adhere 
to the custom of lobola finds expression within the right to culture.784  This right 
to culture, if the custom of lobola is an aspect of culture, competes with the 
rights to human dignity and equality.  They and the corresponding constitutional 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom take primacy over the right to 
culture.  Of course, the right to culture may not be exercised in a manner that is 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 785   This constitutional 
subjection of the right to culture to any provision of the Bill of Rights constitutes 
an internal limitation.  Properly construed, the phrase "any provision of the Bill of 
Rights" has the effect of subjecting sections 30 and 31 to other provisions of the 
Bill of Rights.  This subjection creates a hierarchy between sections 30 and 31 
rights and the other rights in the Bill of Rights.  It implies that sections 30 and 31 
rights are subordinate to the other rights in the Bill of Rights.  In the premise, the 
rights to human dignity and equality override the right to culture. 
7.4.4 The transfer of the bride to the family of the groom 
According to informants, the family of the bride transfers or hands her over to 
the family of the groom.  The bride becomes a member of the family of her 
husband.  The members of both families may attend the ritual functions at their 
respective homes.  The object of this rite is to transfer the bride's guardianship 
from her natal family's head to her marital family head.  In other words, the 
marital guardianship supersedes the plenary guardianship of the bride.  The 
family group of the bride may give gifts and presents to the bride to tide her over 
in her new household. 
                                            
784 Ss 30 and 31 of the Constitution. 
785 Ss 30 and 31 of the Constitution. 
 147 
7.5 The consequences of customary marriage 
There are two main types of matrimonial consequences, namely personal and 
proprietary (patrimonial) consequences.  Olivier786 states that marriage changes 
the status and legal rights of an individual spouse. 
7.5.1 Personal consequences 
The following paragraphs deal with the capacities of spouses. 
7.5.1.1 Married status 
Marriage effects changes to the status of individual spouses.  Traditionally, the 
emancipated husband replaces the father or family head of his wife as her 
"guardian".  The position of the wife in the spousal relationship and matrimonial 
household is relatively subordinate to that of her husband.  Generally the 
husband has power over the person and the "property" of his wife.  He 
represents her, nomine officio, in the performance of juristic acts, the conclusion 
of contracts, in legal proceedings, and in other family group responsibilities.  Her 
legal capacity subsumes in the legal capacity of the family.  Her husband 
controls her life and demands absolute obedience and loyalty from her. 
In the past, a breach of the wife's duty to obey her husband could earn her 
chastisement or even actual reversion to her natal family for the purposes of 
correctional education (go rutwa molao).  Her husband gains this power 
(guardianship over his wife) not only by virtue of the marriage but, primarily, by 
virtue of being the head of their matrimonial family, that is, by operation of the 
law which is informed and shaped by the tradition of patriarchy and its corollary 
of the customary rule of male primogeniture.  This being the case, the wife at 
Hananwa law is impeded by onerous legal disabilities. 
                                            
786 Olivier et al Indigenous Law para 6. 
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During the subsistence of a valid customary marriage, the wife cannot marry 
another man.  She "belongs" to her marital family in general, and her husband in 
particular.  Her husband is the only man who may exercise conjugal rights over 
her.  If she commits adultery, her husband may claim damages from her 
seducer.  On the other hand, her husband may marry other wives in spite of the 
existing marriage.  Hananwa law recognises polygyny. 
If her husband predeceases her, his family may nominate a tsena husband, 
preferably his younger uterine brother, for the widow.  However, the widow and 
her tsena husband must consent to the tsena marriage.  The children of the 
tsena marriage belong to her deceased husband, assume his surname and are 
members of his family group.  On the other hand, if she predeceases him, he 
may marry one of her close female relatives, preferably her uterine sister, as a 
levirate (seyantlo). 
The wife may assume the surname of her husband.  Her household in a 
monogamous household or house in a polygamous household confers a rank, 
within the agnatic group, upon her.  She assumes the dignities of her husband.  
However, her dignities are limited by the fact of her gender. 
Customary marriage is patrilocal (virilocal)787 and not matrilocal (uxorilocal).788  It 
is for this reason that a wife factually becomes a member of the family of her 
husband.  She is physically transferred or handed over to her marital family and 
integrated into it.  However, a husband does not join his in-laws' family.  The 
most that happens is that the customary marriage establishes inter-familial 
relationships.  In any way, a husband becomes a member of his wife's family by 
affinity and vice versa.  Marriage creates cognates. 
Traditional Hananwa family law does not know the dual headship of a family (ie 
headship by both husband and wife).  Only a male is competent to become the 
                                            
787 The spouses must reside at the family home of the husband. 
788 The spouse must reside at the family home of the wife. 
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head of a household.  Of course, traditionally members of the family share in the 
collective responsibility for the affairs of the family group.  However, males were 
regarded to all intents and purposes as senior members of the family group.  
Among themselves, females rank themselves according to the order of seniority. 
According to the informants, traditionally a wife lacks the status and full capacity 
to perform juristic acts.  A female must always act with the assistance of a male.  
This is so because in the traditional Hananwa law a woman is regarded as a 
perpetual minor and a ward of a man, that is, a father or a guardian.  Marriage 
and age do not accord equal status and full capacity to a wife.  Marriage creates 
a relationship of affinity between each spouse and the blood relations of the 
other.789  In consequence, a spouse is prohibited from entering into marriage 
with the ascendants or descendants of his or her spouse.  Affinity is a legal 
impediment to a valid customary marriage.  However, there are exceptions.  A 
spouse may marry a collateral relative of his or her spouse.  For instance, a 
husband may marry the sister of his wife as a sororate (hlatswadirope) or 
levirate (seyantlo).  A wife may "marry" a brother of her husband as a tsena 
husband. 
The family of each spouse becomes the in-laws of the other spouse.  The 
parents of his wife become his parents-in-law (mother-in-law and father-in-law) 
and vice versa.  The ascendants and descendants of her husband are her in-
laws and vice versa.  Her husband may not marry her ascendants and 
descendants in the direct line ad infinitum.  The collateral relatives of his wife 
become his collateral relatives and vice versa.  Collateral relatives of her 
husband may marry her collateral relatives. 
                                            
789 Hahlo Law of Husband and Wife 106. 
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7.5.2 Proprietary consequences 
According to Hananwa law and custom, the head of the family administers the 
affairs of his family or house for the benefit of his family or house.  Traditionally 
the family property and house property are examples of a communal property. 
7.5.2.1 Forms of Hananwa law property 
The Hananwa law recognises three forms of property: family property, house 
property and personal property.790  Traditional authorities do not allot land for 
residential, agricultural and grazing purposes to a "loose" resident who is not 
affiliated to a family.  Land is for family and communal use.  It is for this reason 
that the Hananwa property law knows only communal land as a landed property: 
house landed property, family landed property and tribal property as opposed to 
individually owned land.  House property and family property are pieces of 
communal land allotted to a house and family respectively for use and so forth. 
Customary law property ownership is not limited to landownership.  However, 
the right to landownership resides in the community at large.  Individual families 
enjoy some limited rights such as the rights to use and enjoy the fruits of and 
occupy land.  These limited rights naturally encumber the right of the community 
to the ownership of its land. 
The ultimate legal question is whether spouses enjoy equal rights in property at 
customary law.  At the very least, the rights in property are the following: 
i. the right of ownership; 
ii. the rights to use and enjoy the fruits of and occupy a property; 
iii. the right to alienate or dispose of a property; 
iv. the right to encumber a property. 
                                            
790 Maithufi "Law of Property" 54-56. 
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In the customary law of property these rights are communal property rights or 
group rights.  They belong to a house, family or community. 
7.5.2.1.1 Family property 
Family property is property which is not allocated or does not automatically 
accrue to any house, but is generally owned by the family group as a whole.  It 
is for this reason that it is also called general property.  Family property includes 
property to which the family head succeeded upon the death of his predecessor; 
the land allocated to the family group for use by the family group; the property 
which the family head "inherited" from his mother's house property; and the 
property earned by the family head himself. 
7.5.2.1.2 House property 
A house consists of a wife and her children.  However, her husband, who is the 
family head of the polygamous household, doubles as a member and head of 
each house.  House property is property which accrues to a particular house.  
House property comprises, inter alia, livestock allocated to the house, and its 
increase; property given to the wife upon her marriage, or received for daughters 
of the house; compensation received for delicts committed against members of 
the house; land allocated to the house; agricultural products produced by 
members of the house on their fields; and the earnings of the members of the 
house. 
The family head controls the family property and the house property in each 
house in a polygamous household.  The house is for the exclusive benefit and 
use of those to whom it belongs.  A member of a house has no personal but a 
collective interest in his or her house property. 
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7.5.2.1.3 Personal property 
Personal property is property that has been acquired by an individual person.  It 
consists of property of an individual, personal nature such as clothing, a walking 
stick, a tobacco pipe, and so forth.  The individual may use or dispose of it at 
will. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The Hananwa law of marriage, like any customary law of marriage, governs the 
relationship between the parties to a customary marriage.  The parties to 
customary marriage are the families of a prospective husband and a prospective 
wife.  It is for this reason that traditionally the communal consent of the family 
group or parental consent is a requirement for the validity of customary 
marriage.  However, Hananwa law has evolved to the extent that spousal 
consent has become a peremptory requirement for a valid customary marriage.  
Only a husband or his family pays lobola.  Only a bride is delivered to the groom 
or his family.  Chapter 8 explores the dissolution of Hananwa marriage. 
 
 153 
CHAPTER 8 
THE DISSOLUTION OF A HANANWA MARRIAGE 
8.1 Introduction791 
This chapter explores the dissolution of a marriage under Hananwa law and the 
consequences thereof.  In short, the dissolution of marriage alludes to the 
termination of the bond of marriage existing between its parties.  Customary 
marriage among the Hananwas was understood to be a permanent marriage 
which would evolve into a kind of perpetual widowhood if the husband 
predeceased the wife or wives.792 
8.2 The general principles of the dissolution of a Hananwa marriage793 
The dissolution of a customary marriage must be understood as being contrary 
to the intrinsic nature of customary marriage, which is uniquely collective.  As 
chapter 7 shows, according to the original Hananwa law, the families of the 
spouses are the parties to a customary marriage.794 
                                            
791 There are no scholarly writings on the Hananwa law of marriage including the law of 
dissolution of a marriage through death or by divorce.  This thesis may be the first written 
contribution of its kind on Hananwa law.  However, the living Hananwa law regulates 
customary marriages and the dissolution of customary marriages.  The writer held face-to-
face discussions with selected community experts (collectively and singly).  See ch 1 of 
this thesis for details of how a leadership dispute led to the establishment of a community 
of rebels - the Hananwas.  The Hananwas later split into the Hananwa of Maleboho and 
the Hananwa of Kibi. 
 The data collection and interpretation were made easy by the fact that the writer is also a 
member of the Hananwa community.  Setumu Our Heritage 1ff gives a general outline of 
the historical development of the Hananwa community.  He explores the disputes related 
to succession to the positions of traditional leadership.  See ch 3 of this thesis regarding 
the decision of Leboho in which the court dealt with Hananwa law, in broad terms, in order 
to resolve a dispute about the succession to the position of traditional leadership of the 
Hananwas. 
792 For a general discussion of permanent marriage and perpetual widowhood, see Mofokeng 
Legal Pluralism 20-21. 
793 This paragraph was sourced from face-to-face discussion with the community experts. 
794 For a detailed comparative discussion of individual spouses or families as parties to 
customary marriage in general see, for instance, Jansen "Customary Family Law" 45ff; 
Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 43ff; Bennett Customary Law 188-293; Bennett Human Rights 
115-128; Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 98-214; Myburgh Indigenous Law 83-89. 
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8.3 How a Hananwa marriage dissolves 
Not all of the ways for terminating a civil marriage are applicable to the 
dissolution of a traditional Hananwa marriage.  Generally, there are only two 
ways for the dissolution of a marriage: death and divorce.  Furthermore, by its 
nature and purpose, traditional customary marriage continues to exist beyond 
the duration of the earthly lives of the individual spouses.  It is for this reason 
that, according to the informants, the dissolution of a customary marriage by 
death and divorce in a traditional context, if it were to occur, would be an 
exception rather than the rule.  The dissolution of a Hananwa marriage (as 
against separation in the sense of simply living apart) is a rarity if not an oddity.  
If irreconcilable differences arise between a husband or his family and his wife, 
the husband or his family may solicit the intervention of her family or even return 
her to her natal family for them to call her to order.  Lebitla la mosadi ke 
bogadi.795  Even widowhood does not dissolve marriage.  Lehu ga le hlalwe.796 
8.3.1 The death of one or both spouses 
The concept and practice of Hananwa marriage involve a hybrid of religious and 
secular rites and its dissolution concerns both.  The spirits of the ancestors are 
invoked during the lobola negotiations, the conclusion of the Hananwa marriage, 
and the burial of a spouse.  In other words, the marriage in the realm of the 
living reverberates in the council of the living dead.  The marriage is deemed to 
continue after the death of a spouse or both.797  Traditionally it is a marriage first 
between the family of a man and the family of a woman and second between 
individual spouses.798 
                                            
795 Literally, a woman's grave is at her marital home.  A wife stays truthful to her vows until 
the end of her days. 
796 African tradition prohibits the divorce of the dead.  Literal translation: death may not be 
divorced. 
797 Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 85. 
798 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC). 
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After the death of a spouse the surviving spouse continues his or her marital 
relationships within the "cognate group".  A surviving husband remains a 
mokgonyana (son-in-law) of his late wife's natal family.  Conversely, if a woman 
is widowed she would continue to be a ngwetsi (daughter-in-law) of her late 
husband's family group.  Hananwa law complements the doctrine of perpetual 
marriage with the invocation of the doctrine of spousal substitution.  If a wife dies 
her sister, seyantlo,799 will replace her as her widower's wife.  Conversely, if a 
husband dies one of his closest male relatives will replace him as a tsena 
husband.800 
The children born of the liaison between a tsena wife (a widow) and a tsena 
husband belong to her deceased husband and assume his surname.  On the 
other hand, the children of a seyantlo belong to her husband.  At any rate, the 
children of a customary marriage are the children of the husband's family group, 
in general, and the husband of a customary marriage, in particular.  Monna o 
tswala ngwana mosadi a mmelega (a man begets a child; a woman gives birth 
to it). 
In Hananwa family law a woman can have no children because they belong to 
her husband.  The mother of customary children is in the situation of a daughter 
in relation to her customary husband and in the situation of a sister in relation to 
her children. 801   Of course, the sororal and fraternal substitutes serve to 
preserve and perpetuate a marriage between the two families after the death of 
a spouse or both spouses. 
8.3.2 The dissolution of Hananwa marriage by divorce 
Nowadays, divorce is one of the ways of dissolving a customary marriage. 
                                            
799 A sororal husband. 
800 A substitute husband. 
801 This compares with the status of women in Roman law.  See, in this regard, among 
others, Van Zyl Roman Private Law 103. 
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8.3.2.1 Defining divorce 
A divorce action is not heard in a court of law but is initiated by a party as a 
private matter purely between the families.  If the divorce is at the instance of the 
family of the husband, the onus rests upon the family of the husband to return 
the wife to her natal family with the demand that her natal family should return 
the lobola or its value to her marital family.  If the family of the wife is awarded 
custody of her marital children, her family may deduct maswi a bana 
(maintenance cattle) from the returnable lobola cattle.  However, if the wife was 
not at fault the lobola or its value is not returnable. 
If the divorce was at the instance of the wife and she was the cause of the 
breakdown of the marriage, her marital family or husband may reclaim the full 
value of the lobola cattle.  However, if the marriage has already produced 
offspring and their custody is vested in her natal family, her natal family may 
retain some of the lobola cattle as maswi a bana (maintenance cattle).  It is 
noteworthy that maintenance is payable if the marital children are transferred to 
the guardianship of their mother's natal family head. 
8.3.2.2 Who may institute divorce? 
According to the informants, traditionally the following persons were competent 
to take action to cause the dissolution of a traditional Hananwa marriage: 
i. the family of the husband (the family head/guardian); 
ii. the family of the wife (the family head/guardian). 
However, nowadays Hananwa family law has changed to such an extent that 
the following have become legal subjects and may institute divorce in their own 
right: 
iii. the husband; 
iv. the wife. 
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8.3.2.3 Grounds for divorce802 
According to the informants, the following are some of the main grounds for 
divorce among the Hananwa: 
8.3.2.3.1 Adultery 
Adultery is an unlawful intentional consensual sexual relationship between a 
married woman and a man other than her husband.  Both the man and the 
woman are guilty of adultery.  If a man has sexual intercourse with a married 
woman without her consent he commits both adultery and the offence of rape.  
On the other hand, she does not commit adultery but is a victim of rape.  A 
husband may have consensual sexual relations with an unmarried woman other 
than his wife without committing adultery.  Neither is guilty of adultery.  For a 
man to commit adultery the woman concerned must be another man's wife.  On 
the other hand, a married woman commits adultery whether or not a man she 
has sexual intercourse with is married.  Her husband has the right to claim 
damages for adultery or even divorce his wife. 
8.3.2.3.2 Barrenness 
Reproduction is essential for the achievement of the purpose of Hananwa 
marriage.  If a wife is barren the lineage of the husband cannot be furthered 
through her.  The family of her husband may, on this basis, dissolve the 
marriage.  However, the Hananwa family law has creative ways of ensuring the 
achievement of the purpose in spite of the barrenness of the wife, besides the 
dissolution of the marriage.  The family of the wife may allocate the husband a 
                                            
802 There are diverse views regarding divorce, in general, and grounds for divorce, in 
particular.  Some people state that divorce is part of the Hananwa law of marriage, while 
others are adamant that divorce is foreign to the Hananwa law of marriage.  These 
contradictions must be understood against the backdrop that the Hananwa community is a 
migrant community as well as that other families and clans, among the Hananwas, are not 
the Hananwas by origin and that they still live by some aspects of the customary laws of 
their communities of origins, particularly in respect of family law which is largely a family-
based law. 
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sister of the wife as hlatswadirope (sororate) for the purposes of bearing children 
on behalf of her sister.  This is called a sororal marriage.  The principle operates 
appropriately in the context of arranged marriages.  If the husband repudiates 
the sororal wife and dissolves the marriage he forfeits lobola for his barren wife. 
8.3.2.3.3 Impotence 
The ability to have sexual intercourse and procreate children is essential for the 
realisation for the purpose of the Hananwa marriage.  If the husband is impotent 
the guardian of the wife or the wife may, on that basis, dissolve the marriage.  
Unlike the disability of barrenness, a notion of a substitute husband for the 
impotent husband is unheard of in the Hananwa family law.  There is an 
allegation that if a husband were sterile the family may arrange that his uterine 
brother or a close relative to sleep with his wife in order that he should bear 
children for his brother.  However, the research failed to find classical examples 
of this practice. 
8.3.2.3.4 Neglect of the family 
The family head controls the family property and, if the household were 
polygamous, also the house property.  He has a legal duty to take care of his 
family.  The duty of care includes maintenance and support.  The family 
members, including his wife, have a right to be cared for.  If the family head 
were to neglect his responsibilities towards his family in general and his wife in 
particular, the family has recourse to remedies.  The strongest action is to 
remove him from the position of the head of the family However, if the husband 
denies his wife conjugal rights or maintenance and support and if his family 
group fails to remedy the situation, the natal family head of the wife may sue for 
divorce. 
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8.3.2.3.5 Ill-treatment 
The spousal relationship is a relationship of love.  A spouse has a right to 
consortium omnis vitae.  The husband has no right to abuse his wife and vice 
versa.  In other words, no domestic violence may be visited upon a spouse by 
another.  Domestic violence includes physical, emotional, psychological, 
economic, sexual or any other abuse.  It diminishes a love relationship which is 
the basis of a spousal relationship.  If a husband were to abuse his wife and his 
family group were to fail to remedy the situation, the natal family head of the wife 
may sue for divorce. 
8.3.2.3.6 An accusation of witchcraft 
An accusation of witchcraft is a form of abuse.  It may come in the form of 
emotional or psychological abuse.  It may lead to death.  If a husband were to 
accuse his wife of witchcraft and if his family group were to fail to remedy the 
situation, the natal family head of the wife may sue for divorce. 
8.4 The consequences of the dissolution of a Hananwa marriage 
There are two categories of consequences of the dissolution of a customary 
marriage in accordance with Hananwa law, namely personal consequences and 
proprietary consequences. 
8.4.1 Personal consequences of the dissolution of a Hananwa marriage 
This rubric explores the consequences of the dissolution of the marriage on the 
person of the parties to the customary marriage and/or individual spouses.  The 
personal consequences of marriage are expressed in the form of competencies 
such as the legal capacity, the capacity to act and the capacity to litigate. 
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8.4.1.1 The competencies of a divorcee 
8.4.1.1.1 The legal capacity  
Historically, after divorce the guardianship of the woman reverts to the family 
head of her natal family.  The guardianship of the man does not change.  
Nowadays, as a consequence of the individualisation and equalisation of legal 
persons in customary law a divorced woman becomes an independent 
householder.  She enjoys equal rights. 
8.4.1.1.2 The capacity to act 
A divorcee may perform any juristic act without any restriction on the grounds of 
gender. 
8.4.1.1.3 The contractual capacity 
Historically a male family head, for instance the husband, could enter into 
contracts on behalf of the family.  The wife was afforded a status of permanent 
minority and could therefore not enter into a contract.  However, nowadays 
married and unmarried women may enter into binding contracts provided that 
the requirements for a valid contract must be met.  A married woman is 
regarded, for all legal purposes, as a major. 
8.4.1.1.4 The capacity to litigate 
Historically the male family head litigated on behalf of the family.  However, he 
was enjoined to consult his family, in particular the senior male family members.  
Nowadays women may hold their own houses and act for their own accounts.  
They litigate in their own right.  Divorcees are equally competent to litigate. 
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8.4.2 The proprietary consequences of the dissolution of Hananwa 
marriage 
The nature of property in customary law determines the patrimonial 
consequences of marriage.  As explained above, the customary law property 
system is communal in orientation.  The right of ownership to property in 
customary law is not an individual right but a group right belonging to an agnatic 
group and not an individual member.  This being the case, in the indigenous 
context Hananwa law does not recognise a matrimonial property system.  
Family or house property belongs to the family collective. 
However, owing to the individualisation and equalisation of the legal persons in 
customary law, it seems that the individual spouses have been substituted for 
their families as parties to the customary marriage.  Similarly, the individual 
rights of spouses have to an extent superseded the group rights of the family 
groups.  Equally, the matrimonial property system has superseded the 
communal family and house property system.  Be that as it may, there is a 
dimension of co-ownership of property by individual spouses.  It follows, 
therefore, that if their marriage were to dissolve the joint estate ought to be 
divided. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Customary marriage is very rarely dissolved.  In other words, the dissolution of 
customary marriage is the exception rather than the rule.  If it were to dissolve, it 
might do so on account of death or divorce.  While the Recognition Act 
stipulates only the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage as the ground for 
divorce, 803  there are various reasons that can come into play.  The 
consequences of the dissolution of marriage on any ground are unfavourable to 
the interests of a customary wife.  The dissolution of marriage has juristic 
consequences: personal and proprietary consequences.  The interests of the 
                                            
803 See s 8(1) of the Recognition Act. 
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wife are not only inferior to those of her customary husband under the traditional 
Hananwa law but are also secondary to those of the family.  This state of affairs 
is consequent upon the perpetual minority of the wife and, therefore, her 
perpetual subjection to the guardianship of either her natal family (if unmarried) 
or her husband or her husband's family head (if married).  The traditional 
Hananwa family law is, therefore, discriminatory. 
Chapter 9 deals with the law of parent and child. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE HANANWA LAW OF PARENT AND CHILD 
9.1 Introduction804 
Chapter 9 deals with the Hananwa law of parent and child, which pertains to 
parent-child relationships and the relationships between children inter se. 
9.2 The general principles of Hananwa law of parent and child 
 Hananwa law does not prescribe the age of majority.  Strictly speaking, a 
person is a major only when he is no longer a "child".  Traditionally, an African 
woman is perpetually a minor.  On the other hand, a man ceases to be a minor 
when he is emancipated from the guardianship of his family head.  The 
Hananwas call the custom of emancipation go fiwa dipitsa (to be given one's 
own pots).  An emancipated person enjoys the competencies of a major while 
the competencies of an unemancipated person are equal to the competencies of 
a minor.805  These competencies include the legal capacity, capacity to act and 
capacity to litigate.  However, in accordance with the traditional Hananwa law 
these competencies are embedded in the communal rights of the family group to 
which an individual child belongs.  The family head exercises group rights and 
performs group duties in consultation with the responsible family members. 
                                            
804 There are no scholarly writings on the Hananwa law of parent and child.  However, the 
living Hananwa law regulates the relationship between parents and children.  The writer 
held face-to-face discussions with selected community experts (collectively and singly).  
See ch 1 of this thesis for details of the method of the research.  The discussions were 
made easy by the fact that the writer is also a member of the Hananwa community.  
Setumu Our Heritage 1ff gives a general outline of the history of this community and the 
succession to traditional leadership.  See ch 3 of this thesis regarding the decision of 
Leboho in which the court dealt with the Hananwa law of parent and child, in broad terms, 
in order to resolve a dispute about the succession to the position of the traditional 
leadership of the Hananwas. 
805 Bekker "Children and Young Persons" 192. 
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9.3 Categories of children 
There are four main categories of extramarital children, namely (a) children of an 
unmarried woman (bana ba lefetwa); (b) pre-marital children; (c) adulterine 
children of a married woman (bana ba bohlotlolo); and (d) children of a widow.  
Children are also classified in accordance with their marital or extramarital birth, 
the social ranks of their parents (and households) and their own individual age, 
for instance.  Bekker806 states correctly that the status of an African mother 
determines the status of her children at birth or thereafter.  Wives rank in 
seniority according to the chronological order of their individual marriage or 
according to the order of seniority, which accrues by virtue of the social rank of 
the natal family or natal house of a wife.  For instance, a daughter of a paternal 
uncle is senior to a daughter of a maternal uncle in respect of the ranking 
system of the wives of a polygynous husband.  The wives of a polygynous 
husband rank in a declining order of seniority in respect of the applicable ranking 
system.  Each wife is attached to a house which is accorded a rank within the 
polygynous household.  The rank of each house is commensurate with the rank 
of the wife who is attached to it. 
9.3.1 Children of a married woman 
According to Bekker,807 a child born of African parents who are married to each 
other is regarded in law as a marital child.  The labelling of children born in 
wedlock as legitimate and of children born out of wedlock as illegitimate is 
absolutely unfortunate.  An unmarried mother has only natural or biological 
children and not "legitimate" or "illegitimate" children.808  On the other hand, a 
father may have marital and extramarital children.809  In effect, the innocent 
children (because they are born innocent) are punished for the "sins" of their 
                                            
806 For a full comparative discussion, see Bekker "Children and Young Persons". 
807 Bekker "Children and Young Persons" 187. 
808 Gough 1959 JRAS 49. 
809 Gough 1959 JRAS 49. 
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parents.  In a roundabout way, the law visits the sins of parents who are not 
married to each other upon the children born of their liaison. 
In traditional Hananwa law, if the parents of the children are married to each 
other the children belong to their father and are subject to the guardianship of 
their father's group.  Nonetheless, the marital children are specifically attached 
to their mother's house within a polygynous household.  This legal principle 
accords with the two sayings: the cattle bring forth children and the children 
belong where the cattle are not.810  In other words, the children of a married 
woman belong to her husband.  Hence, the maxim: cattle beget children.811  The 
marital children enjoy the right to inherit from, their father or the family head of 
their father through their father, while the extramarital children acquire the right 
to inherit from their mother's natal family head through their mother.  In effect, 
the extramarital children enjoy unequal or ultimate rights because their mothers 
do not enjoy equal status in their natal families.  In other words, the extramarital 
children could only inherit if there was no other heir in the family. 
Hananwa law does not regard unmarried parents and their extramarital children 
as an autonomous and close-knit nuclear family.  Generally, unmarried parents 
belong to two different and separate families or households.  An unmarried 
mother and her children are members of her natal family, while an unmarried 
father of the extramarital children is a member of his natal family.  If a man 
wants to adopt his extramarital children he must pay special lobola for them.  
This adoption affiliates the extramarital children to their father's family.  The 
father's affiliation to his extramarital children transforms their extramarital status 
into the status of marital children. 
The traditional Hananwa law of succession distinguishes between males and 
females, sons and daughters, first-born sons and sons who are not first-born 
sons, and marital children and extramarital children (bana ba hlaba).  However, 
                                            
810 Bekker "Children and Young Persons" 187. 
811 See, for comparison, Madyibi v Nguva 1944 NAC (C) 36. 
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one of the corollaries of the Hananwa customary family law is that a child is a 
child of lobola cattle or a child is begotten by lobola cattle (monna o e gapa le 
namane 812  and ngwana ke wa dikgomo 813 ).  According to this custom the 
marriage of a mother legitimises her extramarital child as a child of her husband.  
If a customary husband affiliates or adopts an extramarital child of his customary 
wife the child becomes his legitimate child for all legal purposes. 
The living Hananwa law has developed to the extent that nowadays the parental 
power over the extramarital children is vested in their natural mother.  The 
transfer of the parental power from the father, guardian or husband to the 
natural mother of the extramarital children does not include the equal vesting of 
the parental power in both of their natural parents (including his or her natural 
father).  Both the common law father and the customary law father are on the 
same page in so far as the parental power over an extramarital child is 
concerned.  It is obvious that the substitution in common law of individual rights 
for the collective rights of customary law empowers the natural mothers of 
extramarital children to the exclusion of their natural fathers, while customary 
marriage subjects a wife to the marital guardianship of her husband or his family 
head and her children to the parental power of her husband or family head. 
The Constitution makes everyone equal before the law and provides everyone 
with equal protection and benefit of the law.  The Constitution protects the rights 
of every person and not some persons to the unfair exclusion of others.  In the 
past the law constitutionalised political, social, economic, religious and cultural 
discrimination.  The protection of the rights of man amounted to the protection of 
some persons and not all citizens.  Correctly construed, the Constitution has 
codified the progression of the law from the law that entrenches the hegemony 
of the parental power (the rights of the parent) over the person and property of 
the child to the law that entrenches the rights of the child.  The complex rights of 
the child are euphemistically called the best interests of the child, which are 
                                            
812 Literally, a cowherd takes home a cow together with its calf. 
813 A child is a child of cattle. 
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paramount in matters affecting a child.814  No child may be discriminated against 
on the grounds of birth. 815   Extramarital children have equal rights to 
maintenance from the estate of their father.  Both parents enjoy the right to 
parental power over their children regardless of whether they are married to 
each other or not, unless a competent court orders otherwise.  The 
Constitutional Court intervened in Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North,816 
and declared the equality of the rights and duties of the natural parents towards 
their extramarital child.  The consent of both natural parents is a prerequisite for 
a valid adoption of a child by a third party.817  However, the consent may not be 
withheld unreasonably.818  A competent court may substitute its consent for the 
one unreasonably withheld by a parent. 
9.3.2 Extramarital children of an unmarried woman 
There are two types of children born out of wedlock: extramarital children and 
adulterine children.  Posthumous children may fall within either of these 
categories.  In terms of traditional Hananwa customary law a lefetwa (an 
unmarried woman) is a ward of her natal family head, who exercises 
guardianship over his ward within the group right context of the family.819 
The family head plays a leading role820 in the administration of the affairs of his 
family.  He controls the persons and properties of his wards in his family.  In any 
event, the family or house property is communally owned.  The individual 
property rights are inseparable from and not external to the rights to the 
communal property of the household.  The children inherit the "rank" of their 
mother's house.  In other words, her children are the wards of her family head 
                                            
814 See s 28 of the Constitution. 
815 See s 9(3) of the Constitution. 
816 Fraser. 
817 Fraser. 
818 Fraser. 
819 See Church 1979 CILSA 328 and authorities cited in it. 
820 See Church 1979 CILSA 328 and authorities cited in it. 
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as a guardian.821  If their mother enters into a marriage after their birth, her 
husband becomes their de iure father and guardian.  This principle applies 
universally to both the husband's premarital children with his wife and her pre-
marital children with another man because children are the children of the lobola 
cattle.  However, in both cases the groom or his family group offers the bride's 
family something such as a beast in lieu of pre-marital children as quid pro quo 
for pre-marital support and maintenance by his wife's natal family. 
The natal family of the wife has a duty to take care of and maintain the 
extramarital children of an unmarried woman.  In effect, the children belong to 
the father of the unmarried woman or the family head.  If her subsequent 
husband intends to adopt her premarital extramarital children, he must negotiate 
a special lobola for those children. 822   He would then be liable for the 
maintenance of her adopted premarital extramarital children.823  If the adoption 
of such children is valid in law, as the Kewana824 and Metiso825 cases seem to 
suggest, those children would enjoy the right to inherit from their adoptive father.  
The husband would also enjoy the right to be maintained by and inherit from 
them. 
The extramarital children are transferred to their mother's marital family together 
with their natural mother.  However, the husband of their mother may repudiate 
her premarital, extramarital children.  If a man repudiates the premarital children 
of his wife, the children would remain the members of the natal family of their 
mother.  The head of the natal family of the mother of the premarital, 
extramarital child or adulterine child would control the person and property of the 
child.  If the husband did not expressly repudiate his wife's premarital 
extramarital children, the lobola negotiations would include the special lobola for 
                                            
821 For the purposes of comparison see Olivier et al Indigenous Law para 146 and the 
authorities cited in it. 
822 See Hartman Tsonga Law 88-89 about customary adoption among the Tsonga. 
823 See Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (T). 
824 Kewena v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (T). 
825 Metiso v Padongeluk Fonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T). 
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any extramarital child.  If the husband or his family head paid lobola together 
with the special lobola in respect of the affiliation of the premarital, extramarital 
children of his wife to his family the said children would acquire equal status of 
his marital children and would be competent to claim maintenance and inherit 
from him. 
According to traditional Hananwa law, the father of a child of an unmarried 
woman is fined for her seduction and impregnating her.  He must also "pay" a 
cow for the child's milk.  In Hananwa law, if the extramarital children are not 
affiliated they would seldom enjoy equal rights.  The extramarital children may 
not even enjoy the ultimate rights of succession and inheritance in their father's 
family.  This disadvantaged status constitutes unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of extramarital birth of the child and, indirectly, on the grounds of the 
gender of the mother, and the marital status of the natural parents.826  The law 
again visits the sins of the parents upon their extramarital children. 
9.3.3 Adulterine children of the wife of customary marriage 
In Hananwa law the husband may repudiate his wife's adulterine children.  If the 
husband of the adulteress repudiates the children her "natal family head" would 
assume the custody and guardianship of the rejected children.827  It follows that 
the children would "lose" any rights to be maintained and inherit from their 
mother's husband or his family.  However, the children may enjoy the right to be 
maintained by their mother's natal family head and enjoy the ultimate rights of 
succession in their mother's natal family. 
If the husband accepts the extramarital (adulterine) child of his wife as his own 
son or daughter, the child would enjoy any rights due to a marital child.  If he 
were "his" eldest son the child would step into the shoes of the deceased family 
head after his decease like his eldest natural son.  However, in most instances, 
                                            
826 See s 9 of the Constitution; the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; and Fraser. 
827 The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998. 
 170 
the "legitimate" children of the husband dispute the right of an extramarital child 
to step into the shoes of their natural father or family head. 
9.3.4 Children born to a widow 
The biological posthumous children of the widow's husband are the children of 
her deceased husband and are in the same position as his children who were 
born son before his death.  However, the first-born son would enjoy the rights 
due to a first-born in terms of the doctrine of male primogeniture.  The children 
who are born of the tsena husband and the widow belong to her deceased 
husband and assume his surname.  His successor-family head is their custodian 
and guardian. 
9.4 Conclusion 
A child has at least the following competencies: legal capacity, the capacity to 
act and the capacity to litigate.  Age and mental illness are two of the factors that 
affect the status of a person to perform juristic acts such as entering into 
contracts and marriages or engaging in suits of law.  The law protects a minor 
child by putting impediments or encumbrances upon his or her capacity to freely 
administer his or her estate or affairs.  However, a child may validly enter into 
contracts and perform juristic acts with the assistance or consent of his or her 
parents or guardian.  According to section 28(3) of the Constitution read with 
section 17 of the Children's Act828 a child is a person who is below 18 years of 
age.  The Children's Act has repealed the Age of Majority Act in toto.  Section 9 
of the Recognition Act provides that a groom or bride must be at least 18 years 
of age at the time of the formation of their customary marriage to each other.  
Bekker829 correctly points out that Africans never viewed childhood in terms of 
chronological age.  Among other African customs, initiation and circumcision 
                                            
828 The Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
829 Bekker 2008 Obiter 398. 
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constitute a step into adulthood.830  This implies that childhood ends at different 
ages for different persons.  Hananwa law recognises different categories of 
children.  It distinguishes inter alia between females and males, first-born sons 
and sons who are not first-born, marital children and extramarital children.  The 
rules of Hananwa law may discriminate unfairly.  However, the Constitution and 
legislation override the rules of customary law. 
 
                                            
830 Bekker 2008 Obiter 398. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law 
were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution.  
In doing so, it countenanced two problems.  The first problem was that the 
official customary law is generally "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking 
authority".831  The official customary law is found in the written texts such as the 
legislation, textbooks, commission reports and law reports.  The BAA was the 
main source of the official customary law.  However, it subjected customary law 
to the repugnancy clause (i.e. the principles of natural justice and public policy).  
The Recognition Act and the Reform of Customary law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act have repealed the BAA inasmuch as it 
applied to the customary law of marriage and the customary law of succession 
respectively.  The second problem was that the rules of the Hananwa family law 
could not be readily ascertained and, if they were, could not be ascertained with 
sufficient certainty. 832   This problem originated from the oral nature of the 
Hananwa law which is characterised by its adaptive inherent flexibility.  The 
solution of this problem was found in the documentation of the Hananwa family 
law in chapters 7, 8 and 9 of this thesis. 
Every community has a system of law that governs its goings-on.  Reference 
was had to the systems of law enumerated in section 15(3) of the Constitution 
which provides thus: 
(a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising – 
(iii) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of 
religious, personal or family; or 
                                            
831 Costa 1998 SAJHR 525, 534. 
832 See S 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 55 of 1998. 
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(iv) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or 
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. 
(b) Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this 
section and other provisions of the Constitution. 
Section 15(3) provides for such different systems of matrimonial law as the 
customary law of marriage, common law of marriage, Hindu law of marriage and 
Muslim law of marriage.  However, as things stand, the Constitution expressly 
recognises the following systems of law: the statutory law, common law and 
customary law.  Hananwa law is part of the broad concept of customary law.  
The thesis has shown that customary law is a form of personal law that forms 
part of the basic law of the country on a par with common law. 
10.1.1 Background 
The Constitution includes the Bill of Rights833 and affirms fundamental values 
such as Ubuntu, human dignity, equality and freedom.834  It is the metanorm or 
repugnancy law to which all law and conduct are modified. 835   As already 
pointed out, any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.836  Customary law, in any form, must 
pass the constitutional test.837  The sources of the living version of customary 
law are customs and practices, whereas the sources of the official version of 
customary law are the Constitution, legislation, case law, commission reports 
and scholarly writings. 838   Historically, customary law protects individuals 
through family groups. 839   However, customary law rules evolve over time, 
commensurate with the changing circumstances of the community in which they 
are found.840  Against this backdrop, generally, the customary law group rights 
                                            
833 See ch 2 of the Constitution. 
834 S 39 of the Constitution. 
835 S 2 of the Constitution. 
836 S 2 of the Constitution. 
837 Ss 2, 8(1), 39 and 211(3) of the Constitution. 
838 Ss 2, 8(1), 39 and 211(3) of the Constitution. 
839 Maithufi "Best Interests of the Child" 137. 
840 See ch 6 of this thesis. 
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and group duties have generally already metamorphosed into individual rights 
and individual duties consistent with the conditions of society. 
The rules of customary law must be construed through the prism of the Bill of 
Rights and, if necessary, must be developed consistent with the Constitution.  
Although it is provided in section 39 of the Constitution that the Bill of Rights 
does not deny the existence of the rights recognised or conferred by customary 
law, the Bill of Rights and the accompanying legislation, on the whole, substitute 
individual human rights for group rights.841  Of course, sections 30 and 31 of the 
Constitution recognise the group rights of language, cultural and religious 
communities.  However, the piercing of the corporateness of the group has 
revealed the fairly well-defined competing individual rights and individual duties 
shrouded in the notions of group rights and group duties respectively. 
The evolution of customary law from a largely communal law to an individualistic 
law manifests also in the customary family law in general and the law of 
marriage and the law of parent and child in particular.  This evolution has, to an 
extent, reduced to a bare minimum the dissimilarities between the common law 
of marriage and the official customary law of marriage.  A customary marriage 
concluded under the Recognition Act is not only on an equal footing with but is 
also almost the same as a civil marriage concluded under the Marriage Act.  
Prior to the coming into operation of the Interim Constitution, customary 
marriages were not on an equal footing with civil marriages. 
All children of customary marriages were, originally, indiscriminately treated as if 
they were tantamount to extramarital children.842  Traditionally the guardianship 
of extramarital children was vested in the heads of their mothers' natal families.  
Unless they had paid special lobola and affiliated their extramarital children to 
their family groups, biological fathers could not be their guardians.  This 
customary rule discriminated against both the biological fathers and their 
                                            
841 See chs 2, 3, 6 and 9 of this thesis. 
842 Samente v Minister of Police 1978 4 SA 632 (E). 
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extramarital children in violation of their fundamental human rights.843  However, 
there are fundamental changes.  The Children's Act844 appoints both biological 
parents as equal and competent guardians of their natural (biological) 
extramarital children.845 
The Constitution equalises all members of South African society and therefore 
proscribes unfair discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender, marital status, 
birth or age.846  It provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal and full protection and benefit of the law.847  Women and men are 
equal.848  Women may not suffer legal disabilities on the grounds that they are 
women.  Spouses are equal.849  Boys and girls are equal.850  Nobody is more 
equal than another.851   Section 15 of the Constitution does not prohibit the 
enactment of legislation recognising marriages concluded under any tradition or 
system of religious, personal or family law. 
The legislature has passed some legislation to align customary law with the 
applicable provisions of the Constitution. 852   Once again, unfortunately, the 
legislature often substituted common-law rules for the customary-law ones.853  
Of course, there are times when the courts have shown a preference for the 
living customary law over the official version.854 
The study divides the thesis into two main parts: the official customary law and 
the Hananwa family law.  The analyses in both parts put the emphasis on the 
law of marriage and parent-child law.  Chapter 1 argues that South Africa is a 
                                            
843 See ch 10 of this thesis. 
844 The Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
845 See ch 10 of this thesis. 
846 See ch 1 of the thesis. 
847 See ch 1 of the thesis. 
848 See ch 1 of the thesis. 
849 See ch 4 of the thesis. 
850 See ch 1 of the thesis. 
851 S 9 of the Constitution. 
852 See chs 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis. 
853 See Bhe in ch 1; Mabena v Letsoalo, Hlope v Mahlalela, Mabuza v Mbatha and so forth in 
ch 3 of this thesis. 
854 See ch 3 of this thesis. 
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multi-faith and multi-cultural society that has a multi-layered legal system 
shaped by a Constitution which is the supreme law of the land.855 
Chapter 2 sets out the general principles of customary law.  The thesis argues 
that customary law belongs to the family of non-specialised, underdeveloped 
system of law.  It further argues that customary law evolves constantly 
consistent with the circumstances of the community in which it is found. 
Chapter 3 deals with the versions of customary law.  There are two versions of 
customary law, namely the official and living versions.  On the one hand, the 
official version is found in written texts.  It is generally ossified, distorted and 
closely aligned with the interests of the State.  During the colonial and apartheid 
eras its application was subject to the repugnancy clause (i.e. the principles of 
natural justice and public policy) which mirrored the western conception of 
civilisation and morality.  On the other, the living version changes as the 
conditions of the society change.  It mirrors the ideals, aspirations, wants and 
ways of the community in which it is found.  The thesis shows that, while in the 
past the court was reliant on the official version, nowadays regard is frequently 
being had to the living version.  The Recognition Act and the Reform of 
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, among 
others, give effect to the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the 
fundamental rights to human dignity, equality and freedom.  However, the 
problem that these acts pose is that they often replace the rules of customary 
law with common-law principles.  It is concluded that this approach to customary 
law will render customary law irrelevant and obsolescent, at least in the public 
sphere. 
                                            
855 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa; In re: Ex parte Application of 
the President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Hosten et al 
South African Law 1248-1249.  See also s 15 of the Constitution, which provides that the 
Constitituon does not prohibit legislation that recognises marriages under a system of 
religious law, customary law, traditional law and personal or family law. 
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Chapter 4 deals with the official version of customary marriage.  The thesis 
argues that, besides the fact that customary law must be negotiated, entered 
into and celebrated in accordance with customary law, the Recognition Act has 
almost completely individualised customary marriage and replaced the family 
groups with spouses as parties to customary marriages.  As a result the spousal 
consent is a peremptory requirement while parental consent is required only with 
regard to the customary marriage of a minor.  The spouses enjoy equal status 
and are competent to perform juristic acts regardless of gender.  Chapter 5 
deals with the customary law of parent and child.  According to the Children's 
Act, children enjoy equal status and rights without regard being had to their 
gender, whether or not they were marital or extramarital children or whether they 
were first-born children or not.  For instance, the enjoyment of the right to 
support or inheritance is not based on gender. 
Chapter 6 deals with the general principles and history of Hananwa law.  The 
thesis argues that a leadership dispute occasioned by a system of patriarchy 
precipitated the secession of the Hananwas from the Malete people in 
Botswana.  Although there are examples of women who led them in the past, 
the Hananwa community is generally male-led.  Chapter 7 deals with the 
Hananwa customary marriage.  The thesis argues that the Hananwa customary 
marriage has evolved in response to the changing conditions of the community.  
As a result, although Hananwa law is almost completely unwritten, the research 
found that nowadays the spouses and not the family groups are the parties to 
the Hananwa customary marriages.  Chapter 8 deals with the dissolution of a 
Hananwa customary marriage.  The thesis concludes that nowadays Hananwa 
customary marriage may be dissolved through divorce.  To the contrary, the 
death of a husband does not dissolve Hananwa marriage but results in 
perpetual widowhood of the surviving wife.  A widow remains a member of her 
husband's family group.  She may even consent to a tsena marriage with a 
close relative of her deceased husband.  However, a widow is at liberty to have 
a consort of her choice.  Chapter 9 deals with the Hananwa law of parent and 
child.  Previously, the customary rule of male primogeniture dictated the status 
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of children.  Boys and girls did not enjoy equal rights.  Nowadays children enjoy 
equal status irrespective of their gender, whether or not they were marital or 
extramarital children or whether they were first-born children or not.  Both 
natural parents have a duty to support their natural children and vice versa 
without gender discrimination. 
The following paragraphs present a systematic comparative summary of the 
research findings: 
10.1.2 The main findings 
The following are the main findings of the study: 
10.1.2.1 The requirements for a valid customary marriage 
Although there are others, the following are the main requirements for a valid 
customary marriage: 
i. consent; 
ii. the transfer of the bride to the groom's family; 
iii. a lobola agreement. 
10.1.2.2 Consent 
As previously stated, the study differentiates between spousal consent and 
parental consent.856 
10.1.2.2.1 Spousal consent 
10.1.2.2.1.1 Hananwa law 
Both the prospective husband and the prospective wife must consent to their 
customary marriage.  However, customary marriages are negotiated, entered 
into and celebrated in accordance with customary law. 
                                            
856 See ch 4 and 7 of this thesis. 
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10.1.2.2.1.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
Both the prospective husband and the prospective wife must consent to their 
marriage.  However, customary marriages are negotiated, entered into and 
celebrated in accordance with customary law. 
10.1.2.2.2 The parental consent or the guardian's consent 
10.1.2.2.2.1 Hananwa law 
Historically Hananwa law recognised the communal form of consent.  Parental 
consent and spousal consent were subsumed in the communal consent of the 
family group.857  Later the father was required to give consent to his child's 
marriage after consultation with the mother of his child.  The family head of an 
unmarried mother was required to give consent to the marriage of her child.  
Nowadays, both parents are required to consent to the marriage of their child.  A 
widow, divorcee or unmarried woman must consent to the marriage of her child. 
10.1.2.2.2.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
Parental consent is no longer a requirement for the validity of the customary 
marriage of a person who is 18 years of age or above. 858   However, the 
Recognition Act provides that a parent or guardian must give consent to the 
customary marriage of his minor child.  That notwithstanding, the parental 
consent to the customary marriage of a minor does not supersede but 
complements the consent of the minor spouse.  However, all customary 
marriages must be negotiated, entered into and celebrated in accordance with 
customary law. 
                                            
857 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
858 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
 180 
10.1.2.2.3 The consent of the family group 
This kind of consent alludes to the consent of a family group.859 
10.1.2.2.3.1 Hananwa law 
The communal consent of the family group is no longer a peremptory 
requirement for the validity of a customary marriage.  Individuals have largely 
replaced agnatic groups as legal subjects.  This being the case, although 
customary marriages are negotiated and celebrated communally, only spousal 
consent is a peremptory requirement for the validity of the customary marriage 
of a major prospective spouse. 
10.1.2.2.3.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act does not recognise any form of 
communal consent to the customary marriage of a major prospective spouse, 
but only the spousal consent.  As said before, the consent of a parent or legal 
guardian is required only if a prospective spouse is not yet 18 years of age.  
However, although the Act makes no mention of the consent of the family of the 
prospective husband or wife, it provides that a customary marriage must be 
negotiated, entered into and celebrated in accordance with customary law. 
10.1.2.2.4 The Constitution 
Save for a few group rights such as sections 30 and 31 rights to culture, most of 
the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights are individual in nature.  In most 
sections the rights-holder is "everyone", "anyone" or "a person".  Most of the 
provisions of the Constitution are therefore couched in singular terms and 
manifest an individual orientation.  In this paradigm shift the Constitution 
confirms the substitution of the spouses for their respective families as parties to 
                                            
859 See chs 4 and 7 of this thesis. 
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their marriages.  The Recognition Act has given effect to this orientation.  The 
individual spouses are competent to consent to their customary marriage to 
each other.  The Constitution and the Recognition Act apply to Hananwa law as 
well.  The spousal consent in Hananwa law and the celebration of marriage in 
accordance with Hananwa customs and practices are consistent with the 
Constitution, particularly with sections 9, 10, 15, 30, 31 and 211(3) of the 
Constitution. 
10.1.2.3 The transfer of the bride to the groom's family 
According to customary law, the family of a wife has to give her away in 
marriage. 
10.1.2.3.1 Hananwa law 
Marriages that take place under Hananwa law are patrilocal.  The wife follows 
the domicile or residence of her husband and not vice versa.  The patrilocal 
system of marriage is clearly a residual aspect of the tradition of patriarchy and 
its corollary of male primogeniture.  After the conclusion of the negotiations for 
the formation of the customary marriage and the performance of the requisite 
rituals, the woman is handed over to the family of the man.  Usually, after all is 
said and done, the family of the man asks the family of the woman to hand the 
woman over.  The custom is that the family of the woman requests that they be 
given a week or so to prepare for the delivery of the woman.  On the appointed 
day the woman would leave, in the company of her escort, for the family of the 
husband.  The delivery and integration of the wife into her husband's family 
founds her membership of her marital family group. 
10.1.2.3.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
Understandably the Recognition Act is silent on the topic of the delivery and 
integration of the woman into her husband's family.  In other words, the Act does 
not provide whether the system of marriage is patrilocal, matrilocal or neolocal.  
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Obviously, the Act equalises spouses.  However, in practice the family of the 
woman hands over the woman to the man.  Correctly construed, a customary 
marriage under the Act is neolocal.  This inference is bolstered by the fact that 
customary marriage under the Act is, generally, a marriage in community of 
property.  In other words, the home of the parties to the marriage is a 
matrimonial property that is owned jointly and equally by the spouses.860 
10.1.2.3.3 The Constitution 
At first sight, the delivery of a bride to the family home of the groom and not vice 
versa offends sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution.  A marriage is a consensual 
relationship.  It follows that the couple must enjoy the right to choose to reside at 
the homestead of the husband's or wife's parents or a residence of spousal 
choice (a neolocal residence).  If the situation of the matrimonial home were a 
matter of their choice, this would not offend the Constitution.  In constitutional 
terms, both parties to the marriage must consent to the domicile or residence of 
the spouses as a family.  It is unconstitutional for the marriage to be 
automatically patrilocal by operation of the law. 
10.1.2.4 The lobola agreement 
10.1.2.4.1 Hananwa law 
The family of a man or a man himself and the family of a woman may agree on 
the payment of lobola to the family of the wife.  It is noteworthy that the 
agreement imposes a duty only upon the family of the man or a man to pay 
lobola and not the family of the woman. 
                                            
860 S 7 of the Recognition Act. 
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10.1.2.4.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The Recognition Act does not expressly provide that a man or a woman or both 
should pay lobola.  According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and 
Another, 861  the Recognition Act "does not regulate, in some detail, various 
aspects and incidents of customary marriages".  Accordingly, customary law 
may thus impose validity requirements in addition to those set out by the 
Recognition Act.  It follows, therefore, that in order to "determine such 
requirements a court would have to have regard to the customary practices of 
the relevant community".862  Customary law imposes the duty to pay lobola as a 
validity requirement additional to the ones the Recognition Act imposes. 
10.1.2.4.3 The Constitution 
The Constitution recognises customary law subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.863  Section 39(3) of the 
Constitution provides thus: 
The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill. 
The members of traditional communities have the right to freely marry and 
establish and raise their families.  Their right to culture includes the right to 
perform rituals and practise customs such as lobola.  However, these customary 
law rights must not be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.  For instance, the 
custom of lobola must be consistent with the rights to human dignity, equality 
and freedom.  Unlike the BAA and the Law of Evidence Amendment Act which 
exempted it from their repugnancy clauses, the Constitution did not exempt the 
rules of customary law such as those relating to the customary duty to pay 
lobola and its corresponding right from the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
                                            
861 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) paras 29-30. 
862 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) paras 29-30. 
863 S 211(3) of the Constitution. 
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It is the Recognition Act that gives effect to section 15(3) of the Constitution 
insofar as it relates to customary marriages.  For the sake of completeness, it is 
noteworthy that the Marriage Act is a competent legislation under section 15(3) 
of the Constitution in respect of civil marriages.  The Recognition Act defines 
lobola as property in cash or kind given to the family of the woman in 
consideration of marriage.  In other words, the duty to pay lobola is not 
reciprocal.  Lobola is paid only to "the head of the prospective wife's family in 
consideration of marriage".  No lobola is given to the head of the family of the 
prospective husband.  This being the case, a lobola agreement or a duty to pay 
lobola discriminates against the family of the man or the man by imposing a duty 
to pay it only upon the man or family of the man and conferring a right to receive 
it only upon the family of the woman.  It is noteworthy that traditionally lobola is 
not paid to the bride but to her family.  The custom of lobola is part of African 
culture.  The Constitutional Court has not yet pronounced on the constitutionality 
of the custom. 
10.2 Proprietary consequences 
10.2.1 Hananwa law 
Hananwa law recognises communal property (family property and house 
property) and personal property.  Although personal property is one of the three 
categories of African customary property, historically the Hananwa property law 
mainly revolves around the communal property system (i.e. the family and 
house property regime), which transcends the ambit of the property relations of 
the individual husband and wife and encapsulates the whole family group as a 
communal property rights holder.  Accordingly, the earnings and accruals of 
individual family members accrue to the communal property of their common 
household within either a polygamous or monogamous household system 
regardless. 
However, the individualisation and equalisation of the legal subjects in Hananwa 
law has resulted in the individualisation and equalisation of family and house 
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property relations.  Husband and wife may hold equal shares in a family property 
system.  During the subsistence of the marriage the earnings and accruals of 
the individual spouses contribute towards the growth of the matrimonial 
property.  Unlike the situation in the communal system of family and house 
property, the minor children do not share in the matrimonial property of their 
parents but are mere dependants.  The major children may hold their own 
houses and work for their own accounts. 
10.2.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The Recognition Act provides that a customary marriage is a marriage in 
community of property, profit and loss unless the parties enter into an 
antenuptial contract prior to the formation of the marriage.864  If a man and a 
woman are parties to a customary union and the husband wants to enter into 
another additional customary marriage with another woman, he must obtain an 
order of the High Court in terms of which the existing matrimonial property (the 
joint estate) is divided between the spouses as separate estates. 865   The 
property of the additional marriage therefore excludes the separate estate of the 
first wife.  This being the case, each house within the polygamous household 
has its separate estate.  The separate estates of the house approximate to the 
erstwhile communal property of the house (i.e. the house property), on the one 
hand.  On the other hand, the separate estate of the husband approximates to 
the general family property.  This is so because while the husband has a duty of 
support towards the entire family (i.e. all the houses within the polygamous 
household), the house property is liable for the maintenance of the members of 
the house in question.  Any use of the house property for the benefit of another 
house creates a claimable and reimbursable inter-house debt. 
Clearly, there are three forms of matrimonial property system under the 
Recognition Act, namely in community of property, profit and loss, out of 
                                            
864 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
865 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
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community of property but with an accrual system, and out of community of 
property without an accrual system. 
10.2.3 The Marriage Act866 
A marriage entered into in terms of the Marriage Act may be concluded in 
community of property, profit and loss, or out of community with an accrual 
system and out of community of property without an accrual system.867  The 
parties to the marriage may conclude an antenuptial contract prior to the 
formation of the marriage.  The contract serves to exclude the pre-marital assets 
from the joint estate. 
10.2.4 The Constitution 
Section 25 of the Constitution protects property rights.  It does not specifically 
deal with matrimonial property but property in general.  However, section 15(3) 
recognises marriages under traditional system of family law, personal law and 
religious law.  Customary law is a hybrid of the traditional and religious systems 
of law.  On the face of sections 8(1), 30, 31, 39(3) and 211(3) of the 
Constitution, customary law is recognised subject to the Constitution.  Section 
211(3) subjects customary law both to the Constitution and to legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law.  The question is whether the rules of the 
customary law of property are constitutional.  The Constitutional Court answered 
this question in both Bhe and Gumede.  Bhe individualises and equalises the 
inheritance of the intestate estates of African persons.  Gumede individualises 
and equalises the spousal rights in the matrimonial property.  The Recognition 
Act recognises marriages in community of property (joint estates), out of 
community of property (separate spousal estates) without an accrual system, 
and out of community of property with an accrual system.  The family property 
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and house property systems that obtain in polygynous households are not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. 
10.3 Personal consequences 
The formation of a marriage has a bearing on the persons of the parties to the 
marriage.868 
10.3.1 The legal capacity 
10.3.1.1 Hananwa law 
In its original indigenous form, Hananwa law is not predisposed towards the 
concept of individual rights.869  On the contrary, it is set on the notion of group 
rights.  These group rights are enjoyed and exercised in community with other 
members of the agnatic group.  Individual rights subsume in a system of group 
rights.  In other words, the individual rights are protected through the family 
group.  Notwithstanding the group orientation of customary law, historically 
males play the leading roles in the administration of family and community 
affairs.870   Accordingly, they enjoy more and better rights than women.  In 
consequence, they enjoy the rights to succeed to the office of family head on the 
basis of the tradition of patriarchy and its corollary customary rule of male 
primogeniture.  The husbands are the sole heads of the households.  In a 
polygamous household a husband is the head of both of the family as a whole 
and of each house within the family.  During a lengthy period of his absence 
from home, the husband might often ask one of his senior male relatives to keep 
an eye on his family. 
However, the circumstances of society have been changing over the decades.  
The tradition of patriarchy and the customary rule of male primogeniture are 
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 188 
obsolescent not because of but alongside the Constitution.  However, the new 
constitutional dispensation has given impetus to the individualisation and 
equalisation of rights and of the corresponding duties.  Nowadays, married 
women generally act as de facto heads of their households in the absence of 
their husbands and as co-heads of households in the presence of their 
husbands.  Most unmarried women hold their own houses. 
10.3.1.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act871 
The Recognition Act gives effect to the provisions of the Constitution.872  It goes 
further to give effect to the relevant and applicable rights in the Bill of Rights, 
such as the rights to human dignity, 873 equality874 and culture.875  In this context 
the Act has given effect to the right to equality between husband and wife i.e. 
spousal (gender) equality.  It actually confers, with specificity and precision, 
equal rights upon husband and wife.  Properly construed, both husband and wife 
enjoy equal rights by virtue of being human beings and not because of but in 
spite of their gender.  Married women administer family affairs together with their 
husbands.  Unmarried women may hold their own houses and enter into juristic 
acts in spite of their gender.  They have full and equal status and capacity. 
10.3.1.3 The Marriage Act 
Some members of the Hananwa community conclude marriages in terms of the 
Marriages Act876 but continue to abide by Hananwa law in the conduct of their 
lives as spouses and community members.  Over the years the legal effect of 
the Marriage Act was felt only at the point of the dissolution of civil marriages by 
divorce or death.  During the subsistence of a marriage, families lived by the 
rules of Hananwa law as if they were married in accordance with customary 
                                            
871 The Recognition Act. 
872 See ss 15 and 211 of the Constitution. 
873 S 10 of the Constitution. 
874 S 9 of the Constitution. 
875 Ss 30 and 31 of the Constitution. 
876 Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
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marriage in spite of their civil marriages.  In practical terms, the Marriage Act 
confers equal status and equal rights upon husband and wife. 
10.3.2 The capacity to act 
10.3.2.1 Hananwa law 
Historically, women were regarded as perpetual minors.877  They did not have 
equal capacity to perform juristic acts without the assistance or consent of their 
male family heads.  Their actions were ascribed to their male family heads.  
Nowadays, an adult woman has the capacity to act without the assistance of a 
guardian. 
10.3.2.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The husband and wife have equal capacity to act.  The Recognition Act gives 
effect to sections 9 and 15 of the Constitution.  It has adopted, furthermore, most 
of the provisions of the common law matrimonial legislation such as the 
Marriage Act (as amended) and the Divorce Act (as amended). 
10.3.2.3 The Marriage Act 
The legislature abolished marital power and repealed the Age of Majority Act.  
The husband and wife have equal capacity to litigate.  The Act puts spouses on 
an equal footing. 
10.3.3 The contractual capacity 
10.3.3.1 Hananwa law 
Nowadays married women generally act as de facto heads of their households 
in the absence of their husbands and as co-heads of households in the 
presence of their husbands.  They are competent to enter into contracts.  Most 
unmarried women hold their own houses.  The Constitution has given impetus to 
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the individualisation and equalisation of spouses' rights and corresponding 
duties. 
10.3.3.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The husband and wife have equal capacity to conclude contracts. 
10.3.3.3 The Marriage Act 
The husband and wife have equal capacity to conclude contracts. 
10.3.4 The capacity to litigate 
10.3.4.1 Hananwa law 
Historically the family head acts on behalf of the family group in suits of law.  
Nowadays, individual members of the family may sue in their own right.  Married 
and unmarried women enjoy equal rights to litigate in their own names. 
10.3.4.2 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
Flowing from spousal equality, a spouse has the capacity to litigate. 
10.3.4.3 The Marriage Act 
Each spouse has the capacity to litigate. 
10.3.4.4 The Constitution 
According to section 9 of the Constitution everyone is equal before the law and 
enjoys full and equal protection and benefit of the law.  Section 6 of Recognition 
Act put effect to section 9 inasmuch as it applies to the parties to the customary 
marriages.  It follows therefore that spouses enjoy equal status including legal 
competencies such as the legal capacity, the capacity to act and the capacity to 
litigate. 
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10.4 The dissolution of customary marriage 
10.4.1 By death 
Generally, the death of a spouse does not dissolve customary marriage.  If a 
husband dies, a tsena husband replaces him as the husband to his wife.  If a 
wife dies, a seyantlo replaces her as the wife to her husband. 
10.4.1.1 Hananwa law 
According to Hananwa law the death of a spouse does not dissolve customary 
marriage.  This position resonates with the African saying that "lebitla la mosadi 
ke bogadi".878  The context of marriage is permanence.  This legal position was 
made possible by a system of substitute and supplementary marriages.  
However, substitute marriages are becoming obsolete. 
10.4.1.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
According to the Recognition Act the death of a spouse dissolves a customary 
marriage. 
10.4.1.3 The Marriage Act 
According to the Marriage Act the death of a spouse dissolves a customary 
marriage. 
10.4.2 By divorce 
10.4.2.1 Grounds for divorce 
10.4.2.1.1 Hananwa law 
Marriage may dissolve on the grounds inter alia of adultery, witchcraft and 
barrenness. 
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10.4.2.1.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The Recognition Act recognises only one ground for divorce, namely the 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. 
10.4.2.1.3 The Marriage Act 
Marriage may dissolve on the grounds of the irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage and the mental illness or the continuous unconsciousness of a party to 
the marriage.879 
10.4.3 The consequences of the dissolution of a customary marriage 
Both versions of customary law divide matrimonial consequences into 
patrimonial and personal consequences. 
10.4.3.1 Personal consequences of the dissolution of customary marriage 
10.4.3.1.1 Legal capacity  
10.4.3.1.1.1 Hananwa law 
Historically after divorce the guardianship of the woman reverts to the family 
head of her natal family.  The guardianship of the man does not change.  
Nowadays as a consequence of the individualisation and equalisation of legal 
subjects in customary law a divorced woman becomes an independent 
householder.  She enjoys equal rights. 
10.4.3.1.1.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriage Act 
A divorcee enjoys equal rights in law. 
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10.4.3.1.2 The capacity to act 
10.4.3.1.2.1 Hananwa law 
A divorcee may perform any juristic act without any restriction on the grounds of 
gender. 
10.4.3.1.2.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriage Act 
The Recognition Act ceases to regulate the affairs of the husbands and wives 
upon the dissolution of their customary marriage.  Divorce does not affect their 
constitutional rights.  A divorcee may perform any juristic act without any 
restriction on the grounds of gender.  She or he does not require the consent of 
her or his former spouse in order to enter into binding contracts. 
10.4.3.1.3 The contractual capacity 
10.4.3.1.3.1 Hananwa law 
Historically a male family head, for instance the husband, would enter into 
contracts on behalf of the family.  However, nowadays married and unmarried 
women may enter into binding contracts. 
10.4.3.1.3.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
Divorcees enjoy equal rights to conclude contracts. 
10.4.3.1.4 The capacity to litigate 
10.4.3.1.4.1 Hananwa law 
Historically the male family head litigates on behalf of the family.  Nowadays 
divorcees are equally competent to litigate. 
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10.4.3.1.4.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
Divorcees are competent to litigate in their own right and on behalf of their 
households. 
10.4.3.2 The Constitution 
The divorcees enjoy equal status as explained in 10.3.44 above but with the 
necessary qualification that they do not require the consent of their former 
spouses to perform juristic acts validly. 
10.4.3.3 The proprietary consequences of the dissolution of a customary 
marriage 
10.4.3.3.1 Hananwa law 
The nature of property determines the patrimonial consequences of a marriage.  
As explained above, the customary law property system is communal in 
orientation.  The right of ownership to property in customary law is not an 
individual right but a group right belonging to an agnatic group and not an 
individual member. 
However, owing to the individualisation and equalisation of the legal subjects in 
customary law, the individual spouses have been substituted for their families as 
parties to the customary marriage.  Similarly, individual rights of spouses have, 
to an extent, superseded the group rights of the family groups.  Equally, the 
matrimonial property system has superseded the communal family and house 
property system. 
10.4.3.3.2 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
The Recognition Act governs customary marriages and their consequences 
including their dissolution by death or divorce.  The Act provides that all 
customary marriages are marriages in community of property unless the parties 
thereto enter into ante nuptial contracts antecedent to the formation of the 
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marriage.  If the matrimonial property system was a joint estate, the dissolution 
of the marriage would result in the division of the estate into two equal shares.  If 
the contrary was the case and the spouses kept two separate estates, the 
individual spouses would retain their own separate estates. 
10.4.3.4 The Constitution 
Section 25 of the Constitution protects property rights.  It does not specifically 
deal with matrimonial property.  However, section 15(3) of the Constitution 
recognises marriages under the traditional system of family law, personal law 
and religious law.  On the face of sections 8(1), 30, 31, 39(3) and 211(3) of the 
Constitution, customary law is recognised subject to the Constitution.  Section 
211(3) subjects customary law both to the Constitution and to legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law.  The question is whether the rules of the 
customary law of property are constitutional.  These rules are communalistic in 
focus.  The Constitutional Court answered this question in both Bhe and 
Gumede.  Bhe individualises and equalises the inheritance of the intestate 
estates of African persons.  Gumede individualises and equalises the spousal 
rights in the matrimonial property. 
10.5 The parent-child relationship 
Customary law recognises and distinguishes between two main categories of 
children: marital and extramarital children.  Traditionally, a customary marriage 
determines the rights of children and differentiates between the rights of marital 
children and those of extramarital children.  In so far as intestate succession is 
concerned, first-born children and junior sons are treated differently.  Boy-
children and girl-children are treated differently.  However, as pointed out later, 
both customary law in general and Hananwa law in particular have evolved and 
been reformed by legislation.  Boy-children are senior to girl-children.  Senior 
girl-children are superior to junior girl-children. 
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A marital child belongs to his father's family group and enjoys maintenance and 
inheritance rights in his father's household.  An extramarital child belongs to his 
mother's natal family and is an ultimate heir in the natal family of his mother.  He 
can enjoy inheritance rights in his father's household only if his biological father 
affiliates him to his family. 
This discrimination between marital and extramarital children offends section 9 
and section 28 of the Constitution and the children's rights in the Children's 
Act880 and Maintenance Act.881  The Constitution does not discriminate between 
the rights of marital and extramarital children.  From a constitutional perspective, 
the gender of a child or the marriage of the biological parents of a child is neither 
constitutive of the legitimacy or illegitimacy nor the fundamental human rights of 
the child.  A child is a holder of fundamental human rights in the Bill of Rights by 
virtue of being a human being and a holder of children's rights in section 28 of 
the Constitution (i.e. the mini-charter of children's rights) by virtue of being a 
child.  The best interests of the child are paramount in all matters affecting a 
child.882 
10.5.1 Marital children 
Marital children are the children whose biological parents are married to each 
other at the time of their conception or birth or whose parents marry each other 
after the conception or birth of those children.  The tradition of patriarchy 
informed this legal position.  However, although the tradition of patriarchy has 
weakened and is unconstitutional, it has not, in practice, completely fallen into 
disuse.  The Constitution, in particular the fundamental values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom in tandem with the Bill of Rights has equalised society in 
general and marital and extra-marital children in particular.  The gender of a 
child or whether it was born in or out of wedlock no longer determines the 
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legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child.  The Constitution, therefore, delinks the 
question whether a child is born in or out of wedlock or the gender of a child 
from the entitlement of the child to the enjoyment of maintenance and 
inheritance rights from his father or mother or their respective families. 
10.5.1.1 Boy-children 
Marital boy-children belong to the marital family of their parents.  Historically 
they were subjected to the authority of the family head of their parents.  The 
family head was the most senior male person within the family group.  It often 
happened that their father doubled as a family head. 
10.5.1.1.1 Maintenance and support 
Historically, the family to which a child belonged bore the responsibility for the 
maintenance and support of the child.  The communal property of the family 
defrayed the expenses of each of its members.  Nowadays, customary law 
recognises the reciprocal duty of a parent and a child to maintain and support 
each other if the situation so dictates. 
10.5.1.1.1.1 Hananwa law 
Historically the communal property was legally intended for the maintenance 
and support of all the children belonging to the family without discrimination on 
the grounds of gender.  The family of the father has always been legally 
responsible for the upkeep of the marital children.  However, it had only a 
natural obligation to provide care to the extramarital children of the family.  
Nowadays, the duty to maintain the marital children resides in both parents (i.e. 
their mother and father).  If a child is adopted or affiliated to a family he enjoys 
equal rights in the family.  While as an extramarital child he enjoys equal rights 
in his mother natal family or his mother's single-parent household, the adoption 
or affiliation of the extramarital child extinguishes his extramarital status and 
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confers upon him equal rights in her or his adoptive or affiliated family and 
household. 
10.5.1.1.1.2 Official customary law 
The duty to maintain a marital child rests upon his parents.  If the parents are 
deceased or incapable of maintaining a child, the ascendants or collateral 
relatives, the former excluding the latter, have a duty to maintain the child.  
There is no discrimination on the grounds of gender and birth in this regard. 
10.5.1.1.1.3 The Maintenance Act 
The Maintenance Act does not discriminate between a mother and a father or a 
male child and a female child.  It imposes the duty to maintain a child primarily 
upon his natural parents or adoptive parents.  If the parents are deceased or 
incapable of maintaining a child, the ascendants or collateral relatives, the 
former being capable the latter being excluded, have a duty to maintain the 
child. 
10.5.1.1.2 Inheritance 
Customary law recognises the right to succeed to the position of and inherit from 
the deceased person.  The individualisation of the customary law of succession 
foregrounded the common-law notion of inheritance over the notion of 
succession.  This change has turned the customary law of succession on its 
head.  The following paragraphs deal with the findings on the customary law of 
succession. 
10.5.1.1.2.1 Hananwa law 
Historically, an eldest marital male child succeeded to the family headship and 
the control of the communal property in his father's household, while an 
extramarital child was an ultimate heir in his mother's natal household.  In other 
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words, the extramarital children did not enjoy equal status in both their father's 
family group and mother's family group.  Nowadays, marital children enjoy equal 
rights to succeed and inherit irrespective of their gender.  However, Hananwa 
law still discriminates against an extramarital male child in his father's 
household. 
10.5.1.1.2.2 Official customary law 
The marital male child enjoys an equal right to inherit intestate from his parents.  
If parents are deceased or incapable of maintaining a child, the ascendants or 
collateral relatives, the former being capable the latter being excluded, have a 
duty to maintain the child.  The birth norm has ceased to determine the 
inheritance rights of a child.  A child has no less equal rights to inherit on the 
grounds of his extramarital birth alone. 
10.5.1.1.2.3 The Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation 
of Related Matters Act883 
The Act does not discriminate on the grounds of gender or birth. 
10.5.1.2 Girl-children 
All people have a right to maintenance either as self-providers or dependants 
irrespective of their gender or birth.  Girl-children, therefore, have equal rights to 
maintenance and support to the extent of their need.  However, the duty of 
support is dependent upon the ability of the duty-bearer to support the rights-
holder. 
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10.5.1.2.1 Maintenance and support 
Historically, the family to which a girl-child belonged bore the responsibility for 
her maintenance and support.  The communal property of the family defrayed 
the expenses of each of its members including a girl-child.  Nowadays, 
customary law recognises the reciprocal duty of a parent and child, regardless of 
gender, to maintain and support each other if the situation so dictates. 
10.5.1.2.1.1 Hananwa law 
Nowadays both parents (father and mother) have a duty to maintain and support 
their marital children regardless of their gender.  A parent may contribute in cash 
or kind.  If parents are deceased or incapable of maintaining a child, the 
ascendants or collateral relatives, the former being capable the latter being 
excluded, have a duty to maintain the child. 
10.5.1.2.1.2 Official customary law 
The parents have a duty to maintain and support their marital children 
regardless of their gender.  If the parents are deceased or incapable of 
maintaining a child, the ascendants or collateral relatives, the former being 
capable the latter being excluded, have a duty to maintain the child. 
10.5.1.2.1.3 Maintenance Act 
The Maintenance Act does not discriminate between a mother and a father or a 
male child and a female child.  It imposes the duty to maintain a child primarily 
upon his or her natural parents.  If the parents are deceased or incapable of 
maintaining the child, the ascendants or collateral relatives, the former being 
capable the latter being excluded, have a duty to maintain the child. 
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10.5.1.2.2 Inheritance 
The estate of a person who deceases intestate devolves upon his or her 
dependants, particularly family members. 
10.5.1.2.2.1 Hananwa law 
Nowadays marital girl children enjoy equal rights to succeed and inherit 
irrespective of their sex.  Hananwa law discriminates against an extramarital girl 
child in the household of her biological father.  However, an extramarital male 
child enjoys equal rights to inherit from her mother. 
10.5.1.2.2.2 Official customary law 
The marital female child enjoys equal rights to inherit intestate from her parents.  
A child has no less equal rights to inherit on the grounds of her extramarital birth 
alone. 
10.5.1.2.2.3 The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act 
Girl children enjoy equal rights to inherit intestate.  The Act does not discriminate 
on the grounds of gender or birth. 
10.5.2 Extramarital children 
Over the centuries an extramarital child has suffered legal disabilities only 
because it was a child of parents who were not married to each at the time of his 
or her birth or thereafter. 
10.5.2.1 Boy-children 
Historically, a boy-child was viewed as the most important future of his paternal 
family. 
 202 
10.5.2.1.1 Maintenance and support 
Generally, the biological parents must maintain their children and children must 
maintain their indigent parents.  However, the following systems of law have 
rules that apply to the members of the community they serve. 
10.5.2.1.1.1 Hananwa law 
A mother or natal family has a duty to maintain and support her children without 
gender-based discrimination.  The legal duty of the natural father to maintain 
and support is limited to the payment of the milk cows (maswi a ngwana). 
10.5.2.1.1.2 Official customary law 
A mother or natal family has a duty to maintain and support her children without 
gender-based discrimination.  The legal duty of the natural father to maintain 
and support is limited to the payment of the milk cows (maswi a ngwana). 
10.5.2.1.1.3 The Maintenance Act 
The Maintenance Act does not discriminate between a mother and a father or a 
male child and a female child.  It imposes the duty to maintain a child primarily 
upon his natural parents.  If the parents are deceased or incapable of 
maintaining a child, the ascendants or collateral relatives, the former being 
capable the latter being excluded, have a duty to maintain the child. 
10.5.2.1.2 Inheritance 
Generally, nowadays, children have equal rights to inherit their lawful share of 
the intestate estate of their parents. 
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10.5.2.1.2.1 Hananwa law 
Nowadays extramarital children enjoy equal rights to succeed and inherit from 
their mother irrespective of their sex or chronology or sequence of birth.  
Hananwa law discriminates against an extramarital male child vis-a-vis the 
family of his natural father.  A marital child enjoys better inheritance rights than 
an extramarital, unaffiliated male child of an unmarried woman.  However, as an 
unmarried woman owns property and could inherit from her own parents, her 
extramarital male child enjoys an equal right to inherit from her. 
10.5.2.1.2.2 Official customary law 
The extramarital male children enjoy equal rights to inherit intestate from their 
parents.  The birth norm has ceased to determine the inheritance rights of a 
child.  A child has no less equal rights to inherit only on the grounds of his 
extramarital birth. 
10.5.2.1.2.3 The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act 
Children enjoy equal rights to inherit intestate.  The Act does not discriminate on 
the grounds of gender or birth. 
10.5.2.2 Girl-children 
10.5.2.2.1 Maintenance and support 
Traditionally, the family head has a duty to support his children irrespective of 
their gender or birth.  The costs of maintenance were chargeable against the 
communal property of the household.  In the case of a polygamous household, 
each house has a duty to maintain and support its members.  However, 
nowadays, the parents of a child are obliged to maintain and support his or her 
children. 
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10.5.2.2.1.1 Hananwa law 
Historically extramarital girl-children belonged to the natal family of their mother.  
Their mother was herself subject to the authority of her natal family head.  
However, Hananwa law has done away with the ancient legal disabilities that a 
woman endured only on the grounds that she was a woman.  Single-parent 
women are now heads of their own households.  They maintain and support 
their own offspring.  On the other hand, the duty of a natural father to maintain 
and support his extramarital children is, to the extent of his customary law 
obligation, to pay milk cows (maswi a ngwana) to the family of the mother of the 
child. 
10.5.2.2.1.2 Official customary law 
A parent has a duty to maintain and support his or her children without 
discrimination on the grounds of gender or birth. 
10.5.2.2.1.3 The Maintenance Act 
Each of the natural parents has a duty to maintain and support their child.  A 
child may sue each of them for maintenance and support.  Although the financial 
means of a parent is critical, the best interests of the child are decisive in the 
determination and enforcement of the duty of support.  If the parents are 
deceased or incapable of maintaining a child, the ascendants or collateral 
relatives, the former being capable the latter being excluded, have a duty to 
maintain the child. 
10.5.2.2.2 Inheritance 
Generally, the extramarital and marital children have equal rights to inherit their 
lawful share of the intestate estate of their parents. 
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10.5.2.2.2.1 Hananwa law 
Hananwa law no longer discriminates between the inheritance rights of 
extramarital boy-children and extramarital girl-children in regard to their 
deceased mother's estate. 
10.5.2.2.2.2 Official customary law 
A child enjoys equal rights in relation to the intestate estate of his or her 
deceased parents (its father and mother). 
10.5.2.2.2.3 The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act 
Marital and extra-marital children enjoy equal inheritance rights. 
10.5.3 The Constitution 
The Constitution equalises everyone including spouses and marital and 
extramarital children.  All children are equal before the law and enjoy equal 
protection and benefits of the law.  Marital and extramarital children, boy-
children and girl-children, and first-born and junior children have the right to 
maintenance and inheritance irrespective of the nature of their birth, the 
chronology of birth, their gender and age, or whether or not their parents were 
married.  However, the blood relationship is a paramount consideration in claims 
of maintenance or intestate succession. 
10.6 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the study has substantively achieved the 
research objectives set out in chapter 1 of this thesis. 
First, the study established the selected rules of the official customary family 
law. 
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 Chapter 4 analysed, among others, the validity requirements for and the 
consequences of the customary marriages negotiated, entered into and 
celebrated in accordance with the Recognition Act.  The study found that 
the Recognition Act has converted customary law into a statutory 
customary marriage in almost all respects.  Some of the validity 
requirements for a customary marriage imposed by the Recognition Act 
are similar to those of the civil marriage under the Marriage Act.  
However, as explained earlier in this chapter, the Constitutional Court, in 
MM v MN and Another,884 said that customary law imposes some validity 
requirements for a customary marriage in addition to the ones set out in 
the Recognition Act but subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
 Chapter 5 analysed the rules of the official version of customary law of 
parent and child.  The Children's Act regulates the affairs of all the 
children regardless of whether or not they are marital or extramarital 
children.  The Act gives effect to chapter 28 of the Constitution.  All 
children are equal before the law and enjoy full and equal protection and 
benefit of the law.  The Constitution and the Children's Act impose the 
demands of human dignity and equality and bring the customary law of 
parent and child on a par with the common law of parent and child.  
Customary law imposes the rules of customary law of parent and child 
additional and subject to the Constitution and applicable legislation such 
as the Children's Act. 
The study also established the selected rules of the Hananwa family law. 
 Chapter 7 analysed, among others, the validity requirements for and the 
consequences of the customary marriages negotiated, entered into and 
celebrated in accordance with the Hananwa law.  The study found that 
Hananwa law of marriage has evolved to the extent that the individual 
                                            
884 MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) paras 29-30. 
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spouses are the competent parties to a customary marriage.  The 
communal consent of the family group or the parental consent has given 
way to the spousal consent.  However, the family group, in particular the 
parents of the parties still play important roles in the negotiation, 
conclusion and celebration of the marriages of their children. 
 Chapter 8 analysed the rules of Hananwa law that regulate the 
dissolution customary marriages.  The study found that according to the 
Hananwa law the dissolution of customary marriages may happen only 
through divorce.  Chapter 9 analysed the rules of Hananwa child law.  
The Hananwa law differentiates the maintenance and inheritance rights of 
the marital children from those of extramarital children.  As a result, an 
extramarital child may not inherit from his or her biological father unless 
he or she has been affiliated to the household of his or her biological 
father.  However, the biological father has a duty to support his 
extramarital children, at least, through dikgomo tsa maswi a bana (milk 
cows). 
Second, the study found that the Hananwas still observe the rules of Hananwa 
family law.  Third, the study documented the rules of the official customary 
family law in chapters 4 and 5 as well as the rules of the "living" Hananwa family 
law in chapters 7, 8 and 9.  Fourth, the study found that the rules of Hananwa 
family law are generally compatible with the Constitution.  However, some of its 
rules are apparently inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.  The following are 
classic examples: 
 First, the imposition of the duty to pay lobola upon the prospective 
husband discriminates against the prospective husbands on the grounds 
of gender. 
 Second, the practice of polygyny discriminates against women in that 
only males may enter into customary marriages with more than one 
woman in a polygynous household. 
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 Third, the Hananwa law of parent and child generally discriminates 
against extramarital children and their fathers.  For instance, the 
guardianship and custody of extramarital children whose fathers have not 
paid special lobola to affiliate them to their fathers' families are vested in 
the natal families of their unmarried mothers or their natural mothers. 
 Fourth, the natural father's right of access to his extramarital children is 
not well-defined because the extramarital children belong to the natal 
family of their unmarried mother. 
 Fifth, the acceptance and affiliation of a man of his wife's extramarital 
children as his children, generally, result in the violation of their natural 
father's rights of guardianship, custody and access. 
 Sixth, the imposition of the status of the ultimate heir upon an extramarital 
child abstracts from the equality of his or her inheritance rights at 
Hananwa law in contravention of the provisions of the Bill of Rights read 
together with those of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act. 
The Constitutional Court has not as yet pronounced itself on the constitutionality 
of the customs of lobola and polygyny. 
 
  
 209 
Bibliography 
A 
Albertyn and Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 
Albertyn C and Goldblatt B "Facing the challenge of transformation: 
difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality" 
1998 SAJHR 248 
Allott New Essays 
Allott AN New Essays in African Law (Butterworths London 1970) 
Anyebe Customary law 
Anyebe AP Customary Law: The War without Arms (Fourth Dimension 
Publishers Enugu 1985) 
Armstrong Law and Family 
Armstrong AK Law and Family in Southern Africa - WLSA Working Paper 
7 (WLSA Harare 1987) 
Ashton The Basuto 
Ashton EH The Basuto (Oxford University Press London 1952) 
B 
Barnard, Cronjé and Olivier Law of Persons 
Barnard AH, Cronjé DSP and Olivier PJJ The South African Law of 
Persons and Family Law (Butterworths Durban 1990) 
Becker and Hinz Marriage and Customary Law 
Becker H and Hinz MO Marriage and Customary Law in Namibia (Centre 
for Applied Social Sciences Windhoek 1995) 
Bekink and Brand "Constitutional Protection of Children" 
Bekink B and Brand D "Constitutional Protection of Children" in Davel CJ 
(ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2000) 
Bekker 1976 CILSA 
Bekker JC "Grounds of divorce in African customary marriages in Natal" 
1976 CILSA 346 
 210 
Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 
Bekker JC Seymour's Customary Law in Southern Africa (Juta Cape 
Town 1989) 
Bekker "Children and Young Persons" 
Bekker JC "Children and Young Persons in Indigenous Law" in Robinson 
JA (ed) The Law of Children and Young Persons in South Africa 
(Butterworths Durban 1997) 
Bekker 2003 Anthropology Southern Africa 
Bekker JC "The official status of customary law - ten years later" 2003 
Anthropology Southern Africa 124 
Bekker 2008 Obiter 
Bekker JC "Commentary on the impact of the Children's Act on the 
selected aspects of the custody and care of African children in South 
Africa" 2008 Obiter 395 
Bekker 2008 THRHR 
Bekker JC "Requirement for the validity of customary marriage: Mabuza v 
Mbatha" 2008 THRHR 146 
Bekker 2009 Obiter 
Bekker JC "The existence and proof of customary marriages for purposes 
of Road Accident Fund claims" 2009 Obiter 170 
Bekker "Customary Law of Contract" 
Bekker JC "Customary Law of Contract" in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and 
Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3rd ed 
(Butterworths Durban 2010) 
Bekker and Koyana 2012 De Jure 
Bekker JC and Koyana DS "The judicial and legislative reform of the 
customary law of succession" 2012 De Jure 568 
Bekker and Maithufi 1992 TRW 
Bekker JC and Maithufi IP "The dichotomy between 'official customary 
law' and 'non-official customary law'" 1992 TRW 17 
  
 211 
Bekker and Rautenbach "Application of African Customary Law" 
Bekker JC and Rautenbach C "Nature and Sphere of Application of 
African Customary Law in South Africa" in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and 
Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3rd ed 
(Butterworths Durban 2010) 
Bekker and Van Niekerk 2009 SAPR/PL 
Bekker JC and Van Niekerk G "Gumede v President of the Republic of 
South Africa: Harmonisation, or the creation of new marriage laws in 
South Africa?" 2009 SAPR/PL 206 
Bekker, Labuschagne and Vorster Legal Pluralism 
Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism in South Africa: Customary Law (Part 1) (Butterworths Durban 
2002) 
Bell 1997 Current Anthropology 
Bell D "Defining marriage and legitimacy" 1997 Current Anthropology 237 
Bennett Application of Customary Law 
Bennett TW The Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa: The 
Conflict of Personal Laws (Juta Cape Town 1985) 
Bennett Sourcebook 
Bennett TW A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa 
(Juta Cape Town 1991) 
Bennett Human Rights 
Bennett TW Human Rights and African Customary Law (Juta Cape Town 
1999) 
Bennett "Conflict of Laws" 
Bennett TW "The Conflict of Laws" in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and 
Vorster LP Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Customary 
Law (Part 1) (Butterworths Durban 2002) 
Bennett Customary Law 
Bennett TW Customary Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2004) 
  
 212 
Bennett 2011 PER/PELJ 
Bennett TW "Ubuntu - An African equity" 2011(14)4 PER/PELJ 30, 
accessible at http://www.nwu.ac.za/webfm_send/4736 
Brandel 1958 African Studies 
Brandel M "Urban Attitudes: A Prelimanary Report" 1958 African Studies 
34 
Brookes Native Policy 
Brookes EH History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the 
Present (Van Schaik Pretoria 1927) 
Burns Administrative Law 
Burns Y Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution (Butterworths 
Durban 1998) 
C 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law 
Chaskalson M et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (Juta Cape Town 
1996-) 
Chigwedere Lobola 
Chigwedere AS Lobola - The Pros and Cons (Books for Africa Harare 
1982) 
Chinyenze 1984 ZLR 
Chinyenze M "A critique of Chigwedere's book 'lobola': Pros and cons in 
relation to the emancipation of women in Zimbabwe'" 1984 ZLR 229 
Choongh "Doing Ethnographic Research" 
Choongh S "Doing Ethnographic Research: Lessons from a Case Study" 
in McConville M and Chui WH Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh 
University Press Edinburgh 2007) 
Chui "Quantitative Legal Research" 
Chui "Quantitative Legal Research" in McConville M and Chui WH 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh 2007) 
  
 213 
Church 1979 CILSA 
Church J "Guardianship as an incident of the customary law of parent 
and child - with reference to Transkei" 1979 CILSA 326 
Cobert, Hofmeyer and Kahn Law of Succession 
Cobert MM, Hofmeyer GYS and Kahn E The Law of Succession in South 
Africa (Juta Cape Town 2001) 
Comaroff Meaning of Marriage Payments 
Comaroff JL (ed) The Meaning of Marriage Payments (Academic Press 
London 1980) 
Costa 1994 De Rebus 
Costa A "Polygamy, Other Personal Relationships and the Constitution" 
1994 De Rebus 914 
Costa 1998 SAJHR 
Costa A "The Myth of Customary Law" 1998 SAJHR 525 
Currie "Minority Rights" 
Currie I "Minority Rights: Education, Culture, and Language" in 
Chaskalson M et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (Juta Cape Town 
2000-) 
Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (Juta Cape Town 
1999) 
Currie and De Waal Constitutional Law 
Currie I and De Waal J The New Constitutional and Administrative Law - 
Volume 1: Constitutional Law (Juta Cape Town 2001) 
D 
Darboe Integration of Western and African Traditional Systems 
Darboe MN The Integration of Western and African Traditional Systems 
of Justice: The Problem of Integration (A Case Study of the Gambia) 
(PhD dissertation University of Pennsylvania 1982) 
  
 214 
Davel Child Law 
Davel CJ (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 
2000) 
Davel "Status of Children" 
Davel CJ "The Status of Children in South African Private Law" in Davel 
CJ (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2000) 
Davel and Jordaan Law of Persons 
Davel CJ and Jordaan RA Law of Persons: Students' Textbook (Juta 
Cape Town 1995) 
De Koker 1996 TRW 
De Koker JY "Die bestaanbaarheid van in die nuwe Suid-Afrikaans 
regsbedeling" 1996 TRW 75-102 
De Koker 2001 TSAR 
De Koker JY "Proving the existence of an African customary marriage" 
2001 TSAR 257 
De la Harpe et al Zulu 
De la Harpe P et al Zulu (Struik Johannesburg 1998) 
Devenish Commentary 
Devenish GE Commentary on the South African Constitution 
(Butterworths Durban 1998) 
De Villiers Birth of a Constitution 
De Villiers B Birth of a Constitution (Juta Cape Town 1994) 
Dlamini I 
Dlamini CRM A Juridical Analysis and Critical Evaluation of lobolo in a 
Changing Zulu Society (LLD thesis University of Zululand 1983) 
Dlamini 1984 De Jure 
Dlamini CRM "The modern legal significance of i in Zulu society" 1984 De 
Jure 148 
  
 215 
Dlamini 1985 SALJ 
Dlamini CRM "The Christian v customary marriage syndrome" 1985 SALJ 
701 
Dlamini "Indigenous Law" 
Dlamini CRM "Indigenous Law and the Bill of Rights" in the Bill of Rights 
Compendium (Butterworths Durban 1996) 
Dlamini "Family Law" 
Dlamini CRM "Family Law" in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and Vorster 
LP Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Customary Law (Part 
1) (Butterworths Durban 2002) 
Duncan Sotho Laws 
Duncan P Sotho Laws and Customs (Oxford University Press Cape Town 
1960) 
Du Plessis Introduction to Law 
Du Plessis L An Introduction to Law (Juta Cape Town 1999) 
Durand Swartman 
Durand JFF Swartman, Stad en Toekoms (Tafelberg Cape Town 1970) 
E 
Eekelaar and Katz Marriage and Cohabitation 
Eekelaar JM and Katz NS Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary 
Societies (Butterworths Toronto 1980) 
Elias Nature of African Customary Law 
Elias TO Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester University Press 
Manchester 1956) 
Ellenberger and McGregor History of the Basutho 
Ellenberger DF and McGregor JC History of the Basutho: Ancient and 
Modern (Caxton London 1912) 
  
 216 
Engels Family Private Property 
Engels F The Origin of the Family Private Property and the State (Foreign 
Language Press Pecking 1978) 
G 
Glendon State, Law and Family 
Glendon MA State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the 
United States and Western Europe (North Holland New York 1977) 
Gluckman African Customary Law 
Gluckman M Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1969) 
Gordon and Shapiro Forensic Medicine 
Gordon I and Shapiro HA Forensic Medicine: A Guide to Principles 3rd ed 
(Churchill Livingstone Edinburgh 1988) 
Gough 1959 JRAS 
Gough K "The Nayars and definition of marriage" 1959 JRAS 49 
Grenfell Legal pluralism and the Rule of law. 
Grenfell LThe Relationship between Legal Pluralism and the Rule of law 
in South Africa and Timor-Leste (DPhil thesis Australian National 
University 2009). 
Griffiths 1986 J Leg Plur 
Griffiths J "What is legal pluralism?" 1986 J Leg Plur 1 
H 
Hahlo Law of Husband and Wife 
Hahlo HR The South African Law of Husband and Wife (Juta Cape Town 
1975) 
Hammond-Took Baca Society 
Hammond-Took WD Baca Society: A People of the Transkeian Uplands, 
South Africa (Oxford University Press Cape Town 1962) 
  
 217 
Hammond-Tooke Bantu-speaking Peoples 
Hammond-Tooke WD The Bantu-speaking Peoples of Southern Africa 
(Routledge London 1974) 
Hamnett Chieftainship and Legitimacy 
Hamnett I Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study of 
Executive in Lesotho (Routledge London 1975) 
Hartman Tsonga Law 
Hartman JB Aspects of Tsonga Law (Hartman Pretoria 1991) 
Heaton Casebook 
Heaton J Casebook on South African Family Law / Vonnisbundel oor die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Familiereg (LexisNexis Butterworths Durban 2010) 
Heaton South African Family Law 
Heaton J South African Family Law (Durban Butterwoths 2010) 
Himonga 2005 Acta Juridica 
Himonga C "The advancement of African women's rights in the first 
decade in South Africa: Reform of the customary law of marriage and 
succession" 2005 Acta Juridica 82 
Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 
Himonga C and Bosch C "The application of African customary law under 
the Constitution of South Africa: problems solved or just the beginning" 
2000 SALJ 318 
Hirschon Women and Property 
Hirschon R Women and Property / Women as Property (Croom Helm 
London 1984) 
Holleman Shona Customary Law 
Holleman JF Shona Customary Law (Oxford University Press Cape Town 
1952) 
Holmes The Common Law  
Holmes OW The Common Law (Little Brown Boston 1948) 
 218 
Hooker Legal Pluralism 
Hooker MB Legal Pluralism (Clarendon Press Oxford 1975) 
Hosten et al South African Law 
Hosten WJ et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 
(Butterworths Durban 1995) 
Hunter and Wilson Reaction to Conquest 
Hunter and Wilson M Reaction to Conquest (Oxford University Press 
London 1961) 
J 
Jansen "Customary Family Law" 
Jansen R-M "Customary Family Law" in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and 
Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (Butterworths 
Durban 2002) 
Jansen 2003 TRW 
Jansen R-M "Multiple marriages, burial rights and the role of ?? at the 
dissolution of marriage" 2003 TRW 120 
Jansen and Ellis 1999 TRW 
Jansen R-M and Ellis A "The South African common law and : another 
perspective" 1999 TRW 47 
Juma 2007 Speculum Juris 
Juma L "From 'repugnancy' to 'bill of rights': African customary law and 
human rights in Lesotho and South Africa" 2007 Speculum Juris 88 
K 
Kerr 1994 SALJ  
Kerr AJ "Customary law, fundamental rights and the Constitution" 1994 
SALJ 725 
Kerr 1997 SALJ 
Kerr AJ "The bill of rights in the new Constitution and customary law" 
1997 SALJ 346 
 219 
Kerr 1998 SALJ 
Kerr AJ "Inheritance in customary law under the interim Constitution and 
under the present Constitution" 1998 SALJ 262 
Kerr 1999 Obiter 
Kerr AJ "Role of courts in developing customary law" 1999 Obiter 41 
Kerr 2001 THRHR 
Kerr AJ "Issues arising from a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
customary law of intestate succession – Mthembu v Letsela" 2001 
THRHR 64 
Kerr Customary Family Law 
Kerr AJ Customary Family Law (Butterworths Durban 2005) 
Kleyn and Viljoen Beginner's Guide 
Kleyn D and Viljoen F Beginner's Guide for Law Students (Juta Cape 
Town 1998) 
Koyana Customary Law 
Koyana DS Customary Law in a Changing Society (Juta Cape Town 
1980) 
Koyana 2002 Obiter 
Koyana DS "The indomitable repugnancy clause" 2002 Obiter 98 
Krige Social System of Zulus 
Krige EJ The Social System of Zulus (Longmans Green London 1936) 
Kruger and Robinson "Legal Status of Children" 
Kruger JM and Robinson JA "The Legal Status of Children and Young 
Persons" in Robinson JA (ed) The Law of Children and Young Persons in 
South Africa (Butterworths Durban 1997) 
Kuper Wives for Cattle 
Kuper A Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa 
(Routledge London 1982) 
  
 220 
Kuper Anthropology and Anthropologists 
Kuper A Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School 
(Routledge London 1983) 
Kuper African Aristocracy  
Kuper H An African Aristocracy (Oxford University Press London 1947) 
L 
Lehnert 2005 SAJHR 
Lehnert W "The role of the courts in the conflict between African 
customary law and human rights" 2005 SAJHR 241 
Letsoalo Land Reform 
Letsoalo EM Land Reform in South Africa: A Black Perspective 
(Skotaville Johannesburg 1987) 
Lye and Murray Transformation on the Highveld 
Lye WF and Murray C Transformation on the Highveld: The Tswana and 
Southern Sotho (David Philip Cape Town 1980) 
M 
Maithufi 1998 THRHR 
Maithufi IP "The Constitutionality of the rule of primogeniture in customary 
law of intestate succession: Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 935 (T)" 
1998 THRHR 142 
Maithufi 2000 THRHR 
Maithufi IP "The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act: A 
commentary" 2000 63 THRHR 509 
Maithufi "Best Interests of the Child" 
Maithufi IP "The Best Interests of the Child and African Customary Law" 
in Davel CJ Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 
2000) 
  
 221 
Maithufi "Law of Property" 
Maithufi IP "The Law of Property" in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and 
Vorster LP Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Customary 
Law (Part 1) (Butterworths Durban 2002) 
Maithufi 2002 De Jure  
Maithufi IP "The Constitution and the application of customary family law 
in South Africa" 2002 De Jure 207 
Maitland "Origins of Legal Institutions" 
Maitland FW "Origins of Legal Institutions" in Honnold (ed) The Life of the 
Law: Readings on the Growth of Legal Institutions (Free Press of 
Glencoe New York 1964) 
Malinowski Crime and Custom 
Malinowski B Crime and Custom in Savage Society (Kegan Paul London 
1926) 
Mandela Freedom 
Mandela NM In His Own words - From Freedom to the  
Future (Little Brown London 2004) 
Marwick The Swazi 
Marwick BA The Swazi (Cass London 1996) 
Mashabela People on the Boil 
Mashabela H People on the Boil - Reflections on June 16 1976 and 
Beyond (Skotaville Johannesburg 2006) 
Matthews Bantu Law 
Matthews ZK Bantu Law and Western Civilisation in South Africa (MA 
thesis Yale University 1934) 
Mayer Black Villagers 
Mayer P Black Villagers in an Industrial Society (Oxford University Press 
Cape Town 1980)  
  
 222 
Mbatha 1999 Bulletin 
Mbatha L "The role of court in the development of customary law" 1999 
vol 4 Gender Research Project Bulletin 7 
Mbatha 2002 SAJHR 
Mbatha L "Reforming the customary law of succession" 2002 SAJHR 260 
Mbiti African Religions 
Mbiti J African Religions and Philosophy (Heinemann London 1969) 
Meulders-Klein and Eekelaars Family 
Meulders-Klein MT and Eekelaars J Family, State and Individual 
Economic Security (Story-Scientia Brussels 1988) 
Mofokeng 2005 THRHR 
Mofokeng LL "The agreement as the 'silent' prerequisite for the validity of 
a customary marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act" 2005 THRHR 68(2) 277 
Mofokeng Legal Pluralism 
Mofokeng LL Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Aspects of African 
Customary, Muslim and Hindu Family Law (Van Schaik Pretoria 2009) 
Mokgoro 1998 PER/PELJ 
Mokgoro Y "Ubuntu and the law in South Africa" 1998(1)1 PER/PELJ 14, 
acceisible at http://www.nwu.ac.za/sites/default/files/images/1998x1x_ 
Mokgoro_art.pdf  
Moller and Welch Polygamy and Well-being 
Moller V and Welch GJ Polygamy and Well-being among Zulu Migrants 
(University of Natal Durban 1987) 
Molokomme "Women's Law in Botswana" 
Molokomme A "Women's Law in Botswana" in Women and Law in 
Southern Africa The Legal Situation of Women in Southern Africa - Vol 2 
(WLSA Harare 1996) 
Monnig Pedi 
Monnig HO The Pedi (Van Schaik Pretoria 1967) 
 223 
Moseneke 2007 Speculum Juris 
Moseneke D "Transformative adjudication in post-apartheid South - 
Taking stock after a decade" 2007 Speculum Juris 2 
Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law 
Motala Z and Ramaphosa C Constitutional Law: Analysis and Cases 
(Oxford University Press Cape Town 2002) 
Mqeke 2003a Speculum Juris 
Mqeke R "Reclaiming the heritage of freedom: A legal historical 
perspective" 2003 Speculum Juris 24 
Mqeke 2003b Speculum Juris 
Mqeke R "The role of justice and equity in the determination of African 
burial disputes particularly where the deceased was a polygamist: A 
comment on Thembisile and Another v Thembisile and Another [2002 (2) 
SA 209 (TPD)]" 2003 Speculum Juris 125 
Murray Families Divided 
Murray C Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho 
(Ravan Johannesburg 1981) 
Myburgh "Law and Justice" 
Myburgh AC "Law and Justice" in Hammond-Tooke WD The Bantu-
speaking Peoples of Southern Africa (Routledge London 1974) 
Myburgh Anthropology 
Myburgh AC (ed) Anthropology for Southern Africa (Van Schaik Pretoria 
1981) 
Myburgh Indigenous Law 
Myburgh AC Papers on Indigenous Law in Southern Africa (Van Schaik 
Pretoria 1985) 
Myburgh and Prinsloo Indigenous Public Law 
Myburgh AC and Prinsloo MW Indigenous Public Law in KwaNdebele 
(Van Schaik Pretoria 1985) 
  
 224 
N 
Nathan 1987 CILSA 
Nathan C "The Malome - Then and now" 1987 CILSA 421 
Ndima 2007 Speculum Juris 
Ndima DD "Judicial review and the transformation of South African 
jurisprudence" 2007 Speculum Juris 84 
Ngugi wa Thiong'o Sunday Times Review 
Ngugi wa Thiong'o 'Speaking my language - Sunday Times Literary 
Awards 2012' Sunday Times Review 24 June 2012 1 
Nhlapo 1991 Acta Juridica 
Nhlapo RT "The African family and women's rights: Friends or foes" 1991 
Acta Juridica 135 
Nhlapo Swazi Law and Custom 
Nhlapo RT Marriage and Divorce in Swazi Law and Custom (Websters 
Mbabane 1992) 
O 
Olivier et al Indigenous Law 
Olivier NJJ et al Indigenous law (Butterworths Durban 1995) 
Olivier et al "Indigenous Law" 
Olivier NJJ et al "Indigenous Law" in Joubert WA and Faris JA (eds) The 
Law of South Africa (Butterworths Durban 2004) vol 32 
Oomen 2000 THRHR 
Oomen N "Traditional woman-to-woman marriages and the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act" 2000 THRHR 274 
P 
Pauw Second Generation 
Pauw BA The Second Generation: A Study of the Family among 
Urbanized Bantu in East London (Oxford University Press Cape Town 
1973) 
 225 
Peart 1982 Acta Juridica 
Peart NS "Section 11(1) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927: The 
application of repugnancy clause" 1982 Acta Juridica 110 
Peart 1983 CILSA 
Peart NS "Civil or Christian marriage and customary unions: the legal 
position of the 'discarded' spouse and children" 1983 CILSA 39 
Phillips Survey of African Marriage 
Phillips A (ed) Survey of African Marriage and Family Life (Oxford 
University Press London 1953) 
Phillip and Morris Marriage Laws 
Phillip A and Morris HF Marriage Laws in Africa (Oxford University Press 
London 1971) 
Pienaar "Customary Law of Property" 
Pienaar JM "Customary Law of Property" in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC 
and Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3rd ed 
(Butterworths Durban 2010) 
Pieterse "Traditional African Jurisprudence" 
Pieterse M "Traditional African Jurisprudence" in Roederer C and 
Moellendorf D Jurisprudence (Juta Cape Town 2004) 
Poulter Basotho Society 
Poulter SM Family Law and Litigation in Basotho Society (Clarendon 
Press Oxford 1976) 
Prinsloo and Vorster "Parties" 
Prinsloo WP and Vorster LP "Parties" in Centre for Indigenous Law (ed) 
Indigenous Contract in Bophuthatswana (Van Schaik Pretoria 1990) 
Prinsloo, Van Niekerk and Vorster 1998 De Jure 
Prinsloo WP, Van Niekerk G and Vorster LP "Perceptions of the law 
regarding, and attitudes towards, Lobolo in Mamelodi and Attridgeville" 
1998 De Jure 72 
  
 226 
R 
Ramphele Migrant Labour Hostels 
Ramphele M A Bed Called Home - Life in the Migrant Labour Hostels of 
Cape Town (David Philip Cape Town 1993) 
Raum and De Jager Rural Community 
Raum OF and De Jager EJ Transition and Change in a Rural Community 
(Fort Hare University Press Alice 1972) 
Rautenbach Legal Position of South African Women 
Rautenbach C The Legal Position of South African Women under the 
Law of Succession (LLD thesis PUCHE 2001) 
Rautenbach 2003 Stell LR 
Rautenbach C "Some comments on the status of customary law in 
relation to the Bill of Rights" 2003 Stell LR 107 
Rautenbach 2008 Electronic J of Comp L 
Rautenbach C "South African common law and customary law of 
intestate succession: A question of harmonisation, integration or 
abolition" 2008 Electronic J of Comp L 1 
Rautenbach and Du Plessis "Customary Law of Succession" 
Rautenbach C and du Plessis W "Customary Law of Succession and 
Inheritance" in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and Goolam NMI Introduction 
to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3rd ed (Butterworths Durban 2010) 
Rautenbach and Malherbe Constitutional Law 
Rautenbach IM and Malherbe EFJ Constitutional Law 4th ed 
(Butterworths Durban 2004) 
Reuter Native Marriages 
Reuter A Native Marriages in South Africa According to Law and Custom 
(Aschendorff Munster 1963) 
Rukuni Being Afrikan 
Rukuni M Being Afrikan (Penguin Books Johannesburg 2010) 
  
 227 
S 
SALC Project 90 
South African Law Commission The Harmonisation of the Common Law 
and the Indigenous Law Report on Customary Marriages (Project 90) 
(SALC Pretoria 1998) 
SALC Discussion Paper 93 
South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 93 on Customary Law 
(Project 90) (SALC Pretoria 2000) 
Salmond Jurisprudence 
Salmond JW Jurisprudence 12th ed (Sweet and Maxwell London 1966) 
Sanders 1987 CILSA 
Sanders AJGM "How customary is African customary law?" 1987 CILSA 
405 
Schapera Tswana Law 
Schapera I Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom (Oxford University 
press London 1938) 
Schapera Nativeland Tenure 
Schapera I Nativeland Tenure in the Bechunaland Protectorate (Alice 
Lovedale Press 1943) 
Setumu Our Heritage 
Setumu T Our Heritage: Wars of Resistance in Limpopo – Volume 2: 
Kgosi Malebogo of the Bahananwa (JP Publishers Polokwane 2005) 
Sheddick Land Tenure 
Sheddick V Land Tenure in Basotholand (HMSO London 1954) 
Simons African Women 
Simons HJ African Women: Their Legal Status in South Africa (Hurst 
London 1968)  
  
 228 
Sinclair and Heaton Law of Marriage 
Sinclair JD and Heaton J The Law of Marriage - Vol 1 (Juta Cape Town 
1996) 
Singh 1999 De Jure 
Singh D "Woman know your rights! Recognition of African Marriages Act: 
Traditional practices and the right to equal treatment" 1999 De Jure 314 
Soga Ama-Xhosa 
Soga JH Ama-Xhosa: Life and Customs (Lovedale Mission Press 
Lovedale 1932) 
Spiro Law of Parent and Child 
Spiro E The Law of Parent and Child in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 
1985) 
T 
Terray Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies 
Terray E Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies (translated from the original 
French by M Klopper) (Modern Readers New York 1969)  
Twining Place of Customary Law 
Twining WL Place of Customary Law in the National Legal Systems of 
East Africa (Chicago University Law School Chicago 1964) 
U 
Ubink In the Land of the Chiefs 
Ubink JM In the Land of the Chiefs: Customary Law, Land Conflicts and 
the Role of the State in Peri-urban Ghana (Leiden University Press 
Leiden 2008) 
V 
Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 
Van der Vyver JD and Joubert DJ Persone- en Familiereg (Juta Cape 
Town 1991)  
  
 229 
Van Heerden et al Boberg's Law of Persons 
Van Heerden B et al Boberg's Law of Persons and the Family (Juta Cape 
Town 1999) 
Van Niekerk 2001 CILSA 
Van Niekerk G "State initiatives to incorporate non-state laws into the 
official legal order: a denial of legal pluralism" 2001 CILSA 349 
Van Niekerk 2005 Obiter 
Van Niekerk G "Succession, living indigenous law and ubuntu in the 
Constitutional Court" 2005 Obiter 474 
Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 
Van Niekerk GJ "A common law for Southern Africa? Roman law or 
indigenous African law?" 1998 CILSA 159 
Van Niekerk "Legal Pluralism" (2002) 
Van Niekerk GJ "Legal Pluralism" in Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and 
Vorster LP Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Customary 
Law (Part 1) (Butterworths Durban 2002) 
Van Niekerk "Legal Pluralism" (2010) 
Van Niekerk GJ "Legal Pluralism" in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC and 
Goolam NMI Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3rd ed 
(Butterworths Durban 2010) 
Van Schalkwyk 2003 De Jure 
Van Schalkwyk A "Law reform and the recognition of human rights within 
the South African family law with specific reference to the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and Islamic marriages" 2003 De 
Jure 289 
Van Schalkwyk "Maintenance for Children" 
Van Schalkwyk LN "Maintenance for Children" in Davel CJ (ed) 
Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2000) 
Van Tromp Xhosa Law of Persons 
Van Tromp J Xhosa Law of Persons: A Treatise on the Legal Principles of 
Family Relations among Ama Xhosa (Juta Cape Town 1947) 
 230 
Van Zyl Roman Private Law 
Van Zyl DH History and Principles of Roman Private Law (Butterworths 
Durban 1983) 
Visser and Potgieter Family Law 
Visser PJ and Potgieter JM Introduction to Family Law (Juta Cape Town 
1998) 
Vorster "Institution of Traditional Leadership" 
Vorster LP "The Institution of Traditional Leadership" in Bekker JC, 
Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to Legal Pluralism in 
South Africa: Customary Law (Part 1) (Butterworths Durban 2002) 
Vorster, Dlamini-Ndwandwe and Molapo 2001 S Afr J Ethnol 
Vorster LP, Dlamini-Ndwandwe N and Molapo MJ "Consequences of the 
dissolution of customary marriages" 2001 S Afr J Ethnol 62 
Vorster, Prinsloo and Van Niekerk Urbanites' Perceptions of  
Vorster LP, Prinsloo MW and Van Niekerk G Urbanites' Perceptions of 
Mamelodi and Atteridgeville (UNISA Pretoria 2000) 
W 
Welch and Sachs 1987 Int'l J Soc L 
Welch D and Sachs A "Bride price, revolution and liberation of women" 
1987 Int'l J Soc L 369 
Whelpton Inheemse Kontraktereg 
Whelpton F Die Inheemse Kontraktereg van die Bakwena Ba Mogopa 
van Hebron in die Odi 1 Distrikt van Bophuthatswana (LLD thesis UNISA 
1991) 
Whelpton Swazi Law of Contract 
Whelpton F The Indigenous Swazi Law of Contract (Unpublished Report 
2001) 
Whelpton 2005 Stell LR 
Whelpton F "Land tenure dealing with Swazi nation land in the Kingdom 
of Swaziland" 2005 Stell LR 146 
 231 
Whelpton 2005 TSAR 
Whelpton F "The indigenous Swazi law of succession - A restatement" 
2005 TSAR 828 
Whelpton and Vorster 2001 SA Journal for Ethnology 
Whelpton FP and Vorster LP "Dissolution of customary marriages" 2001 
SA Journal for Ethnology 56 
Whiteford and Friedl Human Portrait 
Whiteford M and Friedl J The Human Portrait: Introduction to Cultural 
Anthropology (Prentice Hall Englewood Cliffs 1992) 
Whitfield Native Law 
Whitfield GMB South African Native Law 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 1948) 
Wilson and Mills Land Tenure 
Wilson M and Mills MEE Keiskammahoek Rural Survey - Vol 4: Land 
Tenure (Shuter and Shooter Pietermaritzburg 1952) 
Women and Men in Southern Africa Uncovering Reality 
Women and Men in Southern Africa Uncovering Reality: Excavating 
Women's Rights in African Family Law (Working Paper 7) (WLSA Harare 
undated) 
Woolman et al Constitutional Law 
Woolman S et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape 
Town 2003)  
Y 
Yacoob "Some Perspectives" 
Yacoob Z "Some Perspectives on the Movement Towards and the 
Struggle for Equality in Our Context" in Jagwanth S and Kalula E Equality 
Law - Reflections from South Africa and Elsewhere (Juta Cape Town 
2001) 
Register of international instruments 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) 
 232 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 
Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1993) 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950) 
European Convention on the Legal Status of the Children Born out of Wedlock 
(1978) 
European Social Charter (1961) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
Register of legislation 
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 
Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972 
Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 
Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
Domicile Act 3 of 1992 
 233 
General Laws Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 
Legal Age of Majority Act 15 of 1982 
Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act 6 of 2005 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 
Maintenance Act 23 of 1963 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 
Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 
Natal Code of Zulu Law 151 of 1987 
Natal Code of Zulu Law, 1967 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 
11 of 2009 
Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act 34 of 1986 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 
Transvaal Law 4 of 1885 
 234 
Register of government publications 
Estate Regulations, 1987 (Gen N R200 in GG 10601 of 6 February 1987) 
Gen N R166 in GG 16049 of 31 October 1994 
Natal Code of Zulu Law, 1987 (Proc 151 in GG 10966 of 9 October 1987) 
Proc 107 in GG 15813 of 17 June 1994 
Register of case law 
A 
Albut v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) 
Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) 
Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
Equality Intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 (SA) 
B 
Baadjies v Marubela 2002 2 All SA 623 (W) 
Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2005 JOL 13583 (CC) 
Bangindawo v Head of Nyanda Regional Authority 1998 3 SA 262 (Tk) 
Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 
2003 2 SA 363 (CC) 
Basetti v Louw 1980 2 SA 225 (W) 
Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2004 2 SA 544 (C) 
Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) 
Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890 
Buthelezi v Minister of Bantu Administration 1961 4 SA 635 (AD) 
Buthelezi v Ndhlela 1938 NAC (N&T) 175 
C 
Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowper 204 
 235 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 10 BCLR 995 (CC) 
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 6 SA 50 (T) 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 
744 (CC); 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) 
Clark v Jeter 486 US 456 
Cliksman v Talekinsky 1955 4 SA 468 (W) 
D 
Daniels v Campbell 2004 4 BCLR 735 (CC) 
Davids v The Master 1983 1 SA 458 (C) 
Desai v Engar and Engar 1965 4 SA 81 (W) 
Docrat v Bhayat 1932 TPD 125 
Drummond v Drummond 1979 1 SA 161 (A) 
Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 
Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2002 10 BCLR 1006 
(CC) 
E 
Ex parte Inkley and Inkley 1995 3 SA 528 (CC) 
Ex parte Jacobs 1936 OPD 31 
Ex parte L 1947 3 SA 50 (C) 
Ex parte Minster of Native Affairs: In re Yako v Beyi 1948 1 SA 388 (A) 
Ex parte Pienaar 1964 1 SA 600 (T) 
F 
Fanti v Boto 2008 5 SA 405 (C) 
Fosi v Road Accident Fund 2008 3 SA 560 (CPD) 
Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North 1997 2 SA 261 (CC) 
 236 
Fraser v Naude 1998 11 BCLR 1344 (CC) 
Fuzile v Ntloko 1944 NAC (C&O) 2 
G 
Gujuluwa v Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S) 
Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 243 (CC) 
H 
Hassam v Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC) 
Henderson v Hanekom 1903 20 (SC) 513 
Heystek v Heystek 2002 2 All SA 401 (T) 
Hlangabeza v Bacela 1982 AC 168 (S) 
Hlengwa v Maphumulo 1972 BAC 58 (NE) 
Hlope v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (T) 
Hoosein v Dangor 2010 4 BCLR 362 (WCC) 
Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1886) LR 1 P & D 130 
I 
In re Bethel, Bethel v Hildyard (1888) Chd 220 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 10 
BCLR 1079 (CC) 
Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A) 
J 
Johnston v Ireland 9 EHRR 203 
K 
Kaba v Ntela 1910 TS 964 
Kalla v The Master 1995 1 SA 261 (T) 
Katekwe v Muchabaiwa 1982 2 ZLR 112 (S) 
 237 
Kewena v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (T) 
Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T) 
Khumalo v Dladla 1981 AC 95 (NE) 
Khumalo v Khumalo 1984 2 SA 229 (D) 
Khumalo v Ntshalintshali 1971 BAC (C) 59 
Kumalo v Jonas 1982 AHK 111 (S) 
Kwitshane v Magalela 1994 4 SA 610 (TK) 
L 
Leboho v Premier of Limpopo 2011 ZAGPPHC 22 
M 
M v S (Center for Child Law Amicus Curiae) 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) 
Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) 
Mabulu v Thys 1993 4 SA 701 (SECLD) 
Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C) 
Madyibi v Nguva 1944 NAC (C) 
Mahala v Nkombombini 2006 5 SA 524 (SE) 
Mahomed v Mahomed 2009 JOL 23733 (ECP) 
Makholiso v Makholiso 1997 4 SA 509 (TKSC) 
Malaza v Mndaweni 1974 BAC (C) 45 
Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) 
Mankahla v Matiwane 1989 2 SA 920 (C) 
Marckx v Belgium 2 EHRR 330 
Masela Mpolo v Cawe Nozihamba 1964 BAC 75 S 
Masenya v Seleka Tribal Authority 1981 1 SA 522 (T) 
Matchika v Mnguni 1946 NAC (N&T) 78 
 238 
Mateza v Mateza 2005 JOL 14332 (Tk) 
Mbanjwa v Mona 1977 4 SA 403 (TK) 
Mbonjiwa v Scellam 1957 NAC (S) 41 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2006 10 BCLR 1237 (N) 
Meesadoosa v Links 1915 TPD 357 
Metiso v Padongeluk Fonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T) 
Mgoza v Mgoza 1967 2 SA 436 (A) 
Mhlekwa and Feni v Head of the Western Tembuland Regional Authority & 
Anorther 2001 1 SA 574 (Tk) 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (1) 2002 12 BCLR 1033 (CC) 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher 1979 3 All ER 21 (PC) 
Mlakalaka v Bese 1936 NAC (C & O) 32 
MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) 
Mngomezulu v Lukele 1953 NAC 143 (NE) 
Mnyama v Gxalaba 1990 1 SA 650 (C) 
Mnyandu v Mnyandu 1974 BAC (C) 459 
Mokoena v Laub 1943 WLD 63 
Moola v Aulsebrook 1983 1 687 (N) 
Moseneke v The Master 2001 2 SA 18 (CC) 
Mosisi v Motseoakhumo 1954 3 SA 919 (A) 
Motan v Joosub 1930 AD 61 
Mpanza v Qonono 1978 AC (C) 136 
Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 936 (T) 
Mthembu v Letsela 1998 2 SA 675 (T) 
Mthembu v Letsela 2000 3 SA 867 (SCA) 
 239 
N 
Nkambula v Linda 1951 1 SA 377 (A) 
Nqgobela v Sihele (1893) 10 SC 346 
O 
Oke Lanipekun v Amao Ojetunde 1944 AC 170 
Omidekun Owonyin v Omtosho (1961) AllNLR 304 309. 
Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 
P 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa; In re: Ex parte 
Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 
Pilane v Pilane 2013 4 BCLR 431 (CC) 
Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W) 
Presenti v Mashalaba 1941 NAC (C&O) 78 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) 
R 
R v Mboko 1910 TPD 445 
Ramayee v Vandiyar 1977 3 SA 77 (D) 
Ramoitheki v Liberty Group Ltd t/a Liberty Corporate Benefits 2006 JOL 18075 
(W) 
Raphuti v Mametsi 1946 NAC (T) 19 
Ratsialingwa v Sibasa 1948 3 SA 781 (A) 
Rolfes, Nebel and Co v Zweigenhaft 1903 TS 185 
Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 
S 
S v Acheson 1991 2 SA 805 (Nm) 
S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 
 240 
Samente v Minister of Police 1978 4 SA 632 (E) 
Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (AD) 
Schmidt v Schmidt 1996 2 SA 211 (W) 
Seedat's Executors v the Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 
Sekupa v Jonkman 1966 BAC (C) 20 
Seodin Primary School v MEC of Education, Northern Cape 2006 1 All SA 154 
(NC) 
Shibi v Sithole Case No 7292/01 (TPD) November 2003 (unreported) 
Shilubana v N'wamitwa 2007 2 SA 432 (SCA) 
Shilubana v N'wamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC) 
Sibasa v Ratsialingwa 1947 4 SA 369 (T) 
Sigcau v Sigcau 1944 AD 67 
Sila v Masuku 1937 NAC (N&T) 121 
Soller v G 2003 5 SA 430 (W) 
Solomons v Abrams 1991 4 SA 437 (W) 
South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 
(CC) 
T 
Thembisile v Thembisile 2002 2 SA 209 (TPD) 
Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (T) 
Tshabalala v Estate Tunzi 1950 NAC 46 (C) 
Tsheola v Maqutu 1976 2 SA 418 (THC) 
Tshiliza v Ntshongweni 1908 NHC 10 
V 
Van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 330 
  
 241 
W 
W v F 1998 9 BCLR 1199 (N) 
Wormald v Khambule 2006 3 SA 562 (SCA) 
Z 
Zimanade v Sibeko 1948 NAC 21 (C) 
Zondi v President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 49 (N) 
Zulu v Mdhlentshe 1952 NAC 203 (NE) 
Zulu v Minister of Justice 1952 2 SA 128 (N) 
Register of interviews 
The following were some of the most senior community leaders and experts 
interviewed: 
 Mr NP Leboho, Chief Counsellor, Bahananwa Traditional Authority:  10 
January 2008 
 Kgosi TJ Leboho, senior traditional leader of Bahananwa for the period 
commencing from the death of Kgosi Ben Seraki Leboho to the 
installation of Kgosi Ngako Leboho:  4 February 2009 
 Mr Jimmy Mohlapi, special advisor to Kgosi TJ Leboho:  4 February 2009 
 Ms Mmankoto Leboho, wife of the late senior traditional leader, Kgosi 
Matome Wilson Leboho:  21 March 2008 
 Mr Makwena Ephraim Rammutla, traditional leader, Letswatla, part of the 
Hananwa community:  30 June 2008 
The people such as Mmamoloko Wilmont Mashamaite, Daniel Moremi and 
Molatelo T Pitsi often acted as research assistants. 
 
